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In this dissertation economic development is defined as meaning the 
social, political and institutional change necessary to generate and 
sustain economic growth. On the basis of this definition an assess­
ment of the relevance of contemporary orthodox economic theory to the 
analysis of economic development is made. It is suggested that where 
countries such as South Africa and the dependent states surrounding 
it have yet to determine such fundamental issues as the nature of 
their future contributions, economic systems and social structures, 
it is not sufficient to discuss the development problems within the 
analytical parameters allowed by the orthodox positivist framework.
The researcher therefore utilises a grounded theory approach to examine 
elements of South Africa's development problem by means of an investi­
gative study into the role of foreign direct investment in economic 
development. Initially the South African economic, ideological, 
social, cultural environment is described by means of an eclectic 
discursus of the literature which is used to suggest possible roles 
for the multinational corporation. The strategic response of foreign 
firms operating in South Africa is then studied by means of an analysis 
of extended interviews conducted with senior executives of inter­
national firms operating in South Africa who, the researcher felt, 
would have an overall understanding of the activities and ethos of 
their firm and who were not restricted by particular functional, divi­
sional or other structurally related perceptions.
In a separate appendix a set of detailed case studies briefly contrasts 
the shorter term operations of international service agencies and heavy 
engineering contractors from other European countries with this long
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term involvement of British manufacturing firms, concluding that their 
developmental contributions were negative. Reasons ranged from corrup­
tion to simple inefficiency.
On the basis of this approach, the conclusion is reached that foreign 
enterprise has a major role to play in the political development of 
South Africa as one element of its economic development and that this 
politicisation of its role emerges from its economic activities and is 
inherent in areas where there is rapid economic growth in conjunction 
with political change.
At the same time, however, where there is a lack of control over 
involvement which is, by the nature of the operation, essentially 
short term foreign enterprise may have an extremely detrimental effect 





1.1 THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Controversy over the role of foreign direct investment in South African 
political and economic development over the last two decades has led to 
the emergence of two schools of thought as to the desirability of such 
international corporate participation in its economy. Both arguments 
are essentially politically motivated the first suggesting that such 
investment is supportive of the present political system and therefore 
inimical to the full economic development of all population groups.
The second approach, by contrast, sees such investment as generating, 
through its contribution to economic growth, pressures for such social 
and political changes as are necessary to at least sustain current 
levels of economic activity. In each instance economic development is, 
in the tradition of such economists as Seers, Streeten and Myrdal, 
perceived as the economic, social, political and institutional change 
necessary to bring about the achievement of the full potential of the 
human personality within the market economy by all those who wish to 
participate in it. (Seers, D ., 1972(i); Streeten, P., 1972; Myrdal, 
G., 1970.)
Despite, however, the burgeoning literature on the political parameters 
of foreign direct investment in South Africa, there has been little 
structured debate on the interelationship between economic development 
and the strategic framework within which multinational corporations 
conduct their operations. While theoretical knowledge of the role of 
foreign direct investment as an element of the economic development of 
South Africa may be readily furthered by means of a discursive approach
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to the literature this, as will be demonstrated in ensuing chapters, 
is of little value.
a. Firstly, the relevance of contemporary orthodox economic 
theory to the problems of the rapidly developing countries 
may be questioned;
b. Where the inherent assumptions of such theories do take 
into account the specific problems of such countries they 
are of little relevance to South Africa because of its 
unique social, political, cultural and economic structure;
c. While a normative approach to development in South Africa 
is acceptable and is advocated in ensuing chapters, such
an approach should preclude subjective political judgements 
while nevertheless accepting the necessity for a full 
analysis of the political dimension of development which 
is also, as will be demonstrated, of direct relevance to 
the strategy formulation of multinational corporations 
operating in areas of high political risk;
d. Implicit in this criticism of the literature is what is 
referred to in Chapter Two as "illegitimate isolation". 
Foreign direct investment in South Africa may be analysed 
in terms of the contribution of individual firms - the 
ethos of each firm, the ethical perceptions of their 
managements, political constraints in the home economy, in 
addition to the standard determinants of strategy such as 
product type, technology, market structure, etc. However, 
this contribution must be seen as being determined within
- 2 -
the overall South African economic, cultural, historical 
and social milieu which cannot be legitimately broken down 
into constituent isolated variables for ease of analysis.
Nevertheless, an eclectic approach to a discursus of the relevant 
literature does serve to indicate the framework within which a useful 
empirical study of the role of the multinational corporation in South 
Africa may take place.
South Africa has developed a powerful economy based upon high levels 
of technological development, efficient mining and agricultural tech­
niques and a high degree of capital mobilisation. It is difficult, 
however, to assess the role that foreign direct investment has played 
in this process. Because of political pressure, both at home and abroad, 
the South African government through statute and internal departmental 
regulation has restricted all data which could serve to indicate the 
degree of South Africa's dependence on foreign capital. Thus, while it 
is possible, as in Chapter Three, to postulate on the extent of South 
Africa's dependence on such capital, it is difficult to determine this 
precisely.
Two solutions to this problem may be suggested. Firstly, it is possible 
to conduct a general qualitative study to assess the dependence of South 
Africa on foreign technology, the efficiency of labour utilisation by 
foreign firms, market expansion at home and abroad as a result of the 
activities of multinationals, the utilisation of the South African 
capital markets in relation to the productive asset value of firms 
operating in the Republic, etc. Each of these areas would, however, 
require a major research effort and a long term commitment by the 
researchers involved as well as the organisations with which they
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would need to cooperate. Should these difficulties be overcome those 
of the financing of the project and the question of whether or not the 
South African government itself would permit such a study to be under­
taken would still remain.
The second solution is to conduct a detailed investigative study based 
on research into a limited selection of firms with interests in South 
Africa. While it would not be possible to generalise from such a study, 
the findings from this type of investigation would certainly provide 
the basis for a deeper understanding of the contribution of foreign 
enterprise to South African development.
Such a study should not, however, be conducted at a superficial level. 
The overall contribution of each form selected must not only be assessed 
in terms of the conventional variables of analysis, listed in the 
ensuing chapters, but also in terms of, for example, managerial ethical 
and political perceptions, the implications of the adoption of codes of 
conduct, and so on.
Such a study has not been previously undertaken within the South African 
context using both development theory and corporate strategic analysis. 
Thus, a study of this nature would encompass a wide range of economic 
variables. However, these cannot be considered in isolation. It is 
necessary to examine the political contribution of the international 
firm which flows, in part, from its economic role.
The political aspect is inherent in the mere presence of the firm 
through the politicisation of foreign enterprise operating in South 
Africa. This has occurred not only through the change in strategic 
perceptions of such organisations but also through the ideological
4 -
crisis induced within the Republic itself through the emerging conflict 
between political philosophy and the necessity to sustain high levels 
of economic growth to absorb an increasing labour force and maintain 
current living standards in addition to the strategic requirements 
arising from threatened economic isolation, however ineffective in the 
past.
Thus, while firms operating in South Africa may not wish to become 
involved in the political process itself, a change in perception has 
occurred as regards their traditional role. This change has resulted 
in several foreign firms adopting the European concept that business 
enterprise has a positive role to play in society. However, this 
interrelationship between business and society in South Africa is made 
more complex by the lack of clear definition of what society in South 
Africa sees as the function of business enterprise. This is, in part, 
the result of a lack of a clear indigenous economic/political philosophy 
such as has been developed in the countries of Europe, albeit from 
certain common roots. This lack of an indigenous philosophy as to the 
relationship between the political and economic elements of society has 
affected many other countries in Africa.
The policy adopted by the state has been one of encouraging free enter­
prise. Nevertheless, this has been tempered by ready intervention 
where this has been seen as being necessary. Such intervention is 
often at an informal level where, for example, a senior member of the 
management of a foreign firm may be advised of the government's wishes 
through a reliable third party with ready access to senior figures in 
the civil service or Nationalist Party. In many instances such 
individuals are utilised by firms wishing to enter the South African
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market as non-executive directors or "wise owls" to guide the company 
in the subtleties of its new environment.
At a more formal level the state may exercise its control through the 
activities of such parastatal organisations as the Electricity Supply 
Commission and the Iron and Steel Corporation. It is, however, compara­
tively rare for legislative controls to be used directly to govern the 
activities of private enterprise. This should not be interpreted as 
meaning that there is little control of the private sector in comparison 
with European countries. The control, perhaps because of the smaller 
size of the economy, is more subtle.
Because of the nature of political change taking place in South Africa 
where political philosophy is not as closely tied to economic doctrine 
as in other countries with the Nationalist Party finding difficulty in 
adapting its philosophical base to accommodate economic development, 
foreign firms have found themselves in the position of being used as 
political instruments by the opponents of apartheid encouraging with­
drawal, Black trade unionists wishing to establish a legitimate and 
credible base for political comment, the South African government 
wishing to demonstrate the degree of international confidence in the 
economy and, by implication, the country as ruled by the Nationalist 
Party and other pressure groups wishing to achieve various diverse aims.
This politicisation of the economic and commercial activities of 
foreign enterprise investing in the South African economy has placed 
management abroad in the position of having to consider in some detail 
the political implications of what would, in normal circumstances be 
straightforward decisions of commercial strategy. The pressures placed 
on individual firms have varied greatly as have the strategic responses
- 6 -
of the firms affected.
Again, an investigative study into the strategic response by management 
to the politicisation of the activities of the organisation and the 
implications of this for the development of South Africa would be of 
considerable interest. However, a problem similar to that of developing 
a feasible study of South Africa's dependence on foreign direct invest­
ment emerges, namely, that of both the number and complexity of the
variables to be examined.
It is within this context that the researcher approached several British
manufacturing firms with long-term interests in South Africa with the 
idea of conducting research into the nature of the strategic response 
of particular organisations to what they perceived to be their economic 
and political role in the development of South Africa and the implica­
tions of this for the Republic. Following a brief period during which 
the researcher had to convince the organisations concerned of his inten­
tions and allay certain fears as to the use to which such research 
would be put, the idea was well received and the wholehearted support 
of those approached was secured.
1.2 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The objectives of the study may be listed as follows:
a. To conduct an investigative study into the interaction
between foreign direct investment in the Republic of South 
Africa and the economic and political determinants of 
economic development within the context of the strategies 
adopted by investing organisations.
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b. On the basis of such a study to attempt a normative 
assessment of the role of the multinational corporation 
in economic development.
c. To bring into consideration such aspects of the strate­
gic evaluation of the firm as the influence of management 
perceptions of the ethics of investment in South Africa, 
the assessment of political risk in areas of high economic 
growth, and the influence of regional, industrial and 
political dependence on South Africa which have not been 
given sufficient attention in the literature.
d. Given the nature of such regional dependence on South 
Africa to expatiate the implications of such development 
on Southern Africa as a whole.
To achieve these objectives the argument is structured within a frame­
work of seven chapters and an appendix contained in two volumes. It is 
useful to examine this structure in detail.
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT
The argument is broken down into two elements. The first, including 
Chapters Two to Five, forms a literature based discursus which develops 
a perspective of the African environment within the context of current 
approaches to the analysis of the South African socio-political and 
economic structure. The multinational corporation is then introduced 
into this and a method for the development of a three-dimensional 
strategic-developmental taxonomy allowing an assessment of the develop­
mental role of such firms is proposed.
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Chapter Two is essentially definitional and examines the meaning and 
objectives of economic development suggesting the areas in which 
contemporary orthodox economic theory demonstrates weaknesses in 
analysis of the problems in the economic development of the industriali 
sing nations.
Chapter Three argues that Southern Africa has yet to achieve its full 
economic potential and focuses the argument on the economic development 
of the Republic. The positive correlation between the economic and 
political elements of development are expatiated and South Africa’s 
political development related to the origins of the Afrikaner identity. 
The chapter concludes by expanding on South Africa’s relationship with 
her neighbours in order to suggest some of the wider implications of 
economic development as defined.
Chapter Four serves to introduce the multinational corporation in terms 
of its emergence since the Second World War and, more specifically, 
since the early 1960's. The emergence and politicisation of the multi­
national in South Africa is considered as fundamental to the approach 
developed given the methodology developed in the following chapters.
Chapter Five is partially methodological and suggests a strategic- 
developmental taxonomy founded upon a trichotomous classification of 
multinational strategic approaches to the socio-political and economic 
imperatives facing the firm.
The second part of the study. Chapters Six and Seven as well as the 
Appendix contained in Volume II, comprises the empirical element in 
which the strategic responses of foreign firms operating in the 
Republic are studied by means of the analysis of a series of extended
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interviews with senior executives of international firms operating in 
South Africa. The developmental role of these organisations is then 
assessed in terms of a strategic-developmental taxonomy. The study 
focuses on the developmental role of long-term foreign direct invest­
ment by British multinationals and this is contrasted briefly with the 
strategic approach adopted by a large South African multinational.
A series of case studies in which the researcher has drawn on a variety 
of sources are developed in the Appendix. These compare the contribution 
of the firms above with that of a number of other organisations whose 
commitments to particular projects are short-term and not necessarily 
manufacturing.
Chapter Six focuses on the perceptions of senior executives as to the 
nature of the South African environment as part of Africa and the 
moral dilemma facing management abroad as regards investment in the 
Republic. Such interviewee identified determinants of strategy as host 
country culture and business style are expatiated and a strategic pro­
file of each organisation developed.
Chapter Seven, the concluding chapter, utilises the preceding discussion 
to place firms within a three dimensional strategic-developmental 
taxonomy to assess this developmental role in terms of the objectives 
established in Chapter Two. It then examines the wider ramifications 
of this role in terms of the criteria established in preceding chapters.
The Appendix, contained in Volume II, briefly examines how other types 
of multinational corporation may influence the development process in 
a negative manner.
-  10 -
It is hoped that by adopting the approach outlined in this chapter 
this dissertation is concise yet of both industrial and academic 
interest.
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CHAPTER TWO
APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The ensuing paragraphs have a threefold definitional objective.
Firstly, as stated in the preceding chapter, they attempt an assessment 
of the relevance of contemporary orthodox economic theory to the 
economic realities of the developing countries. This is done by 
examining the characteristics of what Seers terms "the special case" 
in relation to the characteristics of the less developed countries 
thereby bringing into question the assumptions upon which orthodox 
economic theory is founded. (Seers, D ., 1963.) Secondly, a pragmatic 
system of international economic classification based on the Beckerman 
and Bacon approach is advocated. (Beckerman, W. and Bacon, R . , 1966.) 
As will be argued, the reason underlying such advocacy rests with the 
difficulty of using per capita national income in international com­
parisons of economic development and economic welfare. Finally, there 
is a statement of what the researcher believes the objectives of 
development to be as well as some of the inherent assumptions made 
based on a rejection of the positivist approach to the problem of 
economic development. As will be discussed in succeeding paragraphs, 
any approach to development must involve certain normative judgements. 
This applies particularly if the problem is to be seen as a part of a 
heterogenous whole including the historical, cultural, social and 
political determinants of the overall level of development. It is 
convenient to demonstrate the nature of these subjective judgements 
in a discussion on the polemics of development. The nature of these 
values will be discussed recurringly throughout this dissertation, as
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is in fact demonstrated when an operational definition of the term 
"development" is attempted.
2.2 THE DEFINITION OF DEVELOPMENT
The literature on development abounds with both euphemism and polite 
epithet. Szentes, for example, makes this point when he comments that 
"it is, of course, rather strange to use the phrase 'developing coun­
tries' when in fact this term refers precisely to the least developing 
part of the world". (Szentes, T., 1976: p . 13.)
Several writers point out that the phrase "developing countries" 
implies some form of economic development while "underdeveloped" or 
"undeveloped" both imply some inherent developmental potential unful­
filled. More recently the phrase "less developed countries" has come 
into vogue. This is perhaps a more realistic statement of the level of 
economic development. However, it has been reduced to "LDCs", a fact 
that some writers such as Kindleberger and Herrick deplore as being 
both "clinical and dispassionate" and a result of man's natural tendency 
to keep an "awkward or difficult situation at bay by the substitution of 
initials for a name". (Kindleberger, C.P. and Herrick, B ., 1977: p.4-5.) 
Such a reduction is, however, more acceptable than the post-war term 
"backward". It also has the advantage of being an objective statement 
of fact without subjecting any analysis to the initial assumption that 
a country is developing when, as Thirlwall has demonstrated, it may be 
faced by an ever widening development gap. (Thirlwall, A.P., 1970: 
pp.33-37.) Thus, rather than any euphemistic statement of wishful 
thinking, this dissertation uses the initials "LDC" in recognition of 
the reality of the failure in the second development decade to raise 
some forty per cent of the population of these countries above the
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poverty line. (Meier, G ., 1976: p.l.)
"The Third World" is often used as an alternative to the above.
However, while the LDCs might constitute the Third World, this term is 
more a statement of political and ideological non-alignment. Thus, 
this term will be avoided unless there is a necessity to stress the 
commitment to this ideal of a nation or group of nations.
Having briefly outlined the terminology to be used it is possible to 
attempt a definition of "development" and in so doing enter into an 
extremely controversial area. It is necessary to do so, however, for 
it is only when we dispel the uncertainty around the word "development" 
and decide more precisely what we mean by it that we will be able to 
devise meaningful targets or indicators and thus help improve policy, 
national or international.
The starting point for any such definition is the recognition that it 
is extremely difficult to avoid what the positivists somewhat dispara­
gingly refer to as "value judgements". Development is a normative 
concept. This point is emphasised by Colman andNixson when they 
describe development as follows: "Development can be considered either
as a process of improvement with respect to a set of values or, when 
comparing the relative levels of development of different countries, as 
a comparative state of being with respect to such values". (Colman, D. 
andNixson, F ., 1978: p.2.) The values in question relate to the 
desired conditions in society. There is no universal agreement about 
what these desired conditions should be as individuals have different 
preferences as regards their desired lifestyle, and their relationships 
with the rest of society. Secondly, through their political manifestoes 
nations express different collective views about the desired state of
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society - views which change through time. Inevitably, therefore, the 
rate or relative level of a country's development is a normative con­
cept and its definition and measurement depends on the analyst involved
The assertion that development is a normative concept that will be 
measured differently by different people is a serious charge, but it 
is one which affects all areas of the social sciences. Myrdal observes 
that "value premises are needed even in the theoretical stage of estab­
lishing facts and factual relationships. Answers can only be given 
when questions have been asked. A view is impossible except from a 
viewpoint". (Myrdal, G . , 1970: p.42.) Thus, it has to be recognised 
that value judgements are inescapable elements of the social sciences 
in general and development economics in particular. This is because a
central aspect of the subject of development economics is to formulate
criteria for development and also because many of the commonly chosen 
criteria are difficult to define and measure. There is, therefore, 
considerable scope for judgemental disagreement about:
- what development in fact is:
- what its goals are;
- what the relationships between its aims are.
(Colman, D. and Nixson, F ., 1978: p.3.)
There has recently been extensive debate in the literature on these 
points. However, this debate, while demonstrating the existence of 
disagreement about how development is caused and what weights should 
be assigned to specific goals, nevertheless demonstrates a broad 
measure of agreement about the main objectives of development. This
measure of agreement is not surprising if, as according to Seers,
I
" ..... the values we need are staring us in the face as soon as we
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ask ourselves: what are the necessary conditions for universally
accepted aim, the realisation of the potential of the human persona­
lity?". (Seers, D ., 1972.) Based on this value premise Seers iden­
tifies a number of objectives of development in the LDCs. These are:
a. family income should be adequate to provide a subsistence 
package of food and clothing;
b . jobs should be available to all family heads;
c. that access to education should be increased and literacy 
ratios should be raised;
d. that the populace be given an opportunity to participate 
in government;
e. that national independence should be achieved in the sense
that "the views of other governments do not largely deter­
mine one’s own government’s decisions".
As progress is made towards the economic goals. Seers argues, the educa­
tional and political aims become more important.
Seer’s list of development criteria is similar in basic respects to 
those suggested by others. Myrdal, for example, adopts as "instrumen­
tal value premises" certain modernisation ideals which are:
a. rationality;
b. development and development planning;
c. a rise in productivity;
d. a rise in levels of living;
e. social and economic equalisation;
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f. improved institutions and attitudes;
g. national consolidation;
h. national independence;
i. democracy at the grass roots;
j. social discipline. (Myrdal, G ., 1970.)
To Streeten "development means modernisation and modernisation means
the transformation of human beings. Development as an objective and 
development as a process both embrace a change in fundamental attitudes 
to life and work, and in social, cultural and political institutions". 
(Streeten, P., 1972: p.30.) More specifically Streeten views the pro­
cess of development in terms of progress in a number of interelated 
institutions, namely:
a. output and incomes;
b. conditions of production;
c. levels of living;
d. attitudes to work;
e. institutions;
f. policies. (Streeten, P., 1972: p.IS.)
This all supports the assertion that the criteria for development are 
largely self-evident, and it thus becomes increasingly clear that 
development is a multidimensional process or set of objectives in 
which the dimensions are economic, social, political and cultural in 
the widest sense of these terms.
Having defined the objectives of development it is possible to examine 
the relevance of orthodox economic theory to the development problem 
given the basic characteristics of the LDCs.
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2.3 THE RELEVANCE OF CONTEMPORARY ORTHODOX ECONOMIC THEORY
The underlying assumption of the following discussion is that theory is 
"in the first and last place a logical file of our factual knowledge 
pertaining to a certain phenomenological domain". (Georgescu-Roegen,
N., 1960, excerpted in Meier, G . , 1976: p.59.) Thus, "to each theory,
   there must correspond a specific domain of reality". (Georgescu-
Roegen, N .: Op.Git.) In any science the problem of precisely circum­
scribing this domain involves several difficulties. However, the 
ensuing paragraphs are concerned with the question of whether or not 
an economic theory which successfully describes one economic system can 
be used to analyse another such system equally successfully. (Georgescu- 
Roegen, N . : Op.Git.)
Human societies vary with both time and locality. One school of thought 
argues that these variations are different instances of a unique arch­
type and that consequently all social phenomena can be encompassed by 
a single theory. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to show 
where the weaknesses of the various attempts in this direction lie, 
suffice it to say that when the theories do not fail in other respects 
they are nothing but a collection of generalities of no operational 
value whatever. For an economic theory to be operational - to be 
capable of serving as a guide for policy - it must concern itself with 
a specific type of economy, not with several different types at the 
same time.
This is demonstrated by the increasing criticism of existing Western 
economic theory which, it is argued, tends to be intimately tied up 
with the special conditions, problems, and preconceptions of the 
industrially advanced nations to such an extent that large portions of
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it have to be abandoned before it is possible to develop an understand­
ing of the LDCs. This criticism may be classified into three main 
types: (Myint, H. , 1967: pp.119-121, 123-127.)
a. Firstly, the "realism" of attempting to apply the 
standard models of theoretical analysis meant for 
the advanced countries to the different economic and 
institutional settings of the LDCs is questioned;
b. Secondly, critics question the relevance of static 
neoclassical economics concerned with the problem of 
allocating given resources within an existing economic 
framework to the problem of promoting economic develop­
ment in the LDCs which are more concerned with increas­
ing the amount of available resources, improving 
techniques, and generally with the introduction of a 
dynamic self-sustaining process of economic change 
disrupting the existing framework;
c. Thirdly, it is argued that orthodox economic theory is 
inextricably bound up with preconceptions and biases in 
favour of orthodox economic policies of laisse fairre 
free trade and conservative monetary and fiscal policies 
which are believed to be inimical to rapid economic growth.
While these criticisms form extremely serious charges they do not, as 
such economists as Bauer and Myint point out, justify the total rejec­
tion of orthodox economic analysis. (Bauer, P.T., 1967: pp.111-116; 
Myint, H . , 1967: pp.119-127.) Rather, the basic tools of analysis
must be retained for they form the foundation upon which any model of
- 19 -
a developing economy must be based. Such fundamentals of analysis 
include matters such as the treatment of supply and demand as being 
functionally related to price, of cost as opportunity cost, the theory 
of relative prices, the implications of the theory of comparative 
advantage, and the functional relationships between the flow of money 
incomes, the volume of employment, and the balance of payments.
Thus, any sound theory pertaining to the nature of development must 
take fully into account the characteristics of the country concerned, 
be based upon a full understanding of the fundamental principles of 
analysis and must avoid any danger of generalisation such as the ten­
dency to either apply "Western" analysis to the LDCs or to, as is so 
often done, use India as the basic model to which all LDCs are assumed 
to conform.
The preceding paragraphs demonstrate the importance of a full under­
standing of the economic, political, social, cultural and historical 
dimensions of a society before there can be any effective statement of 
the development problem. It is these dimensions that form the basic 
assumptions of any macro-economic analysis of such economies. To make 
this more explicit it is useful to consider the characteristics of 
what Seers terms "The Special Case". (Seers, D ., 1963: pp.77-98.)
Table 2.1 lists some of the more important characteristics of the 
"special case" and thereby establishes the specific assumptions of any 
theory pertaining to them. In brief, what is assumed is an autonomous 
and flexible socio-economic structure in which each human being responds 
individually to the incentives offered and which is subject to no for­
midable exogenous strains. As has been pointed out, there are certain 
fundamental principles which have a general validity. However, the
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TABLE 2.1 CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE SPECIAL CASE
 Factors of Production
a. Labour. Literate and mobile, mostly in employment; highly organised; 
racial, religious and linguistic differences not sufficiently important 
to break up the labour supply; substantial quantities of skilled and 
professional workers.
b. Land. Most available land cultivated, and by private owners (or far­
mers with secure leaseholds) in plots of economic size.
c. Capital. All sectors heavily capitalised, with spare capacity; 
integrated and comprehensive systems of transport and power.
d. Enterprise. A wide field from which entrepreneurs can be drawn, and
a favourable climate for enterprise; firm legal basis for corporation.
II. Sectors of the Economy
a. Agriculture. Wholly commercial, and flexible in response to price 
changes or technical advances; foreign ownership rare; extensive 
marketing network for foods.
b . Mining. Of limited size and in the hands of local firms.
c. Manufacturing. Diversified, with a large metal-using industry produc­
ing (inter alia) machinery and vehicles; some areas of competition.
d. Overall. Manufacturing much larger than either agriculture or mining;
natural resources adequately surveyed.
III. Public Finance
a. Revenue. Strong reliance on direct taxes relative to import or export
duties; tax laws enforceable.
b. Expenditure. Includes big outlays on social security and agricultural 




a. Exports. Consist of several products for which there is a large 
internal market, and for which price and income elasticities are 
fairly high; export prices determined by local costs and stable; 
exports sold to many countries.
b. Imports. Consist largely of primary products (some of which are 
also produced domestically) which come from many countries, and for
which the income elasticity of demand is not high.
c. Capital. Long-term capital flows and profit remittances of secondary
importance.
V. Households
a. Income. Distribution moderately equal (post-tax); very few living 
at subsistence level.
b. Expenditure. Food not overwhelmingly important; standardisation and 
mass production possible, because of equal distribution of income; 
national promotion and homogeneity of tastes; prestige of local 
manufactures high.
V I . Savings and Investment
a. Savings. Mobilised by a capital market, comprising a stock exchange, 
a bond market and an extensive nationally owned bonding system, with 
a central bank and a managed currency; personal savings significant.
b. Investment. High (probably over 20 per cent of G.D.P.), but import 
content very low.
VII. Dynamic Influences




b. Population. Growth of population slow (less than 2 per cent a year), 
and urbanisation relatively moderate.
c. Asperations. Envy of foreign living standards not high, or spreading 
as a cause of discontent.
(Source: Seers, D., 1963.)
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macro-economic policy aspect is another matter. Streeten, for example, 
points out four systematic biases in any macro-economic model of an LDC 
based upon the assumptions of orthodox economics. (Streeten, P., 1972: 
pp.52-59.) These are:
a. adapted ceteris paribus or automatic mutatis mutandis;
b . one-factor analysis;
c. misplaced aggregation;
d. illegitimate isolation.
Seers, however, makes these more explicit when he shows that the major 
inadequacies of orthodox economics for those dealing with the "typical 
case" are that analysis focuses on the wrong factors and that models do 
not fit at all closely the way in which non-industrial economies 
operate. For example, one respect in which analytical emphasis is 
inappropriate is in that although time can often be ignored when deriving 
propositions for developed economies it cannot in economies which are not 
developed. Consequently purely static propositions are mostly irrelevant 
if not actually misleading. (Seers, D ., 1963: pp.77-98.)
A second error in emphasis is that insufficient attention is paid to the 
social structure, the existence of foreign firms, disparities between 
regions, etc. It is arguable how much such factors hamper progress in 
industrial countries, but, there can be little doubt that they are far 
more serious as obstacles to growth in the LDCs. Orthodox economics 
contains little discussion of the economic implications of policy tools 
such as land reform, nationalisation, raising the educational level of 
the adult labour force, etc. Institutions are taken as given whereas 
the question is precisely what institutions to change and how. (Seers,
D .: Op.Cit.)
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Thirdly, improvements in nutrition, housing and health services are 
treated, if at all, as increases in consumption rather than as influen­
ces on output. This is understandable in societies where economic pro­
gress is not conditional upon the raising of the quality of labour. 
(Seers, D . : Op.Cit.)
Another basic difference between the developed economy and that of many 
of the LDCs is that activity and employment in the non-industrial 
economy depends very much, in both the long- and short-term, on the 
export sector. Moreover, the nature of the response to changes in 
exports depends on the organisation of this sector, especially whether 
taxes, profits of foreign companies, or peasant incomes form the high­
est share in increments in income. It also depends on the type of 
product (particularly whether there is any significant domestic market). 
The role of the export sector is rarely stressed in conventional econo­
mics. The reason for this is that in an industrial economy hardly any 
sector sells the greater part of its output overseas. The Swiss and 
Japanese economies are possible exceptions to this. Thus, non-industrial 
economies such as Zambia (copper), Botswana (cattle, diamonds, copper) 
or industrialising economies such as South Africa (gold, diamonds, coal, 
etc.) cannot be understood unless studied within the context of the 
world economy. The sales of their particular primary products and, 
therefore, their development are determined by:
a. the rate of growth of the industrial economies that 
buy from them;
b . the income elasticities of demand for the commodities 
they export (which reflect, inter alia, the substitution 
of artificial materials for natural ones);
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c. protective measures which limit imports into industrial 
economies ;
d. influences on the distribution of the remaining markets 
between various suppliers.
While the industrial economies of the West do not absolutely require 
this approach, it is essential if the economies of primary exporters 
are to be understood. The development of these countries may become, 
however, partly independent of export performance. This implies import 
substitution which involves for these economies the founding of com­
pletely new manufacturing industries. This in turn requires investment 
in transport, energy, education, etc. and involves a shift in the com­
position of exports. But, the substitution process eventually reaches 
a limit which is set by natural resources and the size of the local 
market. However, this process tends to be ignored in conventional 
economics which thereby fails to recognise one of the essential charac­
teristics of development.
Finally, it is necessary to examine some of the peculiarities of the 
monetary and fiscal sectors which affect the operation of the economies 
of the LDCs. For example, because of the weight of direct taxes and 
the scale of unemployment benefits, the public sector automatically 
compensates, in some measure, for fluctuations in the private economy.
In the LDCs, on the other hand, a slump in trade can rarely be overcome 
by pushing the budget into deficit because the only means of covering 
it will probably be to run down reserves. Thus, the government may in 
time be compelled to raise taxes or reduce outlays thus aggravating 
the initial downward impulse. Secondly, while all industrial economies 
have virtually complete monetary autonomy, this is not universally true.
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Even the larger LDCs, which manage their own currencies, lack many of 
the means of influencing the supply of money such as open-market 
operations. In addition, foreign companies and banks, which draw 
finance from, or supply it to, these economies, may be quantitatively 
important and their operations may affect the money supply more than 
any step taken by the local central bank. Thirdly, because of their 
financial systems, industrial economies have boundaries corresponding 
to their political frontiers. However, when other economies are 
examined it is important to question whether the nation is the correct 
unit of analysis at all. If monetary and fiscal systems are very 
tenuous graphical, racial, or religious barriers may seal off parts of 
the nation into virtually self-contained sub-economies. For this reason, 
national averages may have little meaning, whether used for comparison 
with other countries or for measuring progress over time. However, this 
is discussed below.
The argument demonstrates that there are severe limitations to orthodox 
economic analysis when applied to economies other than those for which 
it was developed. However, as has been pointed out, this does not 
entail a complete rejection of any theory applied to an economy based 
upon different characteristics to those of the more industrialised 
western economies. Rather, it suggests the acceptance of the fundamen­
tal principles and the use of these in analysis based upon the recogni­
tion of the substantial differences between the national economies of 
the world. Once this principle is accepted it is possible to advance 
to a more successful attempt to develop a policy which gives due 
recognition to the reality of the nature of the development problem 
involved.
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2.4 MEASURES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
This section examines some of the major problems associated with the 
use of per capita gross national product as an ordinal measure of the 
level of economic development of the LDCs. In particular it aims to 
develop a basis for the classification of the LDCs by means of regres­
sion and correlation analysis and overcome some of the problems asso­
ciated with the various other existing methods of classification. To 
do this it is convenient to start with a discussion of the measurement 
and comparability of per capita gross national product or per capita 
income.
The difficulties of obtaining meaningful and accurate measures of real 
per capita income relate more to the measurement of real income than 
to population. It is for this reason that it is necessary to concen­
trate on the problems of national income accounting and the use of 
national income statistics.
Firstly, if no allowance is made for the non-monetary sector in the 
national income accounts any long-term growth estimates are bound to 
have an upward bias owing to the gradual extension of the money 
economy and the shift of economic activities from the household to the 
marketplace. Furthermore, if no allowance is made for the subsistence 
sector in some countries it may be misleading to compare periods in 
these countries' history and to compare growth rates between countries, 
especially between the developed countries and the LDCs.
Growth rates may also be biased upwards by using prices as weights in 
compiling national income totals from the output statistics of differ­
ent sectors of the economy (unless the weights are revised frequently)
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since goods with high prices which subsequently fall are usually the 
fastest growing. This is far more of a danger in the LDCs than the 
developed countries because of less sophisticated accounting techniques, 
the greater difficulty in revising price weights and the more widespread 
introduction of new goods with high initial prices.
A consideration of prices is also necessary in deciding what price 
index to use as a deflator of money national income in order to obtain 
an index of real income. The task of converting money income statistics 
raises several difficulties connected with the use of index numbers.
A major difficulty concerns the understatement of living standards in 
the LDCs when their national incomes measured in local currencies are 
converted into U.S. dollars at the ruling rate of exchange. This 
assumes a parity of purchasing powers. Exchange rates, however, are 
largely determined by the supply of and demand for currencies based on 
the goods which are traded, the prices of which tend to be equalised 
internationally. Purchasing-power parity depends not only on the price 
of traded goods, but also on the prices of non-traded goods which are 
largely determined by unit labour costs which tend to be lower the 
poorer the LDC involved. In general, therefore, the lower the level of 
development the lower the ratio of the price of non-traded to traded 
goods and the more the use of the exchange rate will understate the 
living standards of the country measured in U.S. dollars. The ratio 
of the price of non-traded goods to traded goods tends to rise with 
development as wage levels in the non-traded goods sector rise while 
productivity growth is relatively slow and slower than in the traded 
goods sectors. To make meaningful international comparisons of income 
and living standards a measure of purchasing-power parity is required.
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There are several methods of constructing purchasing-power parity 
ratios in order to make binary or multilateral comparisons in which 
the currency of any one group of countries can act as the unit of 
account without altering the ratios of living standards between 
countries.
One approach to the construction of a purchasing-parity ratio between 
two countries is to revalue the national incomes of the two countries 
by selecting a comparable basket of goods, and services in each coun­
try and estimating the purchasing power equivalent of each item in 
county A relative to country B. Thus, if is the price of item i 
in country A, and P^^ is the price of item i in country B, the pur­
chasing-power equivalent of item i in Country A relative to country B 
is P\^/P^^. By extending this calculation to all goods and applying 
the price ratios to the average quantities of each item consumed in 
the two countries a formula for the overall purchasing-power equivalent 
in country A relative to country B is obtained:
E Qi Pia 
i________
E Qi Pib
where Qi is the geometric mean of the quantities of each good consumed 
in the two countries.
The result can then be used to convert one country's national income 
measured in local currency into another country's currency.
This method is only one of several possible approaches to the construc­
tion of a binary purchasing-power parity ratio. For example, instead 
of the quantity weights applied to relative prices being a geometric
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average of the two countries' weights they could be the quantities con­
sumed in either one country or the other. If the quantity weights of 
the poor country are used, the dollar valuation of the L D C s  income 
would probably be even higher because relatively large weights would be 
given to those items which are widely consumed in those countries with 
low relative prices thereby improving the purchasing-power parity ratio, 
Alternatively, comparisons can be made from the output side by valuing 
output in both countries either at one country's prices or the other's.
The results of constructing and using purchasing-power parity ratios 
for making binary comparisons have been dramatic. Millikan (Millikan,
M. cited in Kindleberger, C ., 1965: p.9), for example, has suggested 
that the real incomes of many African and Asian countries in 1950 were 
in the order of 350 per cent larger than indicated by U.N. statistics 
in U.S. dollars per capita. Similarly, Usher has estimated that the 
ratio of British to Thai national income per capita is 13.06 when Thai 
income in local currency is converted into pounds. (Usher, D ., 1966: 
pp.10-11.) However, if Thai incomes are valued directly at Thai 
prices the ratio falls to 2.76. (Thirlwall, A.P., 1978: p.26.)
Apart from the construction of purchasing-power parity ratios there 
have been several other attempts to overcome the problems of using 
suspect national income statistics to compare living standards between 
countries and over time. One approach makes use of non-monetary 
indicators such as levels of health and education, number of cars per 
capita and steel production to rank countries according to an index 
of each indicator. The indices of all the indicators are then 
averaged. This approach, however, suffers from the major drawback 
that there is no satisfactory weighting system that can be used for 
combining different indices.
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An alternative approach is suggested by Beckerman and Bacon which they 
suggest is "theoretically valid, potentially very accurate and at the 
same time almost costless". (Beckerman, W. and Bacon, R ., 1966: p.521.) 
The approach is based upon correlation and regression analysis and the 
procedure adopted may be summarised as follows:
a. Firstly, they take reliable estimates of relative (to 
the U.S.) real consumption per capita for thirteen 
countries ;
b . They then take several non-monetary indicators and select 
those that correlate best with reliable observations of 
real consumption per capita, experimenting with different 
functional forms.
c. Finally, with the aid of a computer, they determine which 
combination of indicators and which forms of equations 
linking them to real consumption per capita give the best 
results in terms of the multiple correlation coefficients 
and standard errors of regression equations.
From the best results it is possible to make predictions of relative 
consumption per capita for countries, where data on income per capita 
are thought to be unreliable, from the non-monetary independent 
variables.
The variables used as predictors are:
a. Annual crude steel consumption per capita;
b. Annual cement production per capita;
c. Annual number of domestic letters sent per capita;
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d. Stock of radio receivers per capita;
e. Stock of telephones per capita;
f. Stock of road vehicles per capita;
g. Annual meat consumption per capita.
Predictions are made by Beckerman and Bacon for eighty countries and 
the countries ranked. (Beckerman, W. and Bacon, R . , 1966: p.533.)
It is generally conceded that this approach is the most appropriate to 
adopt for obtaining a measure of comparative levels of welfare between 
countries as measured by consumption per capita.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has advocated a normative approach encompassing the cultural, 
historical, social and political aspects of LDCs. It has, thus, been 
based on a rejection of the positivist approach to the problem of econ­
omic development and therefore implicitly recognises the need for value
judgements in the various approaches to the analysis of development and 
the determination of economic policy. The relevance of contemporary 
orthodox economic theory to the problems of development in particular 
countries has also been questioned.
Ensuing chapters therefore take an eclectic approach to defining the 
parameters of the South and Southern African development problem and 
the strategic approach of the multinational corporation to direct 
investment in this region. In doing this certain value judgements are 
made explicit. For example, it is argued that economic growth stimula­
ted by foreign direct investment results in an implicit choice between 
further growth or the continuation of a certain political ideology.
The context within which the problem is framed suggests that foreign 
direct investment is good as it leads to growth which, if it is to be
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maintained, implies the weakening of an ideology which is considered 
inimical to the development of all South Africans. Such pressure is 
brought about, for example, by multinational corporations being forced 
to accept and recognise unregistered trade unions which are at the 
forefront of political change. The point will be argued in the follow­
ing chapters, suffice it to say that clearly certain value judgements 
are unavoidable when considering the role of the multinational corpora­
tion in economic development as it has been defined in this chapter.
Chapter Three examines the origins of South African political and 
economic development in terms of the origins of Afrikaner nationalism 
and then goes on to examine economic and political relationships within 
the region in terms of the dependencia approach.
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOUTHERN AFRICA IN CONTEXT
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Southern Africa's latent development potential has been the subject of 
considerable research by both academics and industrialists. Dr. von 
Menges of Mannesman, for example, commissioned a private commercial 
study in January 1979 to examine the feasibility of a common energy 
and transportation system which would be financed by a capital inflow 
of $1 billion into the region, while Dr. Henry Olivier, an internation­
ally respected hydrologist, has suggested a scheme whereby a number of 
the region's transportation problems could be solved by using the 
Zambezi to move goods from Zambia and Zimbabwe through Mocambique to 
the coast. (Olivier, H . , 1977: pp.18-23.)
The late Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, in a discussion on the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference, provided a useful aperçu 
of Southern Africa's development problem. He stated that "although 
individually small and economically weak, collectively our nine states, 
together with the yet to be freed Namibia, are not insignificant. We 
speak for 60 million people living in an area of 5 million square 
kilometres, with an aggregate GDP of U.S. $20 billion even in our 
present underdeveloped condition. We have within our borders the raw 
materials for industrialisation - energy and base metals. We have 
energy in the form of oil, coal, uranium, hydroelectrical power and, 
of course, limitless solar energy when it can be harnessed; and we 
have base metals such as iron, copper, nickel, cobalt, chrome, lead, 
zinc. Add to these our diamonds and gold and the wide variety of our 
agricultural products including cotton, sisal, tea, coffee, tobacco,
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sugar, wool, maize, wheat, leather, beef, wood pulp and mohair. Given 
the political will established at Lusaka and the cooperation of invest­
ment exporting countries, greater economic self-sufficiency for each 
of our countries and for the region as a whole is a realizable objec­
tive". (Nsekela, A.J., 1981: p.vii-viii.)
The failure of the region to achieve its true potential may be partially 
assigned to the lack of political will referred to by Sir Seretse. 
However, a number of other factors have to be considered which have a 
direct effect on the policy and planning process of the multinational 
corporation operating in the region.
Before there can be a definitive statement of policy by a multinational 
corporation considering entry into a particular country, there must 
exist within the corporation concerned a sound assessment of the ideo­
logical, economic and social effects of that country's policies inter­
nally, regionally and internationally as well as the effects of these 
on the multinational should entry be seriously considered. In addition, 
"any serious attempt to understand what they (multinational corporations) 
are doing or the meaning of what they are doing involves a journey into 
politics, sociology and psychology as well as economics". (Barnet, R.J. 
and Muller, R.E., 1975: p.7.)
This chapter, therefore, examines the economic and political development 
of South Africa by means of the interelationship between sustained 
growth and its implications for social and institutional change. This 
is done by means of a brief comment on the origins and present political 
power of the Afrikaner. To do this it is necessary to examine the power 
of the ethnic mobilisation of the Afrikaner and the changing nature of 
the Southern African political, philosophical, economic and strategic
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environment resulting in the obsolescence of this as an ideology and 
the search for a new commitment which, in turn, will have a direct 
effect on the policies and planning of multinational corporations 
entering the region and those already there. It is within this frame­
work that the role of the multinational corporation in the economic 
development of Southern Africa will be analysed in later chapters.
Finally, this chapter discusses the economic and political dependency 
of other countries in the region on South Africa in terms of a Marxist 
approach to dependencia. This is of fundamental importance to develop­
ing an understanding of both South African regional political and 
industrial policy and the locational strategies of firms operating in 
the region.
Firstly, however, it is necessary to define what is meant by South and 
Southern Africa.
5.2 SOUTHERN AFRICA DEFINED
When considering the role of the multinational corporation in South 
African development it is necessary to develop a definition of the 
region which takes into account both the economic and political elements 
of regionality as well as the desiderata of multinational strategic 
planning.
The discussion in the next chapter, for example, is based on inter­
national trade being defined as the act or business of buying, selling 
or bartering goods and/or services between international companies, 
divisions of international companies, or between nations, individuals, 
or companies within the trading nations when the goods or services 
have to cross borders that the governments of those nations delineate
- 37 -
and which the prospective trade participants must recognise if they are 
to be permitted to trade, or which they must recognise, overtly or 
otherwise, in their trading strategies. Foreign direct investment may 
be similarly defined.
Thus, it is necessary for the multinational corporation operating in 
the region to recognise such entities as the Republic of Venda, Transkei 
or Bophuthatswana as being part of Southern Africa although they may not 
be recognised internationally as they are regarded as being unacceptable 
artificial creations of the South African policy of separate development 
International anomalies do emerge. Botswana does not recognise the 
existence of the Republic of Transkei and yet together with the Transkei 
it forms part of the Southern African Customs Union.
Dr. R. Tusenius, at the first Southern Africa Economic Convention held 
in Johannesburg in 1979, produced a workable definition of what is 
meant by South and Southern Africa which takes into consideration some 
of the difficulties outlined in this section. (Tusenius, R.R., 1979(1): 
pp.2-6.) An adapted version of this is reproduced in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.2 provides an overview of the present political, constitutional 
and diplomatic framework of Southern Africa today as well as the present 
situation in relation to economic, technical and associated matters.
At present political considerations prevent South Africa from making a 
full contribution to the development of the rest of Southern Africa on 
the economic, scientific, technical and agricultural fronts. This is 
for two reasons. Firstly, the unacceptability of South Africa’s 
internal policies to other countries in the region. Secondly, the fear 
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The ensuing paragraphs examine the level of development of the South 
African economy in terms of the criteria laid down in Chapter One and 
relate this to South African political development.
5.5 SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ITS SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
Tables 5.1 to 5.7 provide an indication of the level of development of 
the South African economy by means of the identification of certain of 
the key indicators of economic development suggested in Chapter Two.
As may be seen from Table 5.1 and Figure 5.5 South Africa has enjoyed 
a positive increase in its rate of growth as measured by real gross 
national product. However, when measured as real gross national prod­
uct per capita there was a decline between 1975 and 1979. Despite the 
high overall increase in gross national product the South African 
economy is moving into recession following its traditional pattern of 
moving two years behind the Western European economies despite the 
cushioning effects of gold sales.
Table 5.2 shows South Africa as having the highest gross domestic 
product in Africa although it is only the third highest when measured 
per capita. This does not, however, reflect the extreme distribution 
of income between the traditional subsistence sector and those involved 
directly in the industrial development of the country. This will be 
discussed in ensuing paragraphs.
During 1977 the South African rail system carried a freight equivalent 
of 69,550 million ton kilometres. This was the highest level of rail 
utilisation of the countries in Africa for which statistics are avail­
able. It^should be noted, however, that this figure includes freight 
from Zambia and all the countries bordering South Africa which rely
- 41 -
heavily on the South African transport and harbour system for their 
foreign trade because of the congestion at Dar-es-Salaam, difficul­
ties with the Tazara railway and the sabotage of the Benguela railway 
by UNITA forces in Angola.
Table 3.3, although showing figures which are not strictly comparable, 
being based on different years, nevertheless indicates the relative 
levels of participation in education in various African countries.
These figures indicate to a limited extent the dualistic structure of 
the education system in South Africa. The difference in number between 
pupils involved in primary education and those involved in secondary 
education is due largely to the number of Black pupils unable to afford 
the loss of earnings and the expenditure required in secondary educa­
tion. It is also due to the limited number of places in schools and 
the shortage of trained teachers. It is not unusual to find Black 
teachers with only a standard eight school pass.
While such universities as the University of the Witwatersrand, Rhodes 
University, the University of Cape Town and the other "white" universi­
ties have international reputations for their research into nuclear 
physics, icthyology, medicine and other fields, the "black" universities 
appear to still be building their reputations.
The education system has been subjected to considerable upheaval as a 
result of the politicisation of education by Black students in Soweto 
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TABLE 5.2 MISCELLANEOUS STATISTICS IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER AFRICAN STATES - 1977













of M a nu­
facturing
Annual
1,000 rate of km: Persons1 2 R mill. Caput R mill. R mill. R mill. Million R mill.increase per km 1 km
(1970-77)
NORTH AFRICA
Algeria 17,910 3.2 2 ,3 8 1 ,7 4 1 8 17,164 958 6,197 5,052 11,249 1,940 1 ,8 6 5Egypt 3 8 ,7 41 2.2 1,001,449 39 1 6 ,3 2 7 422 4,181 1,501 5 ,6 8 2 2 ,2 0 1 * 3 ^ i9 2
Libya 2, 257: 4.2 1,759,540 2 16 ,8 3 8 6,454 2 ,7 9 3 * 8 ,7 9 4 11,107® - 505
Morocco 18,245 2.3 446,550 41 9,042 496 2 ,7 7 8 1,130 3 ,9 0 8 3,474 1,125
Sudan 1 6 ,9 53 2.5 2 , 5 0 5 , 8 1 3 7 4,618^ 294* 922 575 1,497 2 ,2 8 8 : 142
Tunisia 6 ,0 6 5 2.4 163 ,61 0 37 4 ,3 3 1 714 1,587 801 2 ,3 8 8 1 ,331 390
CENTRAL AFRICA
Angola 5 ,6 4 6^ 1.9 1,246,700 5 2, 349: 377* 544“ 1,067“ 1,611“ 5,461“ -
Cameroon 7 ,9 1 4 1.9 4 7 5 ,4 4 2 17 2 ,8 7 8 * 371* 664 612 1 ,2 7 6 506 317
Congo 1 ,4 4 0 2 .8 3 4 2 ,0 0 0 4 682 505 245 205 450 509 -
Central African
Republic 2 ,370? 2.2 6 2 2 ,9 8 4 4 340* 190* 55 71 126 - 19
Chad 4 ,2 1 3 2.1 1 ,2 8 4 ,0 0 0 3 566* 137* 101® 55* 156® - 56Gabon 534 0.9 2 6 7 ,6 6 7 2 2 J ^ 1 4,245 577 953 1,530 - 131Zaire 2 6 ,3 1 3 2.8 2,345,409 11 3 ,2 1 3 * H 9 * 530 853 1 ,3 8 3 2 ,2 0 3 * 301
SOUTH AFRICA
Republic of
Afri ra 26,129 2.6 1 ,2 2 1 , 0 3 7 21 34,604 1 ,2 4 9 5,125 5,355 10,480 6 9 ,3 3 0 7 ,6 1 3kj V U L 11 (VllX^d
WEST AFRICA
Rep. Upper Volta 6 ,3 1 9 2.3 2 7 4 ,2 0 0 23 530 * 88* 126* 46* 172* - 40
.Benin 3 ,2 8 6 2 .7 112,622 29 525* 160 130* 40* 170* 139“ 31Ghana 10,475 2 .8 2 3 8 ,5 3 7 44 4 ,2 7 0 * 433* 750* 705* 1,455® 305I 175Guinea 4 ,6 4 6 2.5 245,857 19 629 * 143* 28 10 38 - _
Ivory Coast 5,152 2.6 3 2 2 ,4 6 2 16 5,601 1,088 1,524 1,875 3 ,3 9 9 551“ 672Liberia 1 ,6 8 4 2.4 111,369 15 609 338 403 389 792 - 49Mali 5,994 2.5 1,240,000 5 441* 77* 138 109 247 149 -Niger 4 ,8 5 9 2.7 1 ,2 6 7 ,0 0 0 4 6 40* 139* 110* 117® 227* - 17Nigeria 6 6 ,6 2 8 2 . 8 9 2 3 ,7 6 8 72 . 2 1 ,8 4 4 * 347* 9 ,8 3 2 10,281 20,113 9 7 2 “ 1,487Senegal 5 ,0 8 5^ 2.4 196,192 26 1,717- 325 557* 418® 975® 164*Sierre Leone 3 ,4 7 0 3.4 71,740 48 579* 186* 133* 83 230* 41Togo 2 ,3 4 8 2.6 56,785 41 487* 213* 162* 91® 253* 22“ 17
EAST AFRICA
Burundi 3 ,9 6 6 1.1 2 7 ,8 3 4 142 303* 81* 79 80 159 -Ethiopia 2 8 ,9 8 1 2.4 1,221,900 24 2 ,5 2 2 * 90* 306 290 596 260* 197Kenya 14 ,3 3 7 3.6 5 8 2 ,6 4 6 25 3 ,8 5 0 269 1,117 1,055 2 ,1 7 2 - 423Madagascar 8.520 3 .0 587,041 15 1,615 190 248* 239* 487* 210 78Malawi 5 ,5 2 6 3.2 11 8 ,4 8 4 47 741 134 204 170 374 198 21Mozambique 9 ,6 7 8 2 . 3 7 8 3 ,0 3 0 12 2 ,3 6 7 257 242 112 354 3 ,4 0 0 : -Zimbabwe 6 ,7 4 0 3.5 3 9 0 ,5 8 0 17 3 ,1 0 4 461 470 : 565 : 1,035 5 ,0 4 8 621Rwanda 4 ,3 6 8 2.5 2 6 ,3 3 8 166 662 151 99 70® 160* _ 69Somalia 3 ,3 5 4 2.7 6 3 7 ,6 5 7 5 428* 135* 141* 74® 218* -Uganda 1 2 ,3 5 3 3.4 2 3 6 ,0 3 6 52 3,251 263 70* 312® 382* - 76United Republic
of Tanzania 1 6 ,0 8 6 2 .8 9 4 5 ,0 8 7 17 2,971 184 612 436 1,048 - 267
Zambia 5 ,3 0 2 3 .2 7 5 2 ,6 1 4 7 2 J D 7 418 583 780 1 ,3 6 3 - 327
TOTAL AFRICA 424,000 2.7 3 0 , 3 1 9 ,0 0 0 14 201,660 478 46,457 4 6 ,3 2 2 9 2 ,7 7 9 - -
Republic of South
Africa as % 6.2 4.0 17.2
of Africa
(1 )  1972 (2 )  1973 (3 ) 1970 (4) 1974 (5) 1975 Not available or nil
(6) De Jure Population (7] Based on 1968 estimates (8) 1976
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1950 tlO,437 71.1 733* 1,845 23,133
1951 til,008 72.1 805* 1,953 25,879
1952 til,678 74.1 1,129* 2,021 27,298
1953 tl2,823 73.3 1,223* 2,123 29,049
1954 tl4,167 73.5 1,171 2,162 29.851
1955 tl6,021 73.4 1,260 2,337 30.384
1956 tl7,293 74.8 1,299 2,470 32,478
1957 18,720 73.7 1,360 2,526 33,227
1958 19,765 74.3 1,513 2,722 34,998
1959 21,051 75.4 1,703 2,647 36,440
1960 22,717 76.3 1,827 2.704 41,958
1961 23,760 77.0 2,134 2,589 40,278
1962 25,599 75.8 2,216 2,658 41,794
1963 27,335 76.1 2,218 2.884 43,635
1964 t29,547 76.8 2,656 3,455 46,994
1965 31,939 77.4 3,271 3,882 44,306
1966 t33,929 77.0 3,422 3,990 53,288
1967 36,897 77.1 3,420 4,012 53,072
1968 t39,761 77.6 3,775 4,476 55,746
1969 42,847 78.4 3.931 5,118 53,214
1970 47,456 77.7 3,929 5,700 53,333
1971 51,081 79.8 4,010 5,861 56,285
1972 55,298 80.4 4,409 6,112 57,830
1973 60,080 82.8 4,330 6,864 60,599
1974 t65,498 85.9 4,621 7,301 59,992
1975 69,883 88.1 5.177 7,176 65,646
1976 75,381 89.4 5,795 7,048 69,190
1977 79,491 89.7 5,831 6,573 73,521
1978 84,954 91.6 5,928 6,824 83,197
1979 92,613 92.9 7.031 6,199 87.125
1980 99,967 93.1 7.210 7.120 99,555
*) Pig Iron and Ferro-Alloys
**) Year ending 31 March
t) Estimates
Sources: Electricity Supply Commission 1981
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa 1982 
Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of SA 
SA Railways and Harbours
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COUNTRY 1954 1977 1954 1977 1954 1977
WORLD 1,199,000. 7,209,682 2,647,000 4,124.0 453 1,748
AFRICA
Algeria 828 4,650 9.44 17.9 87 260
Ghana 241 4,300 4.55 10.5 53 410
SOUTH AFRICA 14,640 80,198 13.66 26.1 1,072 3,072
ZIMBABWE 972 3,916 2.99 6.7 325 585
AMERICA
Canada 73,980 316,549 15.33 23.3 4,826 13,586
Mexico 6,288 50,632 29.12 64.6 216 789
U.S.A. 544,645 2,211,031 163.03 216.8 3,341 10,198
Chile 2,172 9,776 6.60 10.7 329 914
ASIA
India 7,524 99,096 382.92 625.8 20 158
Japan 60,072 532,609 88.00 113.9 683 4,676
EUROPE
Belgium 11,064 47,099 8.82 9.8 1,255 4,806
France 45,576 210,845 43.06 53.1 1,059 3,971
Italy 35,568 166,545 47.91 56.4 742 2,953
Netherlands 10,584 58,285 10.62 13.9 997 4,193
Norway 21,780 72,250 3.39 4.0 6,424 18,062
Poland 15,468 109,364 26.76 34.7 578 3,152
Germany 
(Fed.Rep.of)^ 68,520 335,320 49.68 61.4 1,379 5,461
Portugal 1,656 13,324 8.57 8.7 193 1,531
Spain 10.476 43.803 28.81 36.7 364 2,556
Sweden 23,952 90,018 7.21 8.3 3,322 10,845
Switzerland 13,176 45,903 4.93 6.3 2,673 7,286
United Kingdom 72,900 283,280 51.05 55.9 1,428 5,068
Yugoslavia 3,444 48,580 18.27 21.8 199 2,228
OCEANIA
Australia 14,472 82,522 8.99 14.1 1,610 5,853
New Zealand 4,308 21,265 2.09 3.1 2,058 6,860
(1) Estimates of mid-year population
(2) Scope of series changes 
(Provisional)
Source: Statistical Year-Book of the United Nations 1978
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AFRICA 80 7,770 .0 5,290.0
Algeria 63 440 .8^ 286.12
Morocco 53 493 .1^ 347.4 I
Zimbabwe 37 250 .0 180 .33
South Africa 11 2,984 .7 2,163.5
Egypt 137 347 .2 283.2
NORTH AMERICA 2 161,240 .0 127,220.0
Canada 3 11,333 .1' 9 ,016.31
Mexico 24 3,759 .6 2,682.0
Puerto Rico 5 732 .3^ 607.83
U.S.A. 2 135,155 .5 109,003.ol
SOUTH AMERICA 30 15,090 .0 11,480.0
Argentina 13 2,907 .3^ 2 ,027.53
Brazil 19 7,313 .5^ 5 ,916.31
Columbia 55 558 .1 453.6
Venezuela 13 1,324 6" 955.22
ASIA 90 40,910 0 26,030.0
India 777 1,495 8 805.4
Indonesia 299 806 4 479.3
Japan 6 31,379 0 19,826.0
EUROPE 5 115,600 0 102,010.0
Austria 4 2,337 4 1,865.3
Belgium 3 3,168 4 2,871.3
Denmark 4 1,656 2 1,381.3
Finland 4 1,220 4 1,075.4
France 3 119,340 0 16,700.0
Germany, Fed.Rep.of 3 21,410 1 20,020.2
Ireland 6 635 9 577.6
Italy 3 17,607 3' 16,371.2
Netherlands 4 4,206 0 3,851.0
Northern Ireland 5 368 3^ 326.61
Norway 4 1,268 5 1,106.6
Poland 22 2,116 3 1,547.3
Portugal 8 1,322 0^ 1,034.0
Spain 6 7,102 6 5,944.9
Sweden 3 3,043. 4^ 2,881.0
Switzerland 3 2,086. 8 1,932.8
United Kingdom 4 16,091. 7' 14,235.81
OCEANIA 3 8,560. 0 6,930.0
Australia 3 6,880. 0 5,550.0
New Zealand 3 1,402. 3 I 1,213.5
WORLD 14 362,070. 0 285,660.0
** Only Commercial vehicles and passenger cars
* Provisional (1) 1976 (2) 1975 (3) 1974
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Table 3.4 shows the rapid increase in the generation of electricity as
well as in the production of pig iron and cement and the total traffic
of the South African railway system while Table 3.5 compares the rate 
of growth of electricity generation between 1954 and 1977 of various 
countries of the world.
South Africa is a major generator of electricity and is at present one
of the major buyers on the world market of generating equipment.
At present the Electricity Supply Commission has a total installed 
capacity of 21,250 MW in twenty-five operating power stations. It is 
estimated that by 1990 ESCOM will have to increase its total installed 
capacity to approximately 35,000 MW.
Figure 3.4 shows the power stations under construction at present to 
meet part of this future demand.
FIGURE 3.4 ESCOM'S POWER STATIONS UNDER CONSTRUCTION
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Other major capital projects planned and under construction amount to 
a total of R54,130 m and are shown in Figure 3.5.
Finally, Table 3.6 shows South Africa as a large consumer of cars and 
Table 3.7 compares the South African rate of inflation with that of 
other industrialising and industrialised countries.
While, on the basis of the Beckerman and Bacon system of classification 
these figures show South Africa to be a rapidly industrialising country, 
certain anomalies emerge when the economy and political system are 
examined in greater detail.
There are other indicators of the level of South African economic devel­
opment. In medicine South Africa leads in transplant surgery and its 
associated technology. It has developed its own uranium enrichment 
process which is cheaper than other methods used elsewhere. It is the 
only country to convert coal to oil on a continuous commercial basis 
although numerous other countries have attempted to do so. South Africa 
has one of the most sophisticated financial markets in the Southern 
hemisphere, and is the home country of such organisations as De Beers 
and the Anglo American Corporation, which, with the exception of its 
related companies, provides employment to 250,000 people and which had 
a tax profit from the companies which it controls of R4,300 m in 1982. 
Through the stimulus of the arms embargo South Africa has, with such 
countries as Brazil and Israel, become one of the world’s new arms 
exporters.
While the preceding paragraphs demonstrate the high level of South 
African economic development in relation to other countries on the 
continent they do not comment on the associated dualistic socio-economic
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structure and the effect that future growth and development will have 
upon it.
Schlemmer and Webster identify two points of view in the literature - 
the "conventional viewpoint" and the "Revisionist Thesis". (Schlemmer, 
L. and Webster, E ., 1978: pp.11-13.)
The conventional viewpoint incorporates two main theses which are often 
presented as being interrelated. The first argues that economic growth 
has a range of consequences which are likely to fundamentally modify 
the socio-political structure of South Africa while the second maintains 
that racial prejudice is an irrational pre-modern characteristic of 
society which is likely to be weakened by the increasing influence of 
the logic of economic rationality attendant upon economic growth. The 
broad value perspective within which these views appear is usually 
extremely close to that of mainstream liberalism and, as regards their 
theoretical assumptions relating to structure, they are broadly compa­
tible with the theories of modernisation in sociology.
In the conventional view of the social effects of industrialisation, in 
which certain logical imperatives are identified, it is argued that the 
ultimate effects of industrialisation are that "ascribed" statuses, 
such as those associated with ethnic identity, vanish as factors which 
structure social relations. The premium placed on rationality will 
relegate discrimination to the periphery of the social structure.
The South African economy is a market economy the tendency of which is 
the rational utilisation of resources. There is therefore, Horwitz 
argues, a conflict between economic rationality and the political factor. 
(Horwitz, R ., 1967.) He argues that in this conflict it is the logic
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of market rationality which is likely to prevail and that in South 
Africa this development will be brought about by three main factors. 
Firstly, in a competitive market capitalists have to utilise the 
available resources in the most rational way possible. The use of 
various techniques of rational analysis will result in a recognition 
of the fallacy of arguments about racial inferiority thus resulting in 
a more full utilisation of the Black labour force. Workers will compete 
with one another on the basis of industrial aptitude and ascent on the 
social ladder will depend largely on the necessary skills.
Secondly, under these circumstances White workers will come more fre­
quently into equal status contact with Black workers of equal compet­
ence thus undermining the empirical basis for discrimination.
Finally, to the extent to which the political factor of apartheid 
delays this process it will at the same time by interfering with the 
logic of the market slow down economic growth and threaten the White 
standard of living. Faced with a choice between prejudice and pros­
perity, it is argued, the already secularised IVhites will, it is hoped, 
opt for prosperity.
This process is envisaged by various writers as happening or likely to 
happen more or less rapidly and more or less peacefully. O'Dowd, for 
example, predicts broadly similar consequences of economic growth. 
(O'Dowd, M.C., in Schlemmer, L. and Webster, E ., 1978: pp.28-50.) His 
theoretical perspective, however, differs from that of others in this 
broad category in that its fundamental economic determination is 
reminiscent of some Marxist thought as Schlemmer, Webster and Fisher 
point out. Using Rostow's theory of the stages of growth he attempts 
to date the probable stages of political change. (Rostow, W ., 1960.)
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His argument is more complicated than the model outlined in that he 
grants a role to Black actors and to revolutionary unrest. However, 
most of those who adopt this position stress the role of the IVhites.
The second approach in the literature is that put forward by the 
revisionists. The term "revisionist" is one which has come to be used 
to indicate a school of thought at variance with older and more conven­
tional views. The term itself as used below is not intended to have 
any political or ideological connotation.
The revisionist position sees the main problem in South Africa as being 
the economic exploitation of the Black population by the White settler 
group. Racialism may be irrational, but in South Africa it is seen as 
"rational" in so far as it functions as an ideology which legitimises 
the exploitation of Black labour. The South African economy is seen 
as a "labour repressive" economy in which the rapid accumulation of 
capital and the achievement of a high standard of living by the White 
working class is made possible by the political machinery of repression 
which assures the continued subservience of the Black labour force.
The tendency in such a labour repressive society is towards the increas­
ing concentration of power. The fruits of economic growth are concen­
trated in the hands of those who control the economy thus both increas­
ing their relative domination of the economy and at the same time pro­
viding the means for strengthening the machinery of political and mili­
tary repression. Thus, it is argued that if capitalism has any
rationalising tendency, it is towards the rationalisation of domination
rather than the removal of prejudice.
The revisionist thesis, like the conventional viewpoint, stresses the
role of Whites, but whereas in the latter case they are seen as agents
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of change, in the former they are seen as irremovable obstacles to 
change.
The evidence of what is occurring in South Africa today tends to support 
the conventional viewpoint. Economic growth in conjunction with the 
ideological limitations placed on the supply of labour have created 
severe stresses in the South African economy. The result has been a 
severe shortage of skilled labour, as well as of supervisory and manag­
erial staff while, to a limited extent, skilled labour has been imported 
from Europe, particularly during the present recession, it has been 
recognised that this problem may only be overcome by developing the 
vast labour pool that already exists. This has happened and increasingly 
Asians, Coloureds and Blacks are moving into jobs previously reserved by 
custom or legislation for Whites. Foreign direct investment has assis­
ted greatly in this process as MNCs are often less patient with limita­
tions placed on their operations by a system of which they are not part 
and the logic of which they do not understand. At the same time multi­
national corporations operating in South Africa have also come under 
increasing pressure to improve their employment practices or to withdraw.
The General Electric Company, for example, is now training Black 
apprentices at its factory in Benoni. Foreign influence through poten­
tial political pressure on the corporation has also had other major 
effects such as the recognition by such organisations as the Chloride 
Group of an unregistered trade union despite conflicting advice from 
various government ministers and the South African Police. This is 
particularly significant when, as was suggested to the researcher by 
the Christian Association of Business Executives, such trade unions 
will form one of the main channels of Black political expression in
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the future given the restrictions on such debate in other areas.
In the study that follows, a number of those interviewed commented on 
what they perceived to be a realisation by the South African Government 
that there has to be a trade-off between ideology and future economic 
growth and development. While this will be discussed within the con­
text of the specific interviews it is interesting to note that as 
economic development has taken place so the Nationalist ideology has 
undergone significant change. The concept of Afrikaner ethnic mobili­
sation has come to be replaced by other approaches such as the idea of 
the survival of White South Africa against what P.W. Botha has termed 
the "total onslaught". It is within the framework of this survival 
concept that both the South African political and military leadership 
have argued the necessity for fundamental change. Both Prime Minister 
Botha and Minister of Defence General Malan have stated on several 
occasions that constitutional and other changes are necessary in order 
to give the population a stake in the future of the country. This has 
led to a major split in the Nationalist Party. However, before comment­
ing on this it is necessary to examine the nature of South African 
political development.
5.4 SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Adam and Giliomee, in their book "The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner 
Power", attempt a simplified review and assessment of six admittedly 
artificially separated approaches in the literature on South African 
political development. (Adam, H. and Giliomee, H ., 1979: pp.16-60.)
This assessment and review delineates an area in which hundreds of 
writers have come to an almost equal number of contradictory conclu­
sions. The dangers of such an approach to the relevant literature are
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clear. However, it is necessary to attempt such a division in the 
interests of analytic convenience.
Essentially, six approaches may be discerned:
a . the focus on Calvinism;
b . the concept of a plural society;
c . the focus on class formation;
d . the colonial analogy;
e . the fascist analogy;
f. the focus on racism.
Rather than focus on any single interpretation to the exclusion of all 
others, the argument that follows will utilise relevant concepts from 
each interpretation. Adopting a single approach to the complex social 
and political structure of South Africa results in certain inherent 
weaknesses as a result of the rigidity imposed by the use of a single 
analytical framework. Thus, for example, to state that the key to 
understanding the Afrikaner is Calvinism is not enough. As is the case 
with all apostles there are as many Calvins as there have been revisions 
or restatements of the original philosophy. Relevant to an understand­
ing of the Afrikaner in this context are, for example, the Synod of 
Dort in the early seventeenth century, the rise of Puritanism, and the 
neo-Calvinism of Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and others in the Netherlands of 
the present. (De Klerk, W.A., 1975: pp.204, 257-258; Kuyper, A.,
1943.) While such an understanding provides an insight into the 
Afrikaner it fails as a direct explanation of his ethnic mobilisation 
or the origins of such elements of the overall political ideology as 
separate development. It is for these reasons that it is necessary to 
examine South African political development in terms of British
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imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as 
the concept of a plural society. The ideas of fascism and class forma­
tion are of little relevance and often form the basis of the rigid and 
somewhat laboured Marxist analogies that have been applied to South 
Africa by such theorists as Slovo. (For example, Davidson, B., Slovo, 
J. and Wilkinson, A., 1976.)
While the ensuing paragraphs attempt to develop an understanding of 
what is occurring in South Africa today they should in no way be seen 
as part of the apologetics of a system that has institutionalised dis­
crimination, enforced separation and even gone so far as to attempt to 
give away South African territory and citizens to a foreign country 
(Swaziland). While it is possible to determine the origins of such 
actions it is difficult to justify them.
To understand what has occurred in South Africa it is necessary to 
firstly examine the origins of Afrikaner identity.
Stavorinus, in 1798, observed that "the first Europeans in the colony, 
which comprises various nationalities, have in the course of time 
intermingled to such an extent that they have in the course of time 
become indistinguishable from each other. (Stavorinus, 1798: p.309.) 
Even most of those who were born in Europe have, so to speak, exchanged 
their national character for the character of this country". Despite 
the integration of the various nationalities and the emergence of 
particular national characteristics the influence of Europe was still 
extremely strong. This influence was most strongly felt through both 
the rule of the Dutch East India Company and the Dutch Government with 
their approach to both civics and justice based to some considerable 
extent on the tenets of Calvinism. In addition, the distinction made
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by the European inhabitants of the Cape between civilisation and the 
lack of it was based on whether or not a person was educated to the 
extent of being able to read and write as this was essential for an 
understanding of the Bible.
As the settlers, or Free Burghers, moved away from the boundaries of 
the settlement that had been defined by the Dutch East India Company 
becoming increasingly isolated so the strength of their literally 
interpreted Biblical beliefs increased. These beliefs were further 
reinforced by the arrival of the Hugenots at the Cape in 1688 following 
the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 by Louis XIV. As de Klerk 
has demonstrated, the religious beliefs of the English immigrants also 
played a major role in that although their beliefs were not the same 
as those of the Dutch settlers they did originate from essentially the 
same fundamental principles, despite the intervention in Church affairs 
by Henry VIII. (De Klerk, W.A., 1975: p . 138.)
Despite this, the arrival of British rule in 1806 and the cession of 
the colony by Holland to Britain in 1814 following the second occupation 
of the Cape by British forces led to major repercussions. For the first 
time the Dutch inhabitants came to feel threatened not only by the Xhosa 
on the Eastern frontier but also by the British system of administration 
which, it was felt, went against the commandments of God and their own 
established institutions. (Adam, H. and Giliomee, H ., 1979: pp.98-100.)
While historical fact demonstrates that this was a result of changes 
in the legal system, the abolition of slavery, changes in the master- 
servant relationship, missionary activity and the constant threat of 
invasion by Xhosa tribes, de Klerk has also attempted to demonstrate 
certain similarities in feelings and religious beliefs between the
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settlers at the Cape and those in America prior to the Declaration of 
Independence in 1776. (De Klerk, W.A., 1975: pp.22-27.) In fact, 
certain similarities in philosophical principle may be discerned in the 
American Declaration of Independence and the Retief Manifesto published 
in 1837 prior to the Great Trek in which the Dutch Settlers moved 
northwards to escape British influence.
The idea of a movement away from British domination provided both a 
sense of unity as well as a further entrenchment of Calvinist fundamen­
talism. However, it failed to achieve its objectives. In 1843 Natal 
was annexed whereupon there was a move north into what is now the 
Orange Free State and the Transvaal. In 1848, however, Britain pro­
claimed its sovereignty over the area between the Orange and Vaal rivers 
although it recognised the independence of the Transvaal in 1852. In 
1854 the independence of the Orange Free State was also recognised. 
(Davenport, T., 1978: pp.18-38.)
At this stage it appeared to the Trekkers that their search for indepen­
dence was over and that they were free to establish their own form of 
government. However, two discoveries that were to have lasting politi­
cal and economic effects on the history and development of South Africa 
were made. These were the discovery of diamonds near Kimberley in 1869 
and the discovery of gold in the Murchison Range (1870) , at Eersteling 
(1871), Lydenburg (1873) and on the Witwatersrand (1886). The results 
of this were felt immediately.
There was an influx of the usual collection of adventurers and fortune 
seekers. More important, however, was the start of low level industrial 
and manufacturing development of support industries which gave the major 
impetus to South Africa's industrial development on which future
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industrial growth could be based. It was in this environment that such 
visionaries as Rhodes and others were able to direct what was to occur 
in the future through the establishment of such organisations as de Beers 
and others which were to become the precursors of such mining-finance 
houses, as the Anglo American Corporation.
The immediate feeling in the Boer Republics was that this influx of 
foreigners would not only threaten their sovereignty but that such an 
influx would have a detrimental effect on the morals of the people and 
destroy everything that the Trekkers had fought for. These fears proved 
not to be unfounded. In 1870 the diamond fields were annexed by Britain 
and in 1877 the Transvaal was proclaimed as a British territory. The 
foundations were now laid for the inevitable results of a conflict 
between religious idealism, identity, the fear of foreign domination 
and the reality of the necessity of control of major mineral deposits 
by an imperial giant. The result eighty years later is a country 
divided against itself, isolated from the international community, on 
the edge of civil war, able to save itself but trapped by its history.
In 1880 the first Anglo-Boer war was fought. It resulted in the 
Transvaal gaining independence under British sovereignty. In 1889 an 
alliance was formed between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
and in 1899 the inevitable happened - war was declared and Boer
Kommandos rode into Natal. In 1902 peace was declared with the signing
of the Treaty of Vereeniging.
During this conflict British forces under the command of Lord Kitchener
adopted a scorched earth policy and placed those still remaining on the
farms into internment camps in an attempt to break down support for the 
Boer Kommandos and hamper their ability to obtain supplies from farms 
or live off the land.
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While Kitchener's tactics may have been successful from a military 
point of view, they were a long-term political disaster. The result 
of a scorched earth policy, the displacement of women and children and 
a major war was a massive influx of people whose very existence had 
been destroyed into the cities of which they had no experience and 
which were almost entirely populated by foreigners. Although there 
had been a peace treaty the nature of the conflict had merely changed.
In victory the British were generous and political power in South 
Africa was vested in the old generals - Botha, Smuts and Herzog. 
Although the Afrikaner retained political power through cooperation 
with Britain and allowing what was to be the Union to become part of 
the greater Empire, economic power was still firmly in the hands of the 
English in the English cities. The effects of Kitchener's policy began 
to be felt on the political, economic and social fronts. This was 
aggravated by Lord Milner's suppression of Dutch in education and his 
wish to ensure the dominance of the British element of society politi­
cally and culturally. (Davenport, T., 1978: p.151.)
The influx of unskilled White labour created the potentially explosive 
"poor white" problem. The Afrikaner felt alienated in the Anglo-Saxon 
socially and economically dominated cities where employment was limited 
and where they had to compete at the lower end of the employment spec­
trum with Black workers faced by essentially the same problem. This 
competition led to the miners strikes and riots of 1913 and 1922 and 
the use of the newly created South African Defence Force by General 
Smuts against Afrikaner miners who felt that they were being subjected 
to unfair competition by Black workers.
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The strongly pro-Empire policies of Botha and Smuts which had resulted 
in South Africa's participation in both World Wars and the growing 
international prestige of Smuts led to the feeling among a number of 
Afrikaners that Smuts had betrayed his people, used his army on them, 
and even forgotten them.
A further factor in this process was that despite the recognition of 
both English and Afrikaans as the two official languages in 1925, 
English remained the language of commerce and law. The literary 
explosion in Afrikaans and the predominant use of English further 
reinforced the feeling of isolation and domination.
It was now that the first stirrings of what was to occur in 1948 were 
beginning to be felt. The embougeousiement of the Afrikaner was 
increasing although employment opportunities were limited by the very 
nature of the economy, the depression and various social factors. The 
Afrikaner became increasingly involved in the search for his identity 
or "eie". (De Klerk, W.A., 1975.) It was realised that this could 
only be achieved by political control backed by economic power.
Political liberation without economic freedom is meaningless as has 
been realised by the Government of Zimbabwe which is at present 
encouraging Black business and entrepreneurs. The fact that political 
power was meaningless without economic power was made clear to the 
emerging educated elite by Vader Kestell at his Blaaukrantz address in 
1939. (De Klerk, W.A., 1975: pp.280-284.)
The new ideology of Afrikaner nationalism brought these factors 
together. This was developed through debate among the new intellectuals 
at such universities as Stellenbosch and Bloemfontein as well as within 
the cells of the newly formed Broederbond. The immediate appeal was
- 65 -
obvious. The objective was to provide the Afrikaner with a home in his 
own country, economic and political power and the removal of the "Black 
Menace" (Swart Gevaar). (Adam, H. and Giliomee, H . , 1979: pp.114-115.)
In 1948 the Nationalist Party came to power and began to implement the 
policies which by leading not only to the rapid economic development of 
South Africa have also led to an institutionalised social and economic 
structure based vertical stratification according to colour. The dog­
matic nature of the ideology of separate development has led South 
Africa into international isolation and the increasing danger of inter­
nal instability and civil war through the dissatisfaction of a Black 
population which, as has been admitted by Prime Minister Botha is 
faced by the same problems today as were faced by the Afrikaner between 
1902 and 1948.
The Black population of South Africa has proved to be an ironic 
challenge to Afrikaner rule.
Promises of change within South Africa have been made by both Prime 
Ministers Vorster and Botha. The "give South Africa six months" state­
ment by B.J. Vorster resulted in a number of diplomatic exchanges with 
Black Africa but there was little effective change.
IVhen P.W. Botha assumed office a number of promises of liberalisation 
were made at such meetings as that which took place with business 
leaders at the Carlton Hotel in Johannesburg and which was followed 
by a similar conference at the Mount Nelson Hotel in Cape Town. To a 
certain extent change has taken place. The concept of power sharing 
with other population groups has been implicitly recognised through 
the major constitutional initiatives of recent years resulting in
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Coloured and Indian membership of the newly formed Presidents Council. 
Such recognition would have been inconceivable during the premierships 
of Verwoerd and Vorster. The degree to which the participants actually 
represent Coloured and Indian opinion is open to question. Black par­
ticipation has not been sought by the Government although for the first 
time the issue has been raised by the political and military leadership 
which has argued strongly through P.W. Botha and Minister of Defence 
General Magnus Malan that unless the Black population is given a stake 
in South Africa there is no reason for it to support the country against 
internal or external aggression.
This debate on the future direction of the Nationalist ideological 
commitment has resulted in a major split in the party and the consequent 
resignation of its Transvaal leader, Andries Treurnicht, to form a more 
right wing party. This has had the advantage of leaving P.W. Botha 
with a more united party with which to bring about the political changes 
perceived to be necessary to ensure the survival of the state and Afrik- 
anerdom against what is now being termed the "total onslaught".
Political thought and strategic perceptions are undergoing rapid change 
in South Africa at present. The policies developed on the basis of the 
ideology of the ethnic mobilisation of the Afrikaner and the search for 
the self (eie) have proved to be self-defeating. As the embourgeoisie- 
ment of the Afrikaner has taken place so their values and perceptions 
have changed. The leaders of Afrikaner business have, for example, 
become far more cosmopolitan in their outlook and have often challenged 
government policy in non-economic spheres. There have been rumours 
that the detente missions into Africa were, to a considerable extent, 
a response to pressure exerted on the government by business. The funda­
mentalist approach has, therefore, come under increasing pressure for 
change.
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What emerges, therefore, is a crisis of approach. The response to this 
has been to substitute the concept of survival into Nationalist ideology 
in the late seventies. All that is then undertaken on the political 
front is therefore labelled as pragmatism in the interests of survival 
in the face of the coming total onslaught against South Africa.
The promised changes of P.IV. Botha have been met with increasing cynicism 
from a Black population disillusioned by the history of Nationalist rule 
and which feels that the policy of separate development will only be 
changed under pressure. Demands are now being made for effective power- 
sharing and the new constitution has been rejected by representatives 
of the various population groups which appear to be aligning themselves 
with Black aspirations.
The challenge facing the Black population in the 1980s is the overcoming 
of the strong tribal divisions that still exist and the need for effec­
tive leadership. At present the leadership vacuum is critical to the 
fulfilment of Black aspirations. It is often felt that such leaders of 
the sixties as Mandela have, through imprisonment, lost touch with the 
youth led response of the seventies. At the same time Inkatha is both 
a tribally based organisation and led by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi who, 
despite his vehement opposition to separate development, has lost credi­
bility among the youth through using KwaZulu as a political base from 
which to direct his criticism without risk of being silenced.
Given the nature of the ideological crisis facing the White leadership, 
the Black population is in a unique situation to make its demands heard 
and force them to be acted upon. To a certain extent this is being 
achieved by the unregistered Black Trade unions which, as has occurred 
elsewhere, will play an increasingly important role where there are
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strong political constraints and a relatively liberal approach to 
industrial representation.
Given the situation existing in Southern Africa today, policy and 
planning may be interpreted as being concerned with political risk, 
fundamental changes in attitudes and values of all race groups and the 
existence of pragmatic economic relationships with the rest of Africa.
The role of the multinational corporation may be seen in terms of the 
contribution to economic growth and thereby to the socio-political 
development of South and Southern Africa resulting in the increased 
participation of the Black population in the economic process at all 
levels, the politicisation of certain elements of this economic process, 
the further political development of the White population and the recog­
nition of the necessity of a trade-off between economic growth and 
political ideology.
As has been stated in preceding paragraphs, what has emerged in the 
seventies in South Africa has been a policy of survival. But its very 
nature this can only be a short-term commitment. However, an interest­
ing result of this has been the suggestion of a constellation of 
Southern African States sharing similar economic and strategic interests. 
The concept of such a constellation was discussed at the Southern Africa 
Economic Convention where it gained some considerable support from 
delegates. (Tusenius, R ., 1979.) Countermoves were, however, dis­
cussed at Arusha in 1979, Lusaka in 1980 and Maputo in 1981 where it 
was felt that this was another attempt at South African hegemony and 
that it should be challenged as such. (Nsekela, 1981.)
The main function, however, of what became the Southern Africa Develop­
ment Coordination Conference was the pursuance by the nine states of
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Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe of 
four developmental objectives through coordinated action. These 
objectives are:
a. the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, 
but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
b. the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable 
regional integration;
c. the mobilisation of resources to promote the 
implementation of national, interstate and regional 
policies ;
d. concerted action to secure international cooperation 
within the framework of the strategy for economic 
liberation. (Nsekela, A.J., 1981.)
While South Africa is surrounded by states which reject its internal 
political policies and which are, in many instances, covertly prepared 
to support armed incursions into its territory there nevertheless exist 
strong pragmatic economic ties founded upon their economic dependence. 
Such dependence is encouraged by the South African government which 
sees this as an important element of its economic and military strategy 
This has important implications for the locational strategies and expo­
sure to political risk of international firms wishing to gain access to 
the region as a whole while maintaining a strong presence in the area 
of highest industrial and market concentration. From this it may be 
seen that it is difficult to understand the apparently conflicting 
rhetoric and real economic relations without an appreciation of the 
nature of this dependency relationship. It is, however, beyond the
- 70 -
scope of this dissertation to consider this in great detail and for 
this reason three of South Africa’s closest neighbours are discussed 
in Appendix 3.1 while the wider regional economic relationships and 
their implications for the multinational corporation are examined in 
Chapter Six.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
The role of the multinational corporation may be seen in terms of its 
contribution to economic growth and thereby to the socio-political 
development of South Africa. In its strategy the multinational corpora­
tion must take into account the present parameters of development, 
however, at the same time it must recognise that it is faced by a 
dynamic developmental process in which the nature of the existing 
ideological framework has as significant an influence as any purely 
economic variable.
In the ensuing chapters the nature of the reciprocal effects of 
economic development and the strategic approach of multinational cor­
porations are explored within the theoretical constraints outlined in 
Chapter Two on the relevance of contemporary orthodox economic theory.
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APPENDIX 5.1 
REGIONAL DEPENDENCY ON SOUTH AFRICA
The nature of the dependency relationship within Southern Africa is 
well illustrated by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and is analysed 
within the context of the Latin American framework.
The dependence approach evolved from a dialogue centred in Santiago 
and which involved Latin American Marxist and non-Marxist economists, 
sociologists and political scientists. It influenced neo-Marxist 
scholars, mainly in France, but soon extended to non-Marxist scholars 
in North America. The Latin American approach focuses on the manner 
in which dependence mechanisms are expressed internally. In contrast, 
the European and North American approaches concentrate on the external 
aspect of the dependence relation. (Strom, G.W., 1978: pp.15-17.)
The Latin American approach adopted in the ensuing paragraphs argues 
that dependence may be defined as a subordinate relation to the outside 
world, which originated historically through foreign intervention, 
although today it is manifested both through the internal socio-economic 
structure established in the peripheral societies and through unequal 
foreign relations. (Strom, G.W., 1978: p . 14.)
Strom bases her analysis of the development of Lesotho upon this 
approach and sets it within the framework of six questions:
(Strom, G.W., 1978: p.12.)
a. Is production becoming less diversified and more 
disintegrated?
b. Are inequalities in wealth, welfare and income increasing?
c. Is the power base of the government decreasing?
- 72 -
d. Are state institutions growing in size and state 
activities in scope?
e. Is foreign control of human and material resources 
increasing?
f. Is economic growth increasingly emphasised as a goal 
of government policies at the same time as the regime 
repeatedly fails to reach this goal?
The tendencies indicated in these questions are sometimes treated as 
automatic indicators of dependence, although not always grouped together 
in the same study. It should be noted, however, that the tendencies 
indicated have their origins in different types of dependency and, in 
fact, looking at these signs as caused by dependence does not exclude 
the fact that they may have other causes in other societal situations.
Botswana and Lesotho obtained their independence from Britain in 1966 
while Swaziland gained hers in 1968. From the late nineteenth century 
until that time Great Britain had administered all three as High Com­
mission Territories, the responsibility for which, somewhat uniquely, 
was vested in the Commonwealth Relations Office rather than the Colonial 
Office. This was the result of the original justification for British 
intervention whereby British interests coincided with the main chiefs 
of the Botswana at that time - Khama of the Ngwato; Setshele of the 
Kwena; Bathoen 1 of the Ngwaketse - as well as King Moshoeshoe I of 
the Basotho who wished to protect themselves from settler expansion 
from the Transvaal and Orange Free State Republics. Swaziland was 
disputed until 1894 when Britain recognised the right of the Transvaal 
Republic to protect it. However, after the defeat of the Transvaal, 
Swaziland became a British protectorate.
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However, the British commitment to these territories was perceived to 
be tentative and the South African Act of Union of 1909 carried an 
addendum explicitly noting that the three territories were expected to 
become part of the Union. The British government appeared to share 
the White South African view that the logic of geography, economics 
and ethnic ties among the people of the territories and the Union poin­
ted towards incorporation as the sensible path for the future.
Fear of incorporation, however, led the people of the territories to 
resist incorporation and the chiefs continued to remind the British 
that they had an obligation to protect the autonomy and basic human 
rights that would be denied to their people on incorporation into the 
Union.
After 1948, after the Nationalist Party came to power in South Africa, 
incorporation took on a different dimension. From the Nationalist 
point of view it became more attractive as the Bantustan concept devel­
oped. This was made explicit in 1956 in the Tomlinson Report in which 
maps of the three territories were included in its view of the overall 
separate development strategy. (Tomlinson, 1955.)
By then, however, external events had strengthened resistance to 
incorporation. The rise and success of African nationalism to the 
North, the international condemnation of apartheid, and other pressures 
combined to make the granting of independence a feasible and politic­
ally expedient alternative.
In 1962, Prime Minister Verwoerd indicated that he was reconciled to 
the High Commission Territories becoming separate self-governing states. 
A year later, however, he asked to be able to appeal directly to the 
people of these states and explain how they would benefit from the
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Tomlinson formula. The tactic was both transparent and too late coming 
at a time when all three were being prepared for constitutional change 
and independence. (Carter, C.M. and O'Meara, P., 1979: pp.223-225; 
Colclough, C. and McCarthy, S., 1980: pp.48-49.)
It was within this context that the present governments of Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland came to power. The power base of each government 
is radically different and the following paragraphs discuss the power 
bases of the governments of the three countries since independence.
Botswana may be regarded as a regional symbol of liberal democracy with 
the openess of its political process standing in sharp contrast to that 
of Lesotho and Swaziland. It has been ruled since independence by the 
Botswana Democratic Party under the leadership of Sir Seretse Khama 
until his death and now under the leadership of Dr. Quett Masire. 
Despite challenges from the Botswana Peoples Party, the Botswana 
National Front, and the Botswana Independence Party, the outcome of 
any of the three elections since independence was never in any doubt. 
(Colclough, C. and McCarthy, S., 1980: pp.34-47, 51-53.)
In terms of popular participation, the degree of mobilisation is low
and popular response to public policy is partial if not passive. The
preoccupation with ideology is extremely limited and the Botswana
Democratic Party speaks of its "national philosophy" in terms of four
concepts - democracy, development, self-reliance and unity. (Colclough, 
C. and McCarthy, S., 1980: Op.Cit.)
In contrast to Botswana's independent democratic image, the post­
independence history of Lesotho has been characterised by intense 
factionalism, outbursts of fratricidal violence, and endemic political 
instability leading to the conclusion that the concept of marginality
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is most appropriate for interpreting the Basotho experience. The 
Basotho experience of marginality vis-a-vis South Africa has resulted 
in the politicisation of virtually every conceivable line of demarca­
tion within society leading to internecine conflicts involving dynas­
tic rivalries which, in turn, have resulted in recrimination and 
obstructionism. (Weisfelder, R ., 1980: p.249.)
In an election defeat, largely attributed to Chief Leabua Jonathon's 
policy of cooperation with South Africa, the Basotho National Party 
lost its slender two seat majority to the pan-Africanist Basotho Con­
gress Party. Jonathon siezed power and subsequently used the resultant 
institutional flexibility of a suspended constitution to co-opt segments 
of the opposition without permanently rebuffing the remainder. The 
royalist Marematlou Freedom Party and the United Democratic Party were 
persuaded to support him while the Basotho Congress Party phalanx was 
cracked by usurping the power of its leader and using the deputy leader 
of the party to lead a contingent of the party into the new National 
Assembly.
In Swaziland, British rule emphasised loyalty to a country, a flag, and 
a set of laws. This concept introduced a dualism between the tradi­
tional and the modern in the social, cultural, political, religious, 
and the economic sectors of the social order. (Vilakazi, A., 1979: 
pp.269-271.) Despite this, however, the new elite at independence 
still proclaimed their loyalty to the traditional king. The King, 
however, accepted the challenge for an elected legislature and formed 
his own Mbokodvo Party which won the 1964 election and promptly changed 
the constitution by disenfranchising white South Africans resident in 
the country. In 1973 the King suspended the constitution and took over 
the reigns of government. The reason for this may be found in the
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concept of "umbango" or the regarding of opposition as being an illegi­
timate contest for power. Secondly, it was an attempt to contain 
change and especially to deal with the harsh intrusions of industriali­
sation, urbanisation, modernisation, and western education into the 
traditional Swazi socio-political landscape. (Vilakazi, A., 1979: 
pp.271-273.) Before commenting on the degree to which the majority 
tends to be left out of political participation in each country and 
the degree to which this reflects the conflict between centre capital 
interests and potential political majorities in the countries concerned 
it is necessary to discuss the remaining questions outlined in Strom's 
framework.
Industrial and mining production in all three countries is heavily 
dependent on South African as well as other foreign interests. Botswana, 
for instance is completely dependent on De Beers for the exploitation of 
its diamond deposits at Orapa and Letlhakane while the Selebi-Phikwe 
copper mining project is jointly controlled by the Anglo-American Cor­
poration and Amax. Anglo-American and De Beers are interrelated compa­
nies, Anglo-American together with other mining houses holding approxi­
mately one-third of De Beers. De Beers is also involved in diamond 
mining in Lesotho although it has been suggested that this is the 
result of political pressure by Chief Jonathon rather than of commercial 
judgement by De Beers given that Lohnro and RTZ both regarded the depo­
sits as too scattered to be commercial. (Strom, G.W., 1978: pp.132-140.)
Industrial production, as is demonstrated by Selwyn in his study of 
industries in the South African periphery, is largely dependent on the 
South African industrial and market centres for capital, certain raw 
materials, skilled labour, and markets. (Selwyn, P., 1975.) In addi­
- 77 -
tion, despite the provisions of the 1969 Customs Union agreement, the 
South African Railway and Harbours Administration exerts effective 
control over road, rail, and air transport to and from these countries, 
although Botswana's rail system is run and owned by Zimbabwe Rail.
South Africa and the EEC form the market for Botswana's meat production 
while mohair from Lesotho is exported through the South African Wool 
Board. The Commonwealth Development Corporation and Courtaulds have 
been active in the Swazi forest products industry. (Vilakazi, A., 1979
p.280.)
Although all three countries boast major tourist attractions, Lesotho 
and Swaziland have been more active in utilising these than Botswana. 
Lesotho, for instance, has agreements with both the Hilton Corporation 
and Holiday Inn.
Thus, as may be seen, all three countries are strongly dependent on 
external interests in primary, secondary and tertiary production.
The above partially demonstrates the extent to which the material 
resources of each country are subject to South African control.
However, it is useful to briefly outline two further aspects of this - 
the Southern African Customs Union and the recruitment of labour.
The Customs Union was established in 1910 and provided for the free 
interchange of goods between South Africa and the three territories as 
well as sharing of the area's total import and excise revenues occurr­
ing from the common external tariff. Although the percentage share of 
the three territories varied slightly under the original allocation, 
in each of the three cases it was less than one percent leaving approxi­
mately 98 percent for South Africa. In 1969 this agreement was
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renegotiated at the collective insistence of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland. The objective was to improve the revenue position of the 
three smaller states relative to South Africa. The new agreement is 
complex. In brief, however, instead of the former straight percentage 
basis, customs revenues are now divided according to a formula based 
on the value of actual imports into each country in relation to those 
of the common customs area as a whole. Although this new formula still 
allows South Africa to benefit disproportionately due to its large 
industrial economy, income from the duties since 1970 has represented 
a significant portion of the public revenues of the three newly indepen­
dent countries. (See Table 3A.1.) (Carter, G. and O ’Meara, P., 1979: 
pp.225-226; Morgan, E.P., 1979: pp.245-246; Weisfelder, R . , 1979: 
pp.256-257.) In fact, it has enabled the economically stronger 
members - Botswana and Swaziland - to eliminate their dependence on 
British subsidies.
TABLE 3A.1 REPRESENTATIVE PROPORTIONS OF ORDINARY GOVERNMENT REVENUES 
FROM CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (in percentages of total)
Country 1959-60 1965-66 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76
Botswana 25 21 50.1 48.5 31.0
Lesotho 50 35 68.7 63.3 48.0 (1976-77)
Swaziland 11 32 46.5 N.A. N.A.
Source: Carter, G.M. and O ’Meara, P., 1979: p.226.
The recruitment of labour from the three countries by the South African 
Chamber of Mines has several implications for economic development.
The researcher, however, has not found any conclusive quantitative 
study of the internal economic effects of this on the countries concer­
ned. The nature of dependency in this instance will, therefore, be 
considered briefly.
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Essentially, the migrant labour system is accepted by Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland because of the contribution to their economies wages 
earned in South Africa are supposed to make. A number of researchers 
point out, however, that the level of earnings repatriation appears to 
be extremely low with wages earned tending to be spent on consumables 
in South Africa or on goods of South African origin. It is therefore 
questioned whether or not the level of repatriation (and type of skill 
acquired by the individual) justifies the withdrawal of men from the 
agricultural sector thus reducing productivity by placing production 
in the hands of women, children and the elderly. This applies particu­
larly to the subsistence sector. Given the nature of the dependency 
relationship outlined thus far, it is difficult to assess the extent to 
which the growth of state institutions are an effect of the centre 
economies' need for an administrative and political presence in depen­
dent countries or the natural result of social, political and economic 
growth and development or a combination of both. Thus, while Strom 
demonstrates the role of South African advisors in the building of 
Lesotho's public administration, this was, it may be argued, a result 
of Lesotho's foreign policy which was changed radically after the 
demonstration of dissatisfaction in the 1970 election. On the other 
hand, British and South African advisors have been heavily involved in 
Botswana although the foreign policy of this country is clearly inde­
pendent - as is demonstrated by her role as one of the Front Line 
states, a major political role in Southern Africa and one denied to 
Lesotho and Swaziland. The nature of the rapid development of Botswana 
leads to the conclusion that the expansion of state institutions is not 
solely due to centre interests.
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It is, however, clear that the growth of state institutions as well as 
industrial investment and mineral exploitation within the highly dual- 
istic economies of the three countries has inevitably resulted in 
extreme inequalities in wealth, welfare and income.
In conclusion, it is necessary to examine the extent to which economic 
growth is emphasised as a goal of government policies and assess the 
degree to which this goal has been achieved.
Lesotho's First Five Year Plan - 1970/71 to 1974/75 - was designed to 
lay the foundation for social and economic development. Some progress 
was made during this period in that dependence on external grants for 
balancing the budget was ended in 1973/74. In addition total employ­
ment outside of the agricultural sector increased by 5,000 to 6,000 
and three agricultural schemes were put into operation while road, 
tele-communications and a number of other services were improved. The 
growth target for the First Plan Period was a minimum annual GDP inc­
rease of 5 percent. However, the most recent GDP estimate available 
at the time of writing is that for 1971/72 thus making it impossible 
to assess the rate of growth directly. However, available data indi­
cate an expansion of the economy. For example, merchandise imports 
rose from R23.9m in 1969 to R79m in 1974. Capital expenditure incurred 
was R20.8m, 80 percent of the planned total. The target for agriculture 
was achieved but, there were major shortfalls in roads and education. 
(Barclays Bank, 1978.)
The Second Five Year Plan directs attention to obtaining greater manu­
facturing and agricultural production, increased employment, and a 
higher level of income. It aims at a GDP growth rate of 3 percent.
A significant increase in employment in the industrial, handicrafts.
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mining and tourism sectors is sought. Other goals include the develop­
ment of water and mineral resources, improvements in communications, 
etc. The Donor Conference Papers published in September 1977 by the 
Central Planning and Development Office of Lesotho suggest that "the 
success of Lesotho in achieving the objectives set out in the Second 
Five Year Plan depends largely on the capacity of the Government to 
acquire sufficient financial resources to sustain its input into the 
development programme and to sustain an effective level of administra­
tive and technical support for that programme through the recurrent 
budget". However, during the first two years of the planning period 
Lesotho experienced an overall budget deficit largely as a result of 
below estimate revenues from the Customs Union Agreement. Liquidity 
difficulties were also experienced in 1977. Attempts were made to 
overcome these problems by improving the ratio of locally raised 
recurrent revenues to total recurrent revenues and reducing delays 
experienced in receiving reimbursements from donors on that portion of 
the capital programme which is accountable to the Treasury. As regards 
development in Botswana, the 1978 Annual Report of the Bank of Botswana 
stated that Botswana’s GDP grew rapidly between 1968/69 and 1973/74. 
However, GDP declined in real terms in the period 1974/75. This 
decline was the result of a fall in construction activity as the mine 
and new town of Selebi-Phikwe reached completion and the failure of 
mining output to increase as planned. 1974/75 was also a bad year for 
agriculture. (Barclays Bank International.)
In 1975/76, growth of GNP was resumed as output from the mine at 
Selebi-Phikwe increased and as output in other sectors also increased. 
The national income accounts for 1976/77 show that GDP at current 
prices grew by 9 percent - less than the rate of inflation. The only
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sector to show significant rates of growth were mining, quarrying, 
general government, and, to a lesser extent, the various services 
included under the heading of Finance. Preliminary estimates for GDP 
in 1977/78 indicate that real growth in GDP was positive but small, 
probably in the order of 5 percent. (Barclays Bank International.)
The basic strategy behind the Botswana Government's strategy for 
development is the achievement of "Kagisanyo" or social harmony. This 
finds expression in the four national objectives upon which the national 
development plans for 1973-78, 1976-81 and 1979-85 are based. These are
a. rapid economic growth;
b . social justice;
c. economic independence;
d. sustained development.
Budgetary proposals for any one year are closely related to the national 
development plan and its objectives. The fundamental themes of the 
Fifth National Development Plan are rural development and the increase 
of productive employment opportunities. The plan is believed to incor­
porate three major ventures:
a. the construction of an international airport at Gaborone;
b. the construction of a central power station at Palapye to
reduce Botswana's total dependence on the South African 
grid;
c. the takeover of the rail system from Zimbabwe.
Botswana asserts that the basic objective of its development policy is
the increase of the living standards of its population as a whole and 
the rural community in particular. (Colclough, C. and McCarthy, S., 
1980.)
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Three overall objectives, similar to those enunciated by Botswana, 
have been set for Swaziland's immediate future development. These are: 
(Fair, T.J.D., Murdoch, G. and Jones, H.M., 1969: pp.3-9.)
a. economic growth;
b. self-reliance;
c. social justice and stability.
A target of 7 percent has been set for growth of GDP, It has been cal­
culated that between 1973/74 and 1976/77 GDP at factor cost, in 1977/78 
prices, grew from E222.5m to E272.1m - rate of 7 percent per annum. 
(Barclays Bank International.)
It is hoped that the Rural Development Areas Programme will increase
agricultural production by percent, while the production target for
industry involves increasing manufacturing and processing output by 7 
percent. In addition, the programme states that the Government will 
promote the maximum use of existing resources and that processing of 
agricultural and mineral raw materials is to be encouraged, new coal
deposits are to be exploited and water resources are to be developed.
It is estimated that the implementation of this programme will result 
in a GDP of E283m in 1982/83 at 1977/78 prices. (Barclays Bank Inter­
national . )
The strategy for the achievement of self-reliance allows for the secur­
ing of more control over productive activities for the Swazi people, 
the strengthening of the Government's administrative capacity, the 
development of local goods and services, and the diversification of 
external economic relations. This outline of the development of Bots­
wana, Lesotho and Swaziland within the framework of the Latin American
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approach to dependency as applied by Strom to Lesotho demonstrates the 
dependency of the three countries on the more central economies, in 
particular those of the United Kingdom and South Africa. This depend­
ency on South Africa has led, since the Tomlinson report, to repeated 
calls by South Africa's leaders for more formalised cooperation. In 
particular. Prime Minister Botha has, as stated in preceding paragraphs, 
made repeated calls for the establishment of a Constellation of Southern 
African States. However, because of the fears of South Africa's neigh­
bours this has evolved into an empty political gesture involving the 
South African Bantustans.
There is no question of the major advantages to be gained from total 
economic cooperation. Reference to Sir Seretse's comment on Southern 
Africa's developmental potential given the resources available to it is 
evidence of this. It is unfortunate that the social and political his­
tory of Africa continues to exercise so powerful an influence as to 
deny its people even the first chance of participating in turning the 
continent into the food, mineral and energy house of the future. It 
will require considerably more than Sir Seretse's act of political will 




THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND ITS 
ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
"The analysis of multinational business enterprise has been clouded by 
controversy, variety of interpretation and numerous, frequently emo­
tive, value judgements". (Hood, N. and Young, S., 1979: p.l.) Hood 
and Young point out that there are few economic institutions that have 
been the focus of more contention than the multinational corporation. 
"Alternatively welcomed and spurned, praised and denigrated, controlled 
and deemed uncontrollable, such enterprises have been at the centre of 
wide-ranging debates both within their domestic base and in recipient 
nations". (Hood, N. and Young, S., Op.Cit.)
Even casuhl exploration of the literature demonstrates the strength of 
positive and negative feeling towards the multinational corporation.
The U.S. Tariff Commission has stated, for example, that "it is a fact 
beyond dispute that the spread of multinational business ranks with the 
development of the steam engine, electric power and the automobile as 
one of the major events of modern economic history". (United States 
Tariff Commission, 1973, cited in Hood, N. and Young, S., 1979.) On 
the other hand their activities have on several occasions been the sub­
ject of strong criticism. For example, following the disclosures 
arising from the board room row Edward Heath, in the House of Commons, 
accused Lonrho of representing "the unpleasant and unacceptable face 
of capitalism". (Cronje, S., Ling, M. and Cronje, G ., 1976: p.8.)
The multinationals comprising the international heavy electrical indus­
try have been accused of forming a cartel, the International Electrical
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Agency based in Lausanne, which has served to hinder the economic 
development of the LDCs by raising contract prices by up to 25 percent 
on certain items of equipment and, in the case of Brasil, placing the 
control of the indigenous industry under the control of foreign firms 
by questionable means. (Mirow, K.R. and Maurer, H . , 1982: pp.3-9,
48-59, 276-282.) The conflicts which emerge between the benefits and 
threats posed by the multinational corporation are well documented in 
case form in Gladwin and Walter. (Gladwin, T.N. and Walter, I., 1980.)
Thus, while many recognise the major contributions to be made by the 
multinational corporation in technology transfer, international econo­
mies of scale, and so on, others stress the more sinister dimensions 
of such organisations as a form of neo-imperialism, economic domination, 
or unanswerable source of power.
The debate on the multinational corporation is not static, for what was 
once regarded as a competitive environment where foreign investors 
acted as neutral agents of capital and technological transfer is now 
seen as a highly oligopolistic world of transnational corporations 
possessing great commercial and economic power and posing a challenge 
to national policy and economic independence.
As will be discussed in ensuing paragraphs, the massive increase in 
economic activity in the present century has led, amongst other things, 
to the rise of the multinational corporation, particularly since the 
early 1960s. Today, Barnet and Muller point out, the multinational is 
transforming the world economy through its increasing control of what 
they term "three fundamental resources of economic life: (Barnet, R.J.
and Muller, R.E., 1975: pp.26-33.)
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- the technology of production
- finance capital
- marketing".
It is this concept of integrated strategic planning on a global scale 
that leads to the definition of the multinational corporation adopted 
by the researcher. This definition is that submitted by Channon and 
Jalland, namely, "a multinational corporation is a company which seeks 
to operate strategically on a global scale". (Channon, D.F. and 
Jalland, M . , 1979: pp.2-3.) D.H. Robertson defines multinational 
corporations as "islands of conscious power in an ocean of unconscious 
cooperation". (Robertson, D.H., cited in Coase, R.H., 1937.)
A precise and generally acceptable definition of what constitutes a 
multinational corporation or business enterprise is not available.
The most widely used definition, however, is an arbitrary one chosen 
as the basis of the Harvard Research Programme directed by Raymond 
Vernon. Vernon adopts the thesis that a firm could be called multina­
tional if it possesses at least six overseas manufacturing subsidiaries 
However, Channon and Jalland argue that by choosing such an arbitrary 
number of overseas manufacturing plants it is possible to study a group 
of concerns for whom the increased complexity of managing a firm in 
many different environments is potentially common such a definition 
says little of how such firms actually manage their operations.
(Channon, D.F. and Jalland, M ., 1979.) It is possible for firms which 
numerically qualify as multinational to have little or no concept of 
themselves operating a carefully coordinated and integrated interna­
tional strategy. In addition, such a definition is confined to the 
manufacturing industry and neglects the importance of multinational 
service corporations.
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Channon and Jalland's definition takes into consideration such organi­
sations as, for example, the General Electric Company which although 
denying its multinationality nevertheless operates strategically on a 
global scale through its centralised control over the budgeting proces­
ses of its subsidiaries as well as centralising all technical innova­
tions made by its foreign companies.
Thus, while it is recognised that this definition is perhaps academic­
ally less rigorous it is of more immediate practical relevance than 
those tended by Vernon and others.
It is within the context of such integrated international strategic 
planning that this chapter examines the role of the multinational cor­
poration in South African economic development, as defined in Chapter 
Two with its consequent effects on social, political and institutional 
change as discussed in the preceding chapter. To achieve this a three­
fold approach is adopted. Firstly, the rise of the multinational cor­
poration, the modification of management attitudes and expectations 
associated with this, the essential characteristics of the multinational 
and its economic impact are discussed. The second element examines the 
role of the multinational corporation in the economic development of 
South Africa and rejects the neo-classical analysis of recent years.
In particular it rejects the comparative static approach as being of 
little use when analysing a dynamic force such as foreign direct invest­
ment. IVhere such approaches as, for example. Mac Dougall's welfare 
analysis have been extended to overcome such problems, the developments 
have taken place at a high level of abstraction and the models have 
tended to be oversimplified representations of reality having little or 
no relevance to the contemporary problems of such industrialising
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countries as South Africa. Two alternative approaches to the role of 
the multinational corporation in South Africa are then proposed.
Finally, this is examined from the point of view of the multinational 
corporation in terms of a conflict management approach which allows a 
more explicit exposition of South Africa's developmental requirements. 
This in conjunction with Chapter Six, which attempts a taxonomy of 
the strategies adopted by particular organisations operating in South 
Africa, allows an assessment of the developmental contribution of 
specific multinational corporations in terms of the strategy adopted 
when operating or investing directly in South Africa.
4.2 THE RISE OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
Despite a number of deficiencies in theory and the difficulties of 
reconciling such theory with managerial practice, it is possible to 
make certain generalisations about the routes adopted by firms in their 
pursuit of a multinational strategy. However, as will be demonstrated 
in the analysis of the empirical element of this dissertation, there 
are several such routes to multinationality. Nevertheless, certain 
routes are more common than others despite the fact that an examination 
of the strategies of many multinational corporations reveals the need 
for variation in planning systems, in information and control systems 
and in the roles expected of and decision making powers granted to 
various levels in the organisations.
In discussing the rise of the multinational corporation Tugendhat starts 
from a similar premise as that of Channon and Jalland in observing that 
the most striking characteristic of the modern multinational is its 
central direction. "Despite", he states, "frequent assertions to the
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contrary the subsidiaries are not run as separate enterprises each of 
which has to stand on its own feet. They must all work within a frame­
work established by an overall group plan at headquarters .....
(Tugendhat, C ., 1971: p.31.)
Such central direction has only become possible in the last three 
decades as it depends on effective communications and information pro­
cessing. It is within this context that it is useful to examine the 
emergence of the multinational corporation in its full sense in the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Western Europe.
In the period since the 1950s the rate of new subsidiary formation by 
U.S. firms has grown rapidly. Although the number of new operations 
based in the developing countries and Latin America in particular grew 
rapidly, the location of overseas assets and the volume of trade con­
ducted by U.S. firms abroad remained heavily concentrated in the devel­
oped economies. Channon and Jalland demonstrate the dramatic expansion 
in the volume of direct investment in the post war period by showing 
how it has risen from $11,788m in book value of total investments in 
1950 to $78,090m in 1970. (Channon, D.F. and Jalland, M . , 1979: pp.7-8.)
This period was especially favourable to such growth by U.S. firms 
operating abroad. Such firms were faced by relatively slow growth in 
their home economy and by several institutional constraints on growth 
by acquisition. However, they perceived themselves as having signifi­
cant advantages over their overseas competitors. Firstly, they saw 
themselves as having the advantage of scale and technology. Secondly, 
they saw themselves as having superior marketing skills developed in a 
highly competitive market place unlike the Europeans for whom cartels 
were more common and who did not appear to have the skills required to
- 91 -
operate in the newly created larger market of the EEC. Thirdly, the 
stringent foreign exchange controls that existed in Europe in the 
immediate post-war period did not exist in the United States. Finally, 
U.S. managers perceived themselves as possessed of an ability to organ­
ise and manage large scale corporations.
The host countries to which this new investment was directed were eager 
to attract these firms which were regarded as being able to provide new 
jobs, technology, management skills and capital all of which were lack­
ing in their own economies. The strategies of these new arrivals was 
essentially simple. Most new subsidiaries were formed to supply a local 
market rather than import and each operated independently of the others 
being principally identified with the needs of the local market. 
Management decision-making, although highly centralised as regards 
investment, tended to be delegated whenever possible to local manage­
ment which was principally concerned with the operational effectiveness 
of the subsidiary.
In the 1960s, however, the first true multinational corporations started 
to emerge. These attempted to build an integrated global strategy where 
national boundaries were no longer the relevant building block. While 
companies operating in manufacturing or raw material processing were 
forced to coordinate centrally global movements of raw materials and 
finished products, local managers were still required to exercise con­
siderable autonomy due to difficulties in communications. Gradually, 
however, this autonomy has been eroded and more of the key strategic 
decisions have been determined centrally.
This centralisation has led to concern among the governments of the 
less developed countries which at the same time as the trend to optimise
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an overseas strategy. For many the achievement of multinational status 
was largely accidental and resulted primarily from changes in domestic 
policies.
In particular, increased competitive pressure coupled with legal 
restrictions against cartels and decolonisation of the Empire in the 
1960s resulted in an increase in industrial concentration as a result 
of domestic merger activity. A corollary of this was that such mergers 
often brought together firms each of which conducted minor operations 
abroad but which in combination created a new enterprise with a sub­
stantial overseas commitment.
The first priority of these newly formed or consolidated firms was to 
rationalise their domestic management structures. Initially the 
strategy acquisition led to the creation of unstable holding company 
systems of management which rapidly proved unsatisfactory. As financial 
performance continued to decline this led ultimately, in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, to the widespread adoption of the multidivisional form 
of organisation. With this new organisational pattern the largest 
British companies have started to develop coordinated strategies towards 
their domestic operations and, latterly, towards their overseas activities
In contrast to the early colonial tradition of British foreign direct 
investment, which was also partially mirrored by the French and Dutch 
experience, the non-colonial developed nations of Western Europe have 
pursued a policy more akin to that of the U.S. multinational corpora­
tions. Many major German enterprises were diversified well before the 
First World War. While some of this overseas activity was located in 
the German colonies, the more limited nature of this empire meant that 
the strategies pursued were more centred on expansion elsewhere in
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Europe. After the war these operations were largely confiscated but 
they were reformed only to be confiscated for a second time in 1945.
The principal direction of investment nevertheless remained inter- 
European which, until 1945, included Eastern Europe. To a large extent, 
therefore, European foreign direct investment may be attributed to the 
classical economic reasons of tariff barriers, patent protection and 
transport economies. Relatively little investment, however, was made 
by German firms in raw material source developing countries.
4.5 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
For the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraphs British companies 
arriving at the turn of the century constituted the first wave of 
foreign direct investment into South Africa. Initially the accent was 
on capital equipment for the mines, although a limited number of con­
sumer goods manufacturers, such as Unilever in 1911, established them­
selves at this time.
In the 1920s and early 1930s most of the U.S. companies now active in 
South Africa arrived. Exceptions were IBM, which only established 
itself locally in the 1950s - along with most other data processing 
companies - and Mobil which has been active in South Africa since 1897.
A more typical example was General Motors, which sited its first, and 
all subsequent, plants in Port Elizabeth in 1926 thereby firmly estab­
lishing the motor industry in this area. The company responded geo­
graphically to a request of the government of the time which was 
attempting to alleviate the then white unemployment in the area.
In subsequent years a number of Continental European firms established 
themselves. However, the next major influx of companies from the mid- 
1950s onwards were German with, to a lesser extent, Swiss, Dutch,
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Italian and Scandinavian firms following while the French opted in the 
main for agency representation. The Japanese also opened trading 
houses but lately have become more directly involved through third 
party investment.
As has been stated in Chapter One, it is impossible to determine which 
nationality holds what percentage of foreign direct investment in 
South Africa. Such information is withheld by the South African 
government to prevent leverage being applied against home governments 
and investors. At the same time it is difficult to accurately deter­
mine the level of dependence of the economy on foreign direct investment
However, Poolman has estimated that the foreign direct private sector 
investment in 1977 was divided as follows: (Financial Mail, 27.6.80:
p.21.)
EEC 62%
North and South America 25%





The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations produced a 
report on multinational activity in South Africa which estimated that 
investment from Britain, the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany 
accounts for over 75% of the total direct investment in South Africa 
with a percentage split of 50%, 20% and 7% respectively based on 1976 
estimates. However, following the growth of U.S. and German investment 
in recent years these percentages are likely to be inaccurate. In 
addition, Germany's 7% excludes Siemens' South African holdings which 
are registered in Switzerland. (Financial Mail, Op.Cit.)
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A 1978 report by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
entitled Investment in Apartheid, showed that the number of foreign 
firms operating in South Africa between 1974 and 1978 increased by 260 
from 1,623 to 1,883. (Financial Mail, 27.6.80: p.21.)
Bissell and Crocker made a series of estimates as to American and 
European investment in South Africa which demonstrate the difficulty 
of assessing the degree of participation by particular countries with 
any degree of confidence. These are reproduced in Table 4.1. (Bissell, 
R.F. and Crocker, C.A., 1979: pp.189-193.)
TABLE 4.1 AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1975
Total 





8.5 19% 1.97% 3-6% 20-35% 64%
Portfolio
Investment
10.4 14%* 6.99% n.a. n.a. 56%
Total
Investment
18.9 16%* 4.72% 11%* 26-34% 60%
Note: Where a range of figures is shown, the low figure is 
official, the higher figure is our estimate.
Estimates are marked (*):
U.S.: Assumes U.S. investment accounts for three-fourths of reported 
North and South American investment.
Germany: Assumes Germany accounts for $2.0 billion of the total 
$11.3 billion EEC investment.
Sources :
U.S.: Dept, of Commerce Survey of Current Business, August 1976, p.45 
France: Statement of South African Ambassador to France, Louis
Pienaar, to the Société d'Economie Politique, February 3,
1977, reported in "L'Afrique du Sud fait Appel aux Investisse­
ments Français," Le Monde, February 8, 1977, p.42.
Germany: Federal Ministry of Economics.
U.K.: Ministry of Trade, Trade and Industry, February 25, 1977,
pp.532-533. Total figure cited in "British in a Quandary over 
South Africa," R.W. Apple, Jr., New York Times, October 26,
1977, p.A6.
EEC: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, December, 1976, 
pp.S-64-65.
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For practical purposes, however, existing direct investment is meaning­
less. Fixed current assets form a more meaningful yardstick by which 
to gauge foreign involvement in an economy.
From their initial arrival in South Africa at the turn of the century 
until the 1950s most foreign firms fell into the classic multinational 
mould. Their plantswere generally little more than assembly workshops 
for the parent products and their management predominantly composed of 
expatriates. Most firms operated on the bases of high priced technology 
agreements with the parent and remitted all surplus cash. The parent 
companies retained tight central decision-making control.
This has, however, altered considerably in recent years. Average local 
content, including industries where no such government requirement 
exists, is approximately 60%. Expatriates now form a minority in 
management. Few firms now remit surplus cash and most firms have 
extensive research and development facilities which although some are 
used for producing original developments, most are used for developing 
local adaptations. There are certain indications that a reversal of 
the technology agreements with such firms as Metalbox charging its 
parent company for local South African technology that flows back to 
the United Kingdom.
The extent of local autonomy varies considerably with central control 
being much tighter among U.S. firms, which also tend to retain 100% 
ownership. In certain U.S. firms any capital expenditure from R50,000 
and above has to be agreed both in the budget and by the relevant head 
office vice president. (Financial Mail, 27.6.80: p.22.)
With European firms, as will be demonstrated, once the budget has been 
approved in the home country, expenditure becomes the concern of the
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subsidiary. In addition, extra budgetary limits tend to be higher 
than for U.S. firms. It is worth noting that many German and Dutch 
firms do not have a formal procedure for additional budgetary expen­
diture but operate more by assessing individual situations as they 
occur.
4.4 THE ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Chapter Three described the high degree of political and economic 
dependency existing among the states of Southern Africa. This in 
conjunction with the liberal argument that economic growth will bring 
about social, political and institutional change in South Africa with 
the consequent implications for the development of the region demon­
strates the importance of examining the role of foreign direct invest­
ment or, more specifically, the role of the multinational corporation 
in economic development.
There have been several theoretical approaches to the developmental 
role of foreign direct investment in the literature. However, the 
methodological difficulties of developing such a theoretical framework 
means that such approaches often serve to illustrate the weaknesses in 
Chapter Two.
The neo-classical analysis of the effects of foreign direct investment, 
for example, derives from an article by MacDougall published in 1960. 
MacDougall analysed the static effects of a flow of capital into 
Australia. (MacDougall, G.D., 1960: pp.13-35.) This inward direct 
investment was seen as increasing the host country stock of capital and 
reducing the home country stock in a simple one-for-one manner. The 
conventional assumptions were applied, namely:
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a. there is perfect competition;
b. there is long-run full employment equilibrium;
c. the balance of payments is in equilibrium and is maintained 
at that level without cost;
d. returns to scale are constant and there are no external 
economies ;
e. there is no taxation;
f. the terms of trade effects are ignored.


















In Figure 4.1 CL relates the capital stock to the marginal physical 
product of capital given the amount of labour. The initial stock is 
AC of which AB is domestically owned and BC is foreign owned. Profits 
on domestic capital are FEBA while on foreign capital they are EDCB. 
Wages amount to CDF. Should foreign investment increase from BC to BM
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profits become JLMB and since the marginal product of capital has fallen 
total profits on domestic capital decline to IIJBA. Although the inc­
rease in real wages amounts to FDLH, FEJH is merely a redistribution 
from the domestic owners of capital. The host country as a whole gains 
EDLJ. Thus, the model was interpreted as indicating that the host 
country gain would be small in relation to the profits accruing to the 
new foreign capital (KLMC).
However, by dropping certain of the assumptions of the model, certain 
benefits may be seen to accrue to the host country. Thus, introducing 
the possibility of external economies from additional foreign direct 
investment increases the likelihood of benefits to the host country.
Such external economies may arise from the introduction of new technol­
ogy, managerial ability and so on through the host economy. Similarly, 
foreign firms may introduce production methods which facilitate econom­
ies of scale so that proportionate growth in output is greater than the 
proportionate increase in capital and labour inputs.
However, it is clearly incorrect to suggest that the effects of foreign 
investment are all beneficial. Once the assumption of perfect competi­
tion is dropped, for example, the range of possible outcomes, including 
adverse outcomes, is considerably increased.
Cost advantages may not be passed on to consumers in lower prices or to 
workers in higher wages. Instead they may accrue as profits to the 
parent company. Indeed, as will be demonstrated in the case studies 
that follow, oligopolistic competition is a notable feature of the 
multinational corporation. Moreover, fluctuations in the net inflow of 
private capital and the fact that at least part of the foreign profits 
earned will be remitted back to the parent company may create balance
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of payments difficulties. Thus, problems in turn may result in defla­
tionary measures being taken which will be lower than the rate of 
growth and produce unemployment.
As may be seen, therefore, the predictions of the model are ambiguous 
and MacDougall's approach is limited. In particular the comparative 
static approach is of little use when analysing a dynamic force such as 
foreign investment. MacDougall's analysis has been extended in several 
ways but most of these developments have taken place at a high level of 
abstraction and the models have tended to be oversimplified representa­
tions of reality.
Hood and Young argue that if this framework is abandoned it is necessary 
to revert to "the equally unsatisfactory procedure of reviewing the 
various areas under which gains and losses could conceivably arise and 
then judging each individual case on its own merits". (Hood, N. and 
Young, S., 1979: p . 183.] They concede that such an approach would in 
itself create several difficulties since in most areas there is no 
prior way of knowing whether the contribution of the multinational cor­
poration would be positive or adverse.
They argue further that such an approach focuses the decision on whether 
or not foreign direct investment leaves the country any better off than 
it would have been under any feasible alternative. They then consider 
the effects of foreign direct investment under four headings, namely: 
sovereignty and autonomy effects, resource transfer effects, trade and 
balance of payments effects, and competitive and anticompetitive 
effects. (Hood, N. and Young, S., 1979: pp.183-227.)
While such artificial isolation may be applied when considering such 
aspects as the role of the multinational corporation in technology
- 102 -
transfer or the effects of such corporations on sovereignty across a 
broad range of countries, it is more difficult to do so when examining 
in detail the role of the multinational in one country or region.
Indeed, it becomes necessary to consider not only the powerful inter­
relationship between a number of political, social and economic varia­
bles but also the reciprocal effects of these on each other and the 
strategy of the specific organisations under discussion.
In South Africa the role of the multinational corporation has become 
highly politicised. It is, therefore, useful to consider the role of 
foreign direct investment in Southern Africa from the point of view of 
the various political parameters within which the multinational corpor­
ation is forced to conduct its operations. To do this the ensuing 
paragraphs examine South Africa’s international strategic position, 
the international rivalries in Southern Africa, the importance of 
foreign direct investment to South Africa and the attitudes of South 
Africans to the multinational enterprise.
4.5 THE POLITICISATION OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
International criticism is often presented by the South African govern­
ment as part of a Soviet strategy to gain control of the Cape Sea route 
and South Africa’s strategic mineral reserves. This point of view is 
presented by Van Rensburg in a South Africa Foundation Briefing Paper 
on South Africa’s mineral reserves. (Van Rensburg, W.C.J.) This paper 
strongly criticised the United States for generally having been "more 
concerned with South Africa’s political and social structures than with 
the realities of strategic geography - the importance of the country in 
terms of raw materials, industrial power and military position". While 
"on the other hand the Soviets understand South Africa’s key position
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in the global balance of power and have sought for decades to detach 
South Africa from the West". (Van Rensburg, W.C.J.) In particular 
it is suggested General Lagovskii's "weak link" principle by which it 
is possible by controlling the supplies of certain critical raw materials 
such as chrome, platinum, nickel, cobalt and titanium seriously reduce 
the United States’ military capacity because of the dependence of modern 
weaponry systems on these minerals.
Professor Van Rensburg argues that South Africa’s adversaries have 
already had considerable success in preventing her from attaining her 
full potential in the export of minerals by encouraging churches, banks, 
corporations and other organisations to refrain from investing in the 
country, by closing merely potential exports, and by organising protests 
against the exports of South African minerals to South Africa’s trading 
partners.
To argue that criticism of South Africa is communist inspired and direc­
ted at detaching South Africa from the West for her strategic reserves 
is naive and represents a failure to understand the fundamental issues 
at stake. Criticism of the South African political system, in the 
experience of the author, in the United Kingdom and Europe takes place 
because of the inability, as Professor Feldberg has stated, of people 
"to accept the political dominance of a small minority over a racially 
and culturally completely different majority". In addition, criticism 
tends to be levelled by all shades of political opinion.
To imply that such criticism is a result of Soviet penetration of church 
groups, political parties and other political groupings ascribes great 
ability to Soviet intelligence networks which would surely be better 
directed at politically destabilising the countries of which these
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organisations are a fundamental part leaving cruder, more directly 
effective techniques available for dealing with a small country such 
as South Africa.
However, this is not to deny the strategic importance of the Cape Sea 
route or that of South Africa's mineral deposits. The position of the 
Cape of Good Hope makes the seas around it one of the world's major 
strategic trade routes given the limited capacity of the Suez Canal and 
the somewhat ephemeral nature of peace in the Middle East. This is 
readily demonstrated by information published by the Foreign Affairs 
Research Institute in 1978 and 1979 showing that the estimated needs 
of the West shipped via the Cape route included:
- 25% of the United Kingdom's food;
- 57% - 68% Western Europe's oil imports;
- 70% Western Europe's raw materials imports;
- 50% Western Europe's exports of consumer and capital goods. 
(Hoek, P.W., 1980: pp.13-20; O'Ballance, E ., 1979;
Parry, A . , 1978.)
The United States Strategic Institute has estimated that in the early 
1980s 60% of U.S. oil imports will be via the Cape. Figure 4.2 illus­
trates how this route could, in time of crisis, be threatened by the 
Soviet navy. (Hoek, P.W., 1980: Op.Cit.)
General Lagovskii, a leading Soviet logistician, stated and illustrated 
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"The problem of sea communications for the Western countries 
even today is recognised as one of the most important prob­
lems in the conduct of war. The solution to the problem of 
supplying the NATO European armed forces with fuel, for 
example, depends almost entirely on the operation of a tanker 
fleet to effect the shipment of oil from the Middle East to 
Europe." (Lagovskii, A., 1960 quoted in Herrick, R.W., 1968:
p.100.)
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the importance of South Africa in the pro­
duction of strategic and other raw materials.
For both political and strategic reasons four major forces - the West, 
the Soviet block, China, and the Third World - are engaged at different 
levels in the struggle to obtain a new political and economic equili­
brium in South Africa. The Third World, Soviet Union and China share 
the common objective of ending white power in the subcontinent but they 
are often divided over the means to achieve this end. The Soviet Union 
and China do not agree on tactics and means of influence within the 
Third World and these rivalries are increasingly noticeable within 
Southern Africa. The West on the other hand has been t o m  between 
defence and its long established interests in this area and its fear 
that failure to achieve further satisfying transitions to majority rule 
will lead to an intensified black/white conflict in Namibia and South 
Africa. Third World countries, and in particular the Black States 
bordering South Africa are undivided in their aim of aiding Black South 
Africans to achieve full political rights within South Africa or "Azania" 
However, their policies are inevitably affected by their perspective on 
how best to achieve this objective and by their own interests. Never­
theless, following the independence of Zimbabwe and the regional
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TABLE 4.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE IN AFRICA'S MINEABLE MINERAL RESERVES 
(1975) AND PRODUCTION (1976)
expressed as a percentage of Africa's reserves and production
South Africa 
Reserves 1975 Africa Production (t)
South Africa's 
Role 1976
Rank % 1976 Rank %
Platinum group metals 1 91 * 1 99
Andalusite/Sillimanite/
Kyanite 1 97 104000 1 99
Vermiculate(Crude) 1 94 225729 1 98
Gold(Metal) 1 90 760460kg 1 94
Coal(Anthracite,Bituminous) 1 93 81650000 1 94
Vanadium(Metal content) 1 99 10584 1 93
Antimony(Metal content) 1 99 12561 1 86
Chrome Ore 1 85 3262780 1 74
Manganese Ore 1 96 8189626 1 67
Asbestos(Fibre) 1 59 577783 1 64
Fluorspar 1 85 451895 1 64
Uranium(Metal content) 1 72** 5733 1 48
Nickel(Metal content) 31 50450 1 44
Zinc(Metal content) 1 77 260508 1 30
Silver(Metal) 1 80 S29541 1 27
Iron Ore 1 38 51399943 2 30
Diamonds(Gem,Industrial)*** High - 28674700c 2 24
Tin(Metal content) 3 8 13372 3 24
Copper(Metal content) 3 11 1462971 3 13
Phosphate Rock(Cone) 4 2 25781000 5 6
Lead(Metal) 1 52 n/a n/a n/a
Titanium(Metal) 1 55 n/a n/a n/a
* Confidential Data
** Includes SWA
*** South Africa is Africa's largest producer of Gem Diamonds
Sources: South Africa: Minerals Bureau, Department of Mines 
Africa: Mineral Trade Notes, U.S. Bureau of Mines 
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa
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TABLE 4.5 SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGIC MINERAL RESERVES AND PRODUCTION, 1977 













RSA + USSR 
% of World 
Mineable 
Reserves
Chrome Ore 51 84 81 84
Manganese Ore 37 93 78 93
Vanadium 53 90 49 97
Platinum 87 89 75 99
Gold 73 64 51 68
Fluorspar 11 46 35 50
Uranium 13 16 n/a 40-50
Diamonds 25 n/a n/a n/a
Source: Minerals Bureau, SA Department of Mines, May 1979 update
109 -
*
3  O  O  1/1 p *3  00 3  00 O CN CN O  to 00 to to X  d  CN 00 d  \0 p  to to X  00 to 3 to d  X  o  d to to to o  d 00 p to X toN  to O  P  (N »û vO O  00 O P  to N  to \0 O  O  to 00 3 3  to X  P  to N) CN O  d' to to X  to d  CN 00 p  d  p  to 00 to X  N)O  to O  3  O CN 3  00 d- O 00 \0 P  3  O O  O  O  O  O d  to X  X  X d  d  o  o  CN p  to 3  NO O CN d  NO 00 p O  d O  CN
^  0 0 ̂ to \0 L/1 O  vO 3  to d- to to to 00 O  P  00 00 00 to 00 3 3  00 3  X  3 to d  d  3  3 to to to P  CN X  CN to to 3 NO X to O to
p 2 iH ; X  3  10 CM d- X  to P  to to tO O  "d O  N 3  3  to P  d CN CN 00 to d to N) to p  NO X  3  NO to P P  to CN 3  to to X  p 0010 to 3  'O P 3  X  00 to to O  CN to P  3 CN (N d  to P to 01 d  d- to d  to to O  vD to 00 to to to d  CN P to O LT)3  ■z ' ^ ( 3 ^ 3 CM 00 'fl- M  (N X  CN 00 3  d" p  3  vO to to CN P  00 d  to p  00 00 00 X d  CN CN CN p C'll fNp p  10 d' LO P d" to (N 00 00 tO to to to to to CN P  P  P rH «H 00 Clh X  d- to (N (N p  p  p (N c
a:uZ.
to K) CM LO
w N  10 O  M  X O  3  X  p  d- d- P  to to to X  3  O  O  to O  to to o  to o  d" d  3  X d  o  \0 p  p to 00 X  to CN 00 oLL \0 10 d' O CN d- CN (N X CN O P to Ĉ  3  00 P to CN to P d  CN o  CN NO X  3  00 to to P  00 P to CN o  tH tou X  X  10 X CN 3  vD to to CN 3  to CN to r4 «H to N
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development conferences in Arusha and Maputo, a consistent approach is 
beginning to emerge among the frontline states in their strategy for 
escaping South Africa's "economic hegemony".
The communist powers have no interests of their own to defend in Southern 
Africa and have, in the past, stood to gain by committing themselves 
fully to challenging the status quo. Their situation is completely 
different from that of the Western powers. Although the Western powers 
have long lost the political hegemony they held over the subcontinent 
they retain considerable economic and strategic interests in the area 
as well as a measure of influence following the Lancaster House Agree­
ment. However, the challenge to the West comes primarily from the 
African and not from the communist world. Following the independence 
of Zimbabwe there is still the call for dependable allies to assist in 
the struggle to achieve majority rule in Namibia and South Africa.
It is this international arena that the multinational corporation enters 
when operating in South Africa. The multinational corporation in South 
Africa is perceived to represent Western interests and therefore Western 
intransigence as regard positive change. In addition, organisations 
operating in South Africa, it is argued, give tacit support to the 
apartheid philosophy by firstly their mere presence, and secondly by 
their ability to operate successfully within an economic system, based 
on a morally unacceptable ideology. This has been recognised in South 
Africa and the policy is to encourage foreign direct investment which 
although it might not be a seal of approval provides at least some posi­
tive recognition. For its part international business interests have 
been politically active in South Africa in terms of attempting to bring 
about a degree of change. However, this has tended to occur in periods
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of low levels of economic activity and high levels of political activity, 
the most recent being in the recession between 1977 and 1979. However, 
fundamental change introduced by the multinational corporation operating 
in South Africa has been limited. Firstly, it is now recognised that 
such codes as the Sullivan and EEC codes of conduct might actually be 
retarding positive development on the labour front by providing organi­
sations with a framework to hide behind. Secondly, such codes represent 
unacceptable moral imperialism to the black workers who have had no part 
in their preparation and who have merely been told that such codes exist 
and that their company will attempt to adhere to them. Such patronising 
paternalism is being increasingly questioned by representative trade 
unions which claim that the black worker should be permitted to speak 
for himself in determining the conditions under which he is to work.
Internally there is evidence that black urban attitudes to foreign 
investment are undergoing change and that many who, in the past have 
extolled the benefits of foreign companies, are now starting to question 
the role of such investment. Many blacks have agreed that foreign 
investment creates jobs, improves the economy providing trickle down 
effects, and gives companies an opportunity to influence the situation 
in South Africa.
Myers cites Lucy Mvubeloof the 24,000 strong black clothing workers 
union and chief Buthelezi of Inkatha, the largest political grouping in 
South Africa as follows:
"Lucy Mvubelo  recently stated, 'the MNCs have been an asset to us
  why should the world be so cruel as to call for these companies
to withdraw when we are only now getting some sunshine in that very 
dark country of ours?' and chief Buthelezi told Forbes magazine in 1978,
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'it is morally imperative that American firms remain active here .....
and support us in our struggle ..... even though the business aspect
may well present problems.' He rejected withdrawal because foreign 
investment fed growth and, 'as industry expands propelled by domestic 
and foreign investment a severe shortage of qualified men is gradually 
approaching, and black people are of necessity being advanced to more 
responsible positions.' He said a 'call for a low down on investment
or actual disinvestment ..... (is) a call for an aggravation of exactly
the conditions we are struggling against   What kind of struggle
for independence can you wage from a level of utter impoverishment?'" 
(Myers, D ., 1980: pp.50-51.)
Both Mvubelo and Buthelezi, however, put caveats on the performance of 
companies operating in South Africa. Buthelezi argues not for mere 
passive investment but for such companies to play an active role in 
bringing about positive change, while Mvubelo stresses that it is up to 
American companies to improve economic opportunities for blacks.
(Myers, D ., 1980: p.51.)
Percy Qoboza, the former editor of South Africa's largest black paper, 
member of the Soweto Committee of Ten, and a security detainee now 
living in exile in the United States argued in 1978 that "To impose 
economic sanctions on South Africa would be to acknowledge total aban­
donment of a peaceful negotiated settlement. What is more, the creation 
of economic chaos here would expedite the very thing we are desperately 
trying to avoid: a bloody racial confrontation". Qoboza applies the
same caveat as Buthelezi and Mvubelo, however, that "companies must be 
compelled to play a far more active role in helping to remove the walls 
of discrimination in our country". (Time, 1978.)
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Steve Biko explaining the position taken by the South Africa Student 
Organisation and the Black People Convention, stated at the trial of 
nine SASO leaders that SASO leaders never thought that foreign firms 
would as a result of their stand withdraw and that they recognised that 
there were limitations that made it impossible for companies involved 
in the South African economy to withdraw. Biko argued that a major 
theme of the campaign for withdrawal was to increase pressure on South 
Africa by using the foreign investment issue as a political forum and 
a means by which to put foreign governments in a position where they 
would have to press for change through their companies as well as by 
normal political means. (Millard, A., 1978; Myers, D ., 1980: p.S3.)
Attitudes to investment in South Africa by Western firms have varied 
from that of total withdrawal through not expanding investment to full 
support. The demands on organisations such as Barclays Bank and Rio 
Tinto Zinc by various pressure groups are well documented and I do not 
intend to discuss these already well researched cases. However, it is 
useful to examine certain ethical questions that have to be faced by 
the organisations contemplating withdrawal because of pressure from the 
home country. Firstly, withdrawal from South Africa means financial 
withdrawal. Fixed capital remains in South Africa placing productive 
facilities and therefore the labour force in the hands of South Africans 
Thus, any impetus for change would easily be lost. Secondly, strong 
legislation exists to limit the repatriation of funds from South Africa 
entailing in certain cases low interest loans to the South African 
government. Thirdly, the direct effects of withdrawal are likely to be 
felt by the black work force in a time of already high black unskilled 
and semiskilled unemployment and less so by the white skilled labour 
force already being supplemented by an estimated 20,000 skilled workers
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from the United Kingdom in 1981. While to a large extent migrant labour 
and to a very limited degree urban blacks can fall back on the rural and 
tribal areas given the extend of family system in the homelands for 
support, this does not apply to the overwhelming majority of urban 
blacks. Thus the decision to call for a withdrawal of investment is not 
one that should be taken lightly. In certain cases this can mean star­
vation and the destruction of an effective means of political leverage. 
Finally, as has been seen in Zimbabwe "liberation" in South Africa is 
likely to occur in two phases. Firstly, the political/military libera­
tion bringing about black majority rule but which requires a strong 
economic base both to develop the people and to meet their rising 
expectations. The second phase is that of economic liberation which is 
achieved through the development of black enterprise ultimately con­
trolling significant sections of the economy. This has been recognised 
by Enos Nkala, who urged Zimbabweans to follow the example of the 
Afrikaner in recognising the importance of the economic factors. Black 
majority rule without a sound economic base would leave South Africa at 
the mercy of world charity which, as Robert Mugabe’s attempts to obtain 
economic aid has shown, is very limited.
Foreign capital and foreign trade are critical to the economic develop­
ment of South Africa. South African economists have estimated that 
foreign capital alone is responsible for approximately one-third of 
the growth in South Africa’s GDP.
It has provided funds to critical growth sectors of the South African 
economy such as electronics, telecommunications, petroleum processing 
and mining. However, figures on foreign investments can be misleading 
as they do not reflect the true extent to which South Africa has to
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rely on foreign investment particularly the technological, managerial, 
and other skills which accompany such investments. Suckling has sugges­
ted that foreign technology accounted for 40% of the growth in South 
Africa's Gross Domestic Product during the period between 1957 and 
1972. (Suckling, J ., Weiss, R. and Innes, D ., 1975.)
Without foreign capital South Africa would find it impossible to 
achieve a rate of growth sufficient to provide jobs for its rapidly 
expanding population. Between 1975 and 1978 South Africa suffered its 
worst recession since the depression of the 1930s. Unemployment among 
whites. Coloureds and Asians, while still small increased by 117%. 
Between 1976 and 1977 unemployment among Blacks was far greater with 
government figures showing 633,000 blacks unemployed in October 1977 
with the figure falling to 569,000 by February 1978. However, such 
figures, because of the difficulties in developing such statistics, 
understate the position. Some unofficial estimates have put the unem­
ployment figure at 25% of the black workforce. (Myers, D ., 1980: p.40.)
South African government officials estimate that a growth rate of 5.5% 
will be required in future years to absorb new black workers coming 
into the job market. The Unit for Forward Research at Stellenbosch 
University has estimated that this would require $1 - $2 billion per 
annum in new foreign capital. While this growth rate has been exceeded 
in 1979 and 1980, the task is still enormous as South Africa will need 
to create 8.5 million jobs by the turn of the century. (Myers, D ., 1980 
Op.Git.)
Recognising the importance of foreign capital to its development. South 
Africa has actively sought foreign investments. Its investment terms 
for example:
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a. all current income may be repatriated;
b. there are numerous concessions to companies interested in
establishing operations in government designated growth 
areas including low interest loans, preferential transpor­
tation rates, cash rebates, and tax concessions;
c. companies may use rand purchased at a discounted price
(financial rand) for a variety of investments.
The preceding paragraphs have described certain of the major political, 
economic and ethical issues facing foreign enterprise wishing to engage 
in direct investment in Southern Africa. However, there are further 
issues which serve to determine the nature of the role of the multina­
tional corporation in the region and it is useful to examine these 
before suggesting a model for the analysis of the strategic approach 
taken by individual organisations in response to the conflict situation 
they find themselves in when operating in South Africa.
Perhaps the most important of these is their adaptation to the South 
African style of business and management which has tended in the past 
to be described as mid-Atlantic or Anglo-American in approach although 
in recent years this is changing to a more European approach. Other 
areas of significance are technology transfer, marketing, etc.
However, these are of more relevance to the analysis of the case study 
and interview element of the dissertation.
In South Africa the social aspect plays a far greater role in business 
than it does in Europe or the United Kingdom. In particular there is 
far greater emphasis on the entertainment of business associates. 
However, it is often difficult to distinguish between normal competitive
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business practice and what may be termed "questionable business prac­
tices". Business dinners, theatres and so on with the seller or con­
tractor paying tend to be acceptable in South Africa. Some organisa­
tions, particularly those of Swiss, German and Japanese origin tend to 
entertain all of their business associates at large rather lavish 
parties. One Japanese company had a reputation for its parties at the 
Carlton Hotel with beluga caviar, oysters and other culinary delights. 
British companies, however, tend to ignore or underplay this aspect of 
business.
While it is unofficially acceptable practice for companies to give 
executives of organisations with which they do a considerable amount 
of business a Christmas hamper containing various minor luxuries or 
wines and spirits not exceeding £50, there exist definite unwritten 
rules as to size and contents with most firms conforming to the standard,
However, there is little bribery or corruption at senior executive 
levels and almost none at lower levels. Nevertheless, there have been 
at least two cases of serious corruption at senior levels of South 
African state or parastatal organisations. However, comment on these 
is beyond the scope of this chapter.
With the growth of Afrikaner business and entrepreneurship in conjunc­
tion with Afrikaner political control and the goal of achieving more 
economic power, other practices have emerged. Steinmuller of Germany, 
for example, has sought the services of a Pretoria advocate who could 
provide the necessary facilitating contacts at ministerial level thereby 
easing its entry into the South African market and the establishment of 
a manufacturing facility through which it could cater to the South 
African, Argentinian and Brazilian markets.
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The use of such individuals for their political contacts can lead to 
certain difficulties such as when a large Japanese and a British manu­
facturer of heavy capital goods found themselves competing for a major 
state contract with a mutual member of their local boards of directors 
who was supposedly assisting each to the full extent of his abilities.
There have been incidents of questionable practices where, for example. 
South Africa's dependency on certain countries such as France and Ger­
many for particular strategic requirements has been used by those 
countries to apply leverage to obtain a favourable outcome to particu­
lar business negotiations.
What emerges, therefore, is an unwritten code of conduct as to what 
is acceptable or unacceptable. There have been incidents where unethi­
cal or questionable business practices have been adopted or the law 
negated but these tend to be frowned upon and leave a bad feeling 
serving to harm business interests more often than assist them. As a 
result they are comparatively rare.
With a government committed to a particular ideology and which has 
built upon its power since 1948 it is clearly in the interests of any 
organisation to develop both ministerial and civil service contacts 
(particularly since senior civil servants tend to be political appoin­
tees). However, this can lead to problems both at home, in the third 
countries and later within South Africa itself.
Firstly, where a company is seen to have close ties with an unacceptable 
regime it may bring public opinion at home against it. Secondly, with 
Black majority rule in Zimbabwe and Mozambique as well as growing 
international efforts to bring about majority rule in South Africa, 
the possibility of a Black government in a unitary South African state
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cannot be ruled out. Clearly any organisation which had been seen to 
cooperate more closely than necessary with Nationalist leaders would 
be subject to considerable pressures.
The multinational corporation seeking to operate in South Africa will, 
therefore, find itself in a series of conflict situations. In indus­
trial relations, for example, foreign firms have found themselves in 
the position of having, against South African government wishes, to 
recognise non-registered Black trade unions. In such a situation non­
recognition of such unions, which are on the forefront of political 
discussion because of the strong political restrictions but compara­
tively liberal labout laws in South Africa, could result in severe 
criticism of the organisation in its home country. However, recogni­
tion against the advice of the South African government could similarly 
result in censure in South Africa. This was the situation faced by the 
Chloride Group. Indeed, Chloride was the first firm in South Africa to 
recognise an unregistered Black union. It was followed, to the relief 
of its Chief Executive, a week later by Barlows - a large South African 
group.
Similarly, the multinational corporation is likely to face criticism 
from its own unions wishing, as in the United Kingdom, both to protect 
jobs in the home country and to take a particular stance against what 
is perceived to be an unacceptable ideology.
Criticism from certain shareholders or pressure groups with nominal 
shareholdings may also be encountered although this has tended in the 
past to be more of nuisance value other than when deliberate campaigns 
have been organised as in the case of Barclays Bank. As these campaigns 
have been well document and, as commented upon elsewhere, this chapter
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will not add further to an already burgeoning literature. The issue 
is, however, highly sensitive and the researcher was intrigued to later 
find out that when approaching one British multinational for its annual 
report and its supplement on the firm's operations in South Africa his 
correspondence had been immediately forwarded to the Chief Executive.
In South Africa the firm will have to decide on the ethics and morality 
of investment or continued investment. In such situations the ethical 
perceptions of individual decision makers cannot be separated from 
their decisions within the organisation itself. This will have a 
direct bearing on the approach of the organisation to business practi­
ces in South Africa, its marketing strategy as regards consumers from 
different racial and economic backgrounds, etc. The question of this 
separation of ethical perspective between the home or personal environ­
ment and the business environment is commented on by P.D.V. Marsh. 
(Marsh, P.D.V., 1980.) Unfortunately he limits his comments to obser­
vations within one country. It would be of interest to determine the 
change in the ethical perspective of individuals when dealing with 
different countries with different cultural, religious, class and poli­
tical perspectives to his own. However, such a discussion is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation although it is of direct relevance to 
the issue of the development of multinational corporate strategy and 
its relationship to economic development in the full sense of the term, 
and is discussed within this context in Chapter Six.
In the analysis of such conflict within the multinational corporation, 
it is both feasible and analytically convenient to draw a clear dis­
tinction between the management of political risk and conflict manage­
ment in the strategic approach of the organisation in most parts of
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the world. However, there are certain countries where the fundamental 
nature of any conflict situation is likely to be determined by the 
ideological and political milieu within those countries as well as by 
their relations with other countries. It is in their willingness to 
abstract from this basic reality that many writers fail in developing 
their theoretical approach.
Gladwin and Walter, however, in discussing conflict management in 
relation to politics, human rights, industrial relations, terrorism, 
technology marketing, the environment, business practices, and consider 
the political and ideological context within which decisions are made 
as well as the implications of such decisions in the South African 
situation. (Gladwin, T.N. and Walter, I., 1980.) Thus, it is recog­
nised that it is not sufficient to merely analyse conflict in terms of 
the conventional unidimensional cooperative - uncooperative dichotomy 
which tends to oversimplify the complex range of behavioural options 
available to the multinational enterprise.
In recognition of this Gladwin and Walter have adopted Thomas's two 
dimensional model of conflict behaviour to develop a framework within 
which to analyse the determinant of the appropriate conflict behaviour 
by the multinational corporation. (Thomas, K.W., 1976: pp.889-935.) 
This framework suggests that in any given conflict, the behaviour 






(Gladwin, T.N. and Walter, I., 1980: pp.555-557.)
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Figure 4.3 illustrates this. As continuums there are an infinite set 
of values which each of these four variables might have. This is also 
true for cooperativeness and assertiveness. The five points on the 
grid represent the extremes of what may be seen as behavioural zones:
- an avoidance zone;
- a collaborative zone;
- an accommodative zone;
- a compromise zone.
(Gladwin, T.N. and Walter, I., 1980: pp.52-65.)
It should be noted, however, that the four situational variables are 
perhaps not equally important. The two variables related to the 
desirability of the outcome stakes and the interest interdependence 
are more important in assessing a conflict situation than the two 
variables related to outcome feasibility, relative power and relation­
ship quality. Thus, it is suggested that the motivational structure 
of the conflict situation is probably a more important determinant 
of desired conflict behaviour and outcome than that of capability 
structure as capabilities are more readily changeable than basic under­
lying motives.
While this analytic model of conflict behaviour is extremely useful in 
the analysis of particular conflict situations and readily applicable 
to multinational operations in South Africa, it is incomplete without 
implicit recognition of the overall strategy of the multinational cor­
poration which determines the parameters within which reaction to con­
flict may take place.
Strategic parameters within which strategy is determined is the subject 
of the next chapter which uses Doz's and Higgins’ approaches to develop
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a three dimensional strategic matrix thereby formulating a strategic 
taxonomy and corporate typology which will be used to establish a 
methodological framework within which to analyse the empirical element 
of Chapter Six.
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4.6 CONCLUSIONS
As has been suggested in Chapter Three, South Africa is a country of 
irony with the two forces of Afrikaner and Black nationalism leading 
to confrontation. That such confrontation will take place cannot be 
denied. The politicisation of the role of business in this context 
makes the setting of both policy and strategy extremely difficult as 
the issues are far beyond the normal role of business and the Western 
conception of the political interplay between government and business. 
In the view of the researcher it is crucial for investment and trade 
to continue. The reasons for this have been argued fully in both this 
and previous papers. However, it is difficult to assess what business 
will expect in terms of return on investment now and how it perceives 
its potential return in the future. To a certain extent such questions 
make it extremely difficult to examine political risk solely in terms 
of premium for risk, go/no-go decisions or standard forms of risk ana­
lysis. The issues in question are highly subjective as the preceding 





Preceding chapters have concentrated on developing an understanding of 
the Southern African milieu and the role of the multinational corpora­
tion. Emphasis has been placed on the establishment of a framework 
upon which to base an analysis of the contribution of the multinational 
corporation to economic development defined in terms of the cultural, 
social, political and economic objectives described as necessary con­
ditions for the achievement of a universally accepted aim - " ..... the
realisation of the potential of the human personality". (Seers, D ., 
1972.)
This chapter seeks to consolidate this approach by attempting to expa­
tiate the conflict between the economic imperative and the political 
imperative in the determination of multinational corporate strategy.
The discussion provides a theoretical foundation upon which to develop 
a strategic taxonomy of companies operating or seeking to operate in 
South Africa. In Chapter Seven a strategic/developmental matrix 
utilising a subjective analysis of the contribution of each strategy 
within the taxonomy to specific dependent developmental variables is 
suggested. This determines the analytical framework within which the 
analysis of the empirical element of the dissertation will be carried 
out and through which it is possible to assess the contribution, both 
actual and as perceived by their management, of particular firms, 
which are the subject of in depth case studies or semi-structured 
interviews, to the economic development of South and thereby Southern 
Africa. This chapter is, therefore, concerned with both theory and 
methodology.
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The previous chapter argued that many writers have overdramatised the 
role of the multinational corporations by suggesting that their acti­
vities may seriously reduce the economic and political sovereignty of 
the less developed countries. Even as respected an economist as 
Kindleberger has, for example, stated that "the nation state is just 
about through as economic unit", and that "tariff policy is virtually 
useless ...". (Kindleberger, C.P., 1969.) Monetary policy is in the 
process of being internationalised. The world is too small. It is too 
easy to get about. Two-hundred thousand ton tankers and ore carriers 
will not permit sovereign independence of the nation state in economic 
affairs. Penrose takes issue with this approach. Firstly, she suggests, 
the arguments designed to persuade a country that its welfare would be 
increased by rapid and comprehensive "integration" with the advanced 
countries via the international firm are inconclusive and unconvincing. 
Secondly, and of greater relevance to South Africa, Penrose points out 
that the people of the developing countries appear to want to demon­
strate their competence and independence and to establish their own 
priorities - and insist on doing so. Finally, she suggests that econ­
omic inequality breeds fear of the more powerful. (Penrose, E ., 1971: 
pp.221-239.)
Streeten suggests that three questions arise in attempting to harness 
the beneficial effects of the multinational corporation and curtailing 
the harmful effects. Firstly, even if the will and the political 
power were present, to what extent is it feasible to control the 
multinational corporation effectively? Secondly, even if there is the 
political power, is there the will? Finally, even if there is the will 
is there sufficient political power? (Streeten, P., 1971: pp.240-263.)
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Hymer, however, combines location theory with Chandler and Redlich's 
three level scheme for the analysis of corporate structure thus 
sketching a model of the multinational corporation in the international 
economy. (Hymer, S., 1970.) Their head offices, in which the frame­
work of control is centred and where global strategy is determined, are 
located in the major cities of the world. Below these cities are 
arranged a hierarchy of lesser, though still large cities, which are 
concerned with communications, information and all other functions 
involved in coordinating and supervising the managers of the production 
and distribution activities that take place at the next level below.
The "Level III" activities are devoted to managing the day-to-day 
operations of the enterprise and are spread widely over the earth, 
their location being determined by the pull of manpower, markets and 
raw materials.
South Africa at present is determined to maintain its sovereignty and 
independence in political and economic issues. Using Hymer’s framework, 
however, it may be argued that the major industrial areas of South 
Africa lie between "Level III" and "Level II" of his structure. South 
African subsidiaries will, therefore, exercise comparatively little 
control over multinational corporate strategy other than at a local 
operational level. However, such an approach implies a homogenous 
strategic approach by the majority of multinationals despite differing 
market perceptions, technologies, the varying importance of countries 
to the operations of individual companies and the greater importance of 
the political factor in certain countries. Such an approach, therefore, 
fails to recognise the differing degrees of autonomy of multinational 
subsidiaries operating in various countries as a result of the selec­
tion of individual strategies more relevant to their operations abroad
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by particular firms. However, as pointed out in the previous chapter, 
certain broad trends may be discerned among the firms originating in a 
particular home nation. For example, U.S. firms exercising a greater 
degree of centralised control than British firms operating in South 
Africa.
It is within the framework of their differing strategies that the 
developmental contribution of the multinationals to South Africa in 
relation to their perceived role may be assessed.
Before continuing, however, it is necessary to dissipate some of the 
semantic confusion surrounding the literature.
Christopher Lorenz writing in the Financial Times emphasised the import­
ance of clear definition. (Lorenz, C ., Financial Times, 27.6.79.) He 
points to the lack of a clear and generally accepted vocabulary and 
argues that "Every company’s quest for the form of planning which suits 
it best is needlessly confused by jargon; not so much the very fact 
that specialised terminology is used to describe concepts or techniques, 
but that there are generally no accepted meanings for each piece of 
jargon". Clearly then an acceptable definition of corporate strategy 
in the international context must be attempted.
Eels points out that "strategia" in the Greek referred to generalship 
and the art of military command exercised to meet the enemy in combat 
under advantageous conditions. (Eels, R., 1976: p.185.) However, it 
is only in very recent times that there has been any extensive litera­
ture on the nature of strategy concerning "the elusive nature of the 
thread of opposition and conflict that runs through the various rela­
tionships of men from the striking of a bargain to the dread clash of 
w a r ’. (McDonald, J., 1950: p.11.) It is in the economic relationship,
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or striking of a bargain that, as Higgins argues, several definitions 
of strategy and strategic planning appear. For example, Andrews states 
that "corporate strategy is the pattern of major objectives, purposes, 
or goals, stated in such a way as to define what business the company 
is in or is to be in and the kind of company it is or is to be". 
(Andrews, K.R., 1971, cited in Higgins, J.C., 1980: p.l.) Similarly, 
Dymsza argues that "strategic planning is especially significant for it 
looks at the basic philosophy, directions and objectives of the company 
in the years ahead". (Dymsza, 1972: p.55.) Chandler refers to stra­
tegy as "... the determination of the basic long term goals and objec­
tives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and allo­
cation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals". (Chandler, 
A.D., 1962.) Some writers stress the relationship of the organisation 
to the environment. Ansoff, for example, states that "Strategic deci­
sions are primarily concerned with external, rather than internal, 
problems of the firm and specifically with the selection of the product 
mix which the firm will produce and the markets to which it will sell". 
(Ansoff, H.I., 1968: p.18.) Steiner and Miner see strategy as "... 
forging of company missions, setting objectives for the organisation in 
the light of external forces, formulating specific policies and strate­
gies to achieve objectives, and assuring their proper implementation so 
that the basic purposes and objectives of the organisation will be 
achieved". (Steiner, G.A. and Miner, J.B., 1977, cited in Higgins,
J.C., 1980: p.l.)
This chapter defines strategy as the determination of the nature of the 
interaction between the explicit and implicit objectives, missions, 
goals, and tasks of the organisation in anticipation of, or in reaction 
to, events that are taking place or have taken place, and which affect
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the internal and external milieu within which the organisation seeks to 
operate. As such, strategy is dependent upon the inherent ethos of the 
organisation and is reflected in the MNC in the degree to which, for 
example, emphasis is given to the economic or socio-political elements 
of the environment in the planning process, the management, and the 
structure of the organisation.
Strategic planning, therefore, is vital to the multinational corporation 
in its attempts to respond to its changing boundary position and the 
turbulence of its environment, and thereby ensuring its survival. The 
evolution of multinational corporations over the last decade has been 
characterised by a growing conflict between the requirements for economic 
survival and success - the economic imperative - and the adjustments 
made necessary by the demands of society and the state in the home and 
host countries for the achievement of certain social and political 
objectives - the political imperative. Several writers have pointed to 
the fact that companies are increasingly having to earn acceptance in a 
social and political context and that successful economic performance 
is no guarantee of acceptability. Higgins, for example, in discussing 
the future of strategic planning and strategic and operational planning 
systems suggests a matrix of socio-political performance and economic 
performance. However, such a matrix neglects the
effect of structure on socio-political responsiveness and effectiveness, 
particularly in the international context. It is, therefore, necessary 
to consider some of the direct and indirect links between strategy and 
structure. Indirect links may be perceived to exist where structure is 
determined by the characteristics of the technology employed, by the 
nature of and variations in the environment, and by size. Direct links 
may be perceived to exist where the structure may be explained by the
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nature and diversity of the products and the markets of the organisation
Thus, the ensuing paragraphs analyse the strategies and administrative 
processes used by multinational corporations to reconcile the conflict­
ing economic and political imperatives. In so doing it revises and 
adapts the work done by Doz (Doz, Y.C., 1980) in his extensive field 
research involving multinational corporations in Europe and the United 
States to provide a strategic taxonomy within which to assess the con­
tribution of the multinational corporation to South African economic 
development.
5.2 A STRATEGIC TAXONOMY
Doz suggests that it is possible for the multinational corporations to 
respond in several ways to the conflict between the economic and poli­
tical imperatives. (Doz, Y.C., 1980: pp.27-44.) However, these res­
ponses will essentially conform to one of three approaches. Firstly, 
the organisation may, for example, respond to the economic imperative 
and follow a worldwide strategy where the activities in various coun­
tries are integrated and centrally managed.
This would be the most attractive solution for companies that have 
extensive manufacturing operations in several countries. The activities 
of such plants could be integrated and their operations rationalised 
among the countries in which the multinational operates.
Here individual plants may provide only part of the product range 
thereby achieving greater economies of scale. Alternatively, plants 
may be specialised by stages in the production process and may be loca­
ted in various countries according to the cost and availability of pro­
duction factors for each stage.
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Essentially, therefore, the driving principle behind an integration 
strategy is the reduction of unit costs and the capture of large sales 
volumes; in industries where economies of scale are significant and 
not fully exploited within the size of national markets, it may bring 
sizeable advantages in productivity. It has been suggested that where 
integration brings about substantial cost advantages over competitors, 
the integrated firm may be able to allocate part of the benefits of 
higher internal efficiency to incur, what may be termed, "good citizen­
ship" costs in the host countries and still remain competitive with 
non-integrated firms. Indeed, Doz points to the fact that a number of 
firms have a policy of full employment, balanced internal trade among 
countries, and performance of research and development in various coun­
tries. Clearly such a policy may lead to less than optimal decisions 
in a short-term financial sense. However, such a policy may also be 
the key to the host country's long-term acceptance of the company.
The benefits of integration not only enable the MNC to be better 
tolerated because of its ability to incur higher citizenship costs, 
but integration itself can be seen as making expropriation less likely 
in the less politically stable areas of the Third World. Integration 
provides the MNC with more bargaining power and turns extreme solutions 
to conflicts with host governments into outcomes where both the host 
country and the-MNC stand to lose.
A well articulated worldwide integration strategy simplifies the 
management of international operations by providing a point of view as 
to the environment, and a framework for the identification of key 
sources of uncertainty as well as a purpose in dealing with them.
Such a strategy may also guide managers in adopting a proactive stance.
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The simplicity of the driving principle of an integration strategy 
makes a consistent detailed strategic planning process possible by 
providing a unifying focus to the various parts of the organisation. 
This process both guides the implementation of strategy and provides 
for its refinement and evolution over time.
The second strategic approach suggested by Doz (Doz, Y.C., 1980) is 
that of national responsiveness. In pursuing a strategy of national 
responsiveness subsidiaries are permitted more freedom to respond to 
the political imperative. Nevertheless, the affiliation of the subsi­
diaries to the MNC can bring them certain definite advantages over 
purely local competitors, namely:
a. the pooling of financial risk;
b . the spreading of research and development;
c. the coordination of export marketing to increase overall 
success in export markets;
d. the transfer of specific skills between subsidiaries.
In this approach, each subsidiary remains free to pursue an autonomous 
economic or political strategy nationally as its management sees fit 
given the situation of the national industry.
In industries where the state plays a key role, national strategies 
are primarily politically orientated, whereas where other local factors 
are important sources of differentiation, but where the state plays a 
less prominent role, the strategies tend to be economic.
Such a strategy involves seeking structural and administrative adjust­
ments instead of pursuing strategic solutions to the conflict between 
the economic and political imperatives. Such adjustments are aimed at
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providing some of the benefits of both worldwide integration and 
national responsiveness.
The strategy implied is that of allowing each strategic decision to 
be made on the basis of its own merits and to challenge prior commit­
ments. Thus, individual decisions do not fit into the logic of clear 
goals the logic of which are tested against a comprehensive analysis 
of the environment and an assessment of the organisation's capabilities 
Strategy here is not the search for an optimal fit, but, rather, a 
series of limited adjustments made in response to specific developments 
without an attempt to integrate these adjustments into a consistent 
comprehensive strategy.
The need for such adjustments emerges when new uncertainties are iden­
tified. These uncertainties may offer opportunities or threats or 
lend themselves to conflicting interpretations. Instead of taking a 
stable proactive stance vis-a-vis the environment and relying on the 
chosen strategy to provide a framework within which to deal with the 
sources of uncertainty and make specific decisions as the need arises, 
MNCs using administrative coordination absorb uncertainties and attempt 
to resolve conflicts internally over time each time new uncertainties 
question prior allocations of strategic resources. Thus, strategy 
becomes unclear, shifting with the perceived importance of changes in 
the economic or political environment, and it may become dissolved into 
a set of incremental decisions with a pattern which may make sense only 
ex post. Essentially, therefore, administrative coordination trades 
off internal efficiency for external flexibility.
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5.5 THE DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGY
It is useful to examine the selection of the strategic approach by the 




- government interaction ;
- management accountability, and political risk.
5.3.1 Market Structure
The range of possible multinational strategies depends firstly upon 
the structure of the world market in terms of customers and barriers 
to trade.
Firstly, the technology and economies of production for certain products 
would strongly suggest global rationalisation. In many cases, however, 
the political imperative may be so strong as to prevent such rationali­
sation. Recent research by Mirow and Maurer as well as investigations 
by a U.S. senate committee and Professor Newfarmer have indicated that 
integration may take place not only within the structure of one multi­
national but across an international industry. (Mirow, K.R. and 
Maurer, H ., 1982; Newfarmer, R . , 1980; Epstein, B. and Newfarmer, R, 
1980; U.S. Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and 
its Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 1980.) Thus, where 
the international trade volume for power systems is low and subject to 
intense expensive competition internationally, integration strategies 
have been followed not only within particular firms but also across 
the industry through the International Electrical Agency. The lEA
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determines the allocation and tender approach of the industry to parti­
cular contracts as well as the combatting of outsiders.
However, certain restrictions come through the monopoly power of state 
controlled entities. This has resulted in the Developed countries in 
contracts for large turbogenerator units and other heavy capital equip­
ment being awarded to national companies. This aspect of international 
integration will be discussed in the analysis of the empirical element 
of this dissertation. Secondly, at the opposite extreme, there exist 
products that are traded freely, the sales of which do not depend on 
location or the nationality of the manufacturer and for which economies 
of scale beyond the size of the national markets are significant. In 
such industries the only strategy is clearly that of international 
integration.
Thirdly, there are businesses - for example computers and semiconductors 
the markets of which are partly government controlled and partly inter­
nationally competitive. In such industries, where both the political 
and economic imperatives are critical, multinationals face the most 
difficult choice between the various alternative strategies some firms 
may choose to integrate their operations while others may decide to 
decentralise their operations to better match the demands of individual 
governments and benefit from their support and assistance. Others may 
not make a clear strategic commitment and may instead resort to a stra­
tegy of administrative coordination.
However this choice is likely to appear significantly different to 
different firms according to their competitive posture. Within the 
industry in broad terms, however, firms with the largest overall shares 
of the world market are likely to find integration more desirable.
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There are several reasons for such a choice:
a. Assuming there are unexploited economies of scale; 
large firms may achieve lower costs through integration 
than can smaller firms.
b. It may be hypothesised that larger firms have more 
influence on their environment than smaller firms and 
thus find it more suitable to centralise strategic 
decision making and reduce environmental uncertainty.
c. Finally, national companies may attempt to achieve 
economies of scale through interfirm agreements for
the joint manufacture of particular component or product 
lines. Over time these national companies may attempt 
to move to a globally integrated system.
In conclusion, it is possible to hypothesise the existence of a relation­
ship between the extent of government control over (and limits to) 
international trade in an industry, the relative international market 
share of a firm active in that industry, and the type of strategy it 
adopts. In industries where free trade prevails competitors may be 
expected to follow an integration strategy. In industries in which 
governments take a keen interest but where they only partly control the 
market, and where formal free trade prevails, all three strategies are 
likely to coexist within an industry. Finally, in industries where the 
political imperative prevails and where the markets are mostly state 




Technology is generally regarded as an important variable in the inter­
face between multinational corporations and host governments and may 
be seen to play a fundamental role in determining the nature of the 
conflict between the economic and political imperatives within the 
industry. Multinationals that control the technology of specific 
industries have more power in bargaining with host governments and 
are able to create technology barriers to competition from national 
firms. Often the minimum scale requirements increase so rapidly in 
high technology industries as to make it almost impossible for national 
firms to catch up.
Doz argues that higher technology products are likely to correspond to 
freer foreign trade. Firstly, as will be argued, there is strong evid­
ence to suggest that multinational corporations most often introduce 
innovations into their home markets first. As long as the technology 
is not adopted by many countries, freer trade is likely to prevail for 
newer products than older ones. Secondly, using the technology diffu­
sion process within the multinational corporation, the need to transfer 
new technology rapidly to subsidiaries creates pressures to increase 
coordination among them. Thus, it may be hypothesised that within an 
industry where the political imperative is significant, higher technol­
ogy firms strive for integration while lower technology firms strive 
for national responsiveness.
It should also be recognised that technological evolution can increase 
the minimum efficient scale of an industry and call into question the 
validity of a strategy of national responsiveness.
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Even in a situation where restricted trade prevails, as the minimum 
efficient scale increases in a high technology industry, pressures 
grow for domestic mergers and rationalisation. Where multinationals 
and national firms compete, government interest may prompt mergers 
into the local national firm rather than allow the national industry 
to be controlled entirely from outside. A strategy of national respon­
siveness makes such mergers easier for the host government to implement.
As may be seen from the discussion above, a move to higher technology 
and new products can permit a firm, on the one hand, to be more multi- 
nationally integrated and centrally managed than it would otherwise be. 
There is an unclear causal relationship here as integration is made 
possible by higher technology but is also required to facilitate tech­
nology transfer within the MNC. On the other hand, it has been argued 
above that very high technologies become extremely important in devel­
oped countries and prompt governments to attempt to narrowly control 
their development and use. Further, higher levels of technology often 
result in a higher minimum efficient scale. This scale of production 
may be used by integrated MNCs to defend their market shares. In 
industries where trade is restricted, the government may respond with 
a policy of mergers into an emerging "national champion" or, secondly, 
the development of multinational government sponsored programs. In 
both cases the MNCs stand to lose. Thus, it is essential to an MNC, 
and to the executives running individual businesses in diversified MNCs, 
to recognise those changes in the market, industry structure and tech­
nology that foreshadow a need to change the overall strategy.
5.5.5 Management Accountability and Political Risk
In areas of high political risk the strategy adopted may have significant
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implications for the bargaining power of the firm with the government 
of the countries in which it operates. In particular large integrated 
multinational corporations may be able to take a stronger position 
vis-a-vis individual government when required and woo them with the 
higher costs of good citizenship. How much integrated firms may be 
willing to give host governments as costs of citizenship may vary sub­
stantially. However, it is possible to argue that the more one inte­
grated firm is submitted to direct competition from other firms the 
less willing it will be to provide host governments with citizenship 
costs except in exchange for profitable moves that competitors will 
not be permitted to match.
Where companies have been criticised in their home countries for con­
ducting operations in such countries as South Africa, two alternatives 
are open to them. The first is that of a strategy of integration 
where positive moves may be made to rectify or improve internal policies 
through direct intervention and the following of such intervention by 
close monitoring. In the second, the firm may choose a strategy of 
national responsiveness which allows the local subsidiary to adapt to 
local conditions and claim the defence that it is subject to the cus­
toms and laws of the country concerned. In South Africa such an app­
roach has been strongly criticised by the government in recent years 
and has also been condemned by pressure groups operating in the United 
Kingdom, Europe and the United States. Clearly, with a strategy of 
integration accountability for the actions of local operations would 
rest firmly with the central management of the multinational corporation 
while with a strategy of national responsiveness such accountability 
would be more likely to rest with the local management.
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Having proposed a taxonomy of multinational strategies based upon the 
work of Doz, it is necessary to extend the argument so as to develop 
a strategic matrix to facilitate the analysis of the contribution of 
the multinational corporation to economic development.
5.4 A STRATEGIC MATRIX
The preceding paragraphs indicate that a simple two dimensional matrix, 
such as that suggested by Higgins, showing socio-political responsive­
ness on one axis and economic effectiveness on the other is an oversim­
plification in the extreme. (Higgins, J.C., 1980: p.231.) Whether 
in the national or international environment several other factors 
have to be taken into consideration in determining the nature of the 
relationship between the multinational corporation and its environment. 
Such factors include the basic philosophy of the firm, the nature of 
the markets in which it operates or seeks to operate, the level of 
technology involved, the extent to which host governments are prepared 
to use coersive power in the reduction of what Fayerweather terms the 
"Span of conflict", etc. (Fayerweather, J ., 1969: p.107.) These fac­
tors are clearly reflected in the strategy the multinational corpora­
tion seeks to adopt as well as its structure if (following Hall and 
Saias rephrasing of Chandler) "structure follows strategy". (Hall, 
D.J., 1980: pp.149-163.)
Thus, it is necessary to consider a third dimension in developing a 
matrix showing the conflict between the economic and political impera­
tives. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1 where the political and 
economic imperatives are shown in the conventional manner, but where 
the third axis shows the strategic perspective of the multinational 
corporation given the nature of its perception of the optimum strategic
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position to adopt in the face of the conflict between the economic and 
political imperatives in the countries in which it operates.
Such a matrix also provides a useful means for developing a typology 
of multinational corporations according to the strategic perspective 
adopted.
The next chapter uses both the strategic taxonomy and the corporate 
typology suggested by this matrix as the basis of an assessment of the 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN INTERVIEW BASED INVESTIGATIVE STUDY OF 
THE ROLE or THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 
IN SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Lipset argues that there are two approaches to the analysis of case 
study material. (Lipset, S.M., 1970.) The first approach, he suggests, 
may be designated as a particularising or ideographic type of analysis 
which is restricted to the description and explanation of a single 
problem situation in order to provide information on the present state 
of things and their dynamics. The second approach utilises the genera­
lising analysis which attempts to derive empirical generalisations 
from the study of case material utilising the findings as a basis for 
wider empirical generalisations.
The ensuing chapters utilise the first approach in the form of an 
interview based study to determine how the managers of particular 
organisations perceive the interaction between strategy and the South 
African political and economic milieu. To achieve this the development 
of the role of the firm is examined in three discrete steps and a 
strategic-developmental taxonomy proposed:
a. Firstly, interviewee responses are examined on a compara­
tive basis to determine how those with responsibility for 
operations in Southern Africa perceive the economic and 
political environment faced by enterprise in the sub­
continent. As may be seen from the preceding chapters, 
it is not sufficiently emphasised in the literature that
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South Africa is an African country and its economic domin­
ance of the region together with the wider effects of its 
internal policies preclude an isolated examination of its 
economic development and reference to political and econ­
omic relationships must be made. The importance of this 
becomes even more apparent when it is recognised that all 
of the organisations interviewed, including Company C (see 
Section 6.2), had interests in more than one country in 
the region.
b. Secondly, the influence of the ethics of foreign direct 
investment in South Africa on the developmental role of 
the multinational enterprise is discussed. The ethical 
parameters of the investment decision are determined by 
the management ethos and moral attitudes of members of the 
firm which, as Marsh argues, may not be separated from 
their ethical perceptions outside the work environment. 
(Marsh, P.D.V., 1980.) Such perceptions have a fundamen­
tal role in determining overall management ethos and thereby 
the nature of the strategic response to such demands as 
those for the recognition of unregistered unions and 
equality of opportunity and wages which, as will be demon­
strated, have important implications for the social and 
political elements of the development process.
c. Finally, the interviewee identified determinant of strategy 
are considered under nine headings which allow an analysis 
of the reciprocal effects of certain strategic determinants 
on a numbqr of developmental variables. The similarities
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in strategic approach, although discussed fully in the 
conclusions, are worth noting at this point. Firms 
appeared to develop remarkably similar positions to cer­
tain elements of the South African economic environment.
It would be of interest to examine these in relation to
firms from other nations to determine to what extent 
strategy is a function of nationality.
Thus the development of the developmental role of the multinational 
corporation in South Africa is discussed in terms of management per­
ceptions of Southern Africa, the strategy of direct investment and the 
role determining ethical framework.
The chapter concludes by analysing the nature of the strategic- 
developmental interaction. The strategic approach adopted by each 
firm is classified according to the three-dimensional taxonomy of the 
preceding chapter and related normatively to a series of developmental 
objectives founded upon those suggested in Chapter Two. This concludes 
that the developmental contribution of long-term foreign direct invest­
ment in manufacturing plays a positive role in economic development as
defined in this dissertation. However, this is contrasted, in Volume 
II, with a detailed study of the potential negative effects of short­
term involvement by service agencies in the heavy electrical industry 
and the effects of secret cartels on world development.
However, before continuing it is useful to briefly consider the selec­
tion of firms for this study and the interview method adopted.
6.2 INTERVIEWEE SELECTION
In the ensuing discussion the firms approached are designated Co-A, Co-B,
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etc., while the individuals interviewed are referred to in terms of 
their company and position held as follows:
Od-A Director of Overseas Operations Company A
Ce-B Chief Executive Company B
Md-C Managing Director Overseas Operations Company C
Ch-D Chairman Company D
Ed-E Executive Director Company E
Ch-F Chairman Company F
Cn Consultant and Corporate Advisor.
The only exception to this confidentiality is made in the case of the
Christian Association of Business Executives, a non-commercial body
providing in many instances, an international forum for the type of 
issue raised in Section 6. of this Chapter. However, the willing 
frankness of the commercial organisations interviewed makes such con­
fidentiality necessary as will become clear in the ensuing paragraphs.
The selection of firms for this study was determined by a number of 
criteria. It is useful to examine these in relation to the particular 
organisations chosen and then in relation to certain broader issues.
The Christian Association of Business Executives (CABE) Code of Conduct 
together with the discussion with its director, Hugh Kay, provide a 
unique approach to the ethical dilemma faced by those undertaking 
direct investment in South Africa. At the same time Hugh Kay’s involve­
ment with the problems inherent in such investment from the point of 
view of the organisations involved is made clear through his reinter­
pretation of the role of the multinational as being not only economic 
and thereby political, but as also involving ethical decisions which 
are inherent to the strategy formulation process although not
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sufficiently recognised as such.
Co-A and Co-B are examples of what may be termed "conventional" multi­
national corporations in terms of the definitions contained in Chapter 
Four, although the Director of Overseas Operations of Corporation A 
argued that :
"Co-A is not a multinational corporation. The only 
common thread is electrical products. It is not a 
business ..... it is a financial controller." (Od-A)
This rejection of Co-A's multinationality will be considered in more 
detail in ensuing paragraphs where it is suggested that despite a 
policy of decentralisation and diversification within the electrical 
and electronic industries such organisations may still be regarded as 
multinational where central control is retained over the financial 
strategy of each member of the group, their investment strategies, the 
appointment of key managers and the technical aspect of each firm's 
operations.
Co-B is structured on a geographical basis with strong central control 
over both the financial and technical aspects of its operations. It 
has a strong reputation in what has been termed "social responsibility" 
and is at the time of writing in serious difficulties following serious 
losses at home, the loss of a large proportion of its overseas manage­
ment in what have become periodic purges and near market saturation of 
its products. It is unusual for a British company without a strong 
foreign shareholding in that in recent years it has had two South 
African Chief Executives, both of whom have very similar backgrounds 
in the Eastern Cape Province where they were educated. Questions as
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to the continuity of policy and style were raised during the interviews
Co-C and Co-D were selected for their strong family associations. The 
Co-D example, although somewhat dated, is relevant from two points of 
view. Firstly, Co-D's operation in South Africa was purchased by Co-B 
and now provides the basis of the penetration of the South African 
industrial market for Co-B’s products. Secondly, it provides a useful 
illustration of a successful paternalistic organisation operating in 
an area, the people of which both the founder and his son professed a 
great admiration, leading ultimately to friendship with certain lead­
ing political figures. Despite its paternalistic and highly effective 
method of management Co-D had a large non-family shareholding.
Co-C, however, is owned by one family. Despite this it has adopted a 
demanding approach expecting its overseas operations to survive without 
home assistance once established. Nevertheless, as will be demonstra­
ted, it provides its overseas management with the independence to 
achieve their budgeted results.
Co-E was selected for several reasons. Firstly, to illustrate the rise 
of the multinational in industrialising countries such as Brazil, India 
and South Africa. Co-E is a mining-finance house that has diversified 
into a number of sectors as is demonstrated by the number of appoint­
ments held by the interviewee, an executive director of Co-E in con­
struction, property and life insurance companies. Secondly, this 
example demonstrates the differences in strategic thinking between 
European organisations and an indigenous South African organisation.
One example of this is the encouragement given to senior executives to 
become involved in the political process. This was illustrated by the 
role of one executive in the Zimbabwe peace process as well as the use
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of some executives to carry messages between President Kaunda and Prime 
Ministers Vorster and Botha. Finally, it is interesting to observe the 
extent to which an organisation which is highly critical of a political 
system is nevertheless dependent on that system for its successful 
operation.
The discussions with the Chairman of Co-F and Cn, a specialist on Cen­
tral Africa, place Southern Africa within the African context and pro­
vide a basis for an analysis of the regional political and economic 
structure which has to be taken into account in the development of an 
approach in the development of an approach to operations in South Africa 
by the multinational corporation.
Given the requirement of the study that as far as possible interviewees 
should not be constrained in their perceptions by particular structural 
parameters but should rather have an overall understanding of the ethos 
and direction of the enterprise, the researcher was limited to making 
approaches at board level. Implicit in this was a recognition that the 
time that would be granted to the researcher would be limited. Thus, 
questions would have to be concise and cover broad points of interest.
Secondly, the nature of the issues to be discussed immediately limited 
access. Organisations are extremely sensitive to enquiries about their 
operations in South Africa. In many instances it is policy for the 
Chief Executive to be immediately informed of any such enquiries.
Thirdly, there has in recent years been considerable criticism of acad­
emic research into industry. Research students have been accused of 
raising irrelevant issues, having an approach to industry that is both 
too academic and naive, and, finally, wasting employee time through
- 151 -
badly planned interviews.
These considerations had to be weighed against the requirements of a 
viable and relevant study of the issues considered by the researcher 
to be of significance in assessing the role of firms concerned with South 
African development. By the very nature of the study proposed it was 
essential to obtain a diverse selection of organisations to secure the 
information required to ensure that a representative cross section of 
the types of multinational corporation in South Africa was selected.
6.3 AN INTERVIEWEE BASED ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
The knowledge and attitudes of those in a position within the enterprise 
to determine or, at least, influence policy and strategy in the count­
ries surrounding South Africa are of considerable significance to the 
enterprise operating in both areas. Because of the economic relations 
existing within the region many firms have established themselves in 
South Africa and have either exported to other countries in the region 
or, to satisfy various legal/political requirements, exported components 
to simple assembly operations in these countries. In certain instances 
the political implications of the independence of Zimbabwe have resulted 
in several firms establishing themselves in other countries recognising 
the potential for increased ideological and military tension in the 
region.
Co-B, for example, has retained its operation in South Africa while 
establishing new plants to cater for African needs in Zimbabwe and 
Kenya thereby gaining "good citizenship" credit in each country while 
at the same time insuring against political risk. While this may con­
tinue in such industries it is doubtful whether it is a feasible course
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of action for high technology firms or those with a high capital 
requirement.
This Section, therefore, seeks to determine how interviewees evaluate 
the African environment and in what way this contrasts with their per­
ceptions of the South African environment. This distinction in out­
look, it is argued, determines the role that European management sees 
industry and foreign direct investment as playing in South Africa.
The initial determinant of the response of the multinational corpora­
tion to immediate decision making requirements or to long-term oppor­
tunities and threats is the polymathic understanding of its senior 
policy making and influencing executives and their conceptualisation 
of the national, regional or international environment within which 
their organisations operate. For example, such knowledge, in many 
cases, delimits the geographical area within which the firm conducts 
its search for opportunities and is based on the expertise developed 
in the particular environments within which the firm may have operated 
during its historical development.
"People have differing perceptions and certain directors 
are hesitant about areas they don't know. If Co-B was 
not involved in such countries as Uganda or Zaire and 
was thinking of going in I would say 'no'. But, because 
we have expertise in these areas, I am determined to 
support our operations there." (Ce-B)
Further, unanticipated immediate decision-making requirements, irrespec­
tive of whether these carry short- or long-term implications, must of 
necessity be founded on the knowledge base of the individual concerned
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and his conceptual framework of the environment within which he is 
operating. For the individual manager the two situations outlined 
may be illustrated as in Figure 6.1.
Few people do not have some cognition of the economic and political 
problems of Africa and South Africa. The ensuing paragraphs, however, 
examine the responses of the interviewees thereby depicting the African 
political and economic environment facing foreign enterprise based upon 
a synthesis of their perceptions which, as is demonstrated in Table 6.1 
illustrating each interviewee's evaluation of the African environment, 
are remarkably similar.
Because of the economic and political relations existing between the 
countries of Southern Africa and the implications of these for the 
strategy of firms wishing to utilise the large advanced Southern produc­
tion and market capacity while at the same time operating in other 
states in the region, the discussion examines the perceptions of those 
with interests in Africa in addition to those with interests in South 
Africa. The relevance of this will be seen in relation to the strate­
gies of such organisations as Co-B. Further, occurrences in Zimbabwe 
are being observed with keen interest by those who see long-term simila­
rities with South Africa, the implications of which are clear for the 
future strategies of many firms operating in Namibia and South Africa.
Initially, in discussing the African environment, a national classifi­
cation on the basis of a series of economic evaluations appeared to be 
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"Co-A is entirely pragmatic in looking at the economics 
of the situation. It also examines the non-economic 
factors - corruption, political instability and so on."
(Od-A)
Indeed, some organisations take a diametrically opposed view in Africa:
"In most of Black Africa we look at the political scene 
and see how it relates to the economic scene and position 
ourselves accordingly." (Ce-B)
The analysis, therefore, takes place under four headings which illus­





- the role of industry.
The discussion focuses firstly on Africa and then specifically on South 
Africa.
6.4 AN INTERVIEWEE EVALUATION OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
OF AFRICA
6.4.1 Political Leadership in Africa
The ethos of political leadership determines the priorities of the 
state in developing its political and economic strategy and thereby the 
place of private enterprise and foreign direct investment in the frame­
work of national economic development. Thus, a rational understanding
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of the nature of leadership in areas of high political sensitivity is 
required as an input in the firm's policy formulation process.
The leadership of such countries as Zambia and Tanzania is composed of 
political leaders who have successfully led their countries in the 
struggle against colonialism to independence. However, in the post­
independence period their leadership has remained ideological in charac­
ter as they lack the technical expertise to face the post-independence 
problems of development. In part this may be reinforced by the extreme 
dualism of such countries where, in many instances, the leadership 
relies on those not directly involved in the generation of wealth for 
office.
"Leaders in Africa are political and do not have an 
economic background. Problems tend to be considered 
politically as leaders rely on non-workers for office."
(Cn)
This is aggravated by the tremendous expectations gap which emerges on 
independence and which, as Zimbabwe has demonstrated, is difficult to 
meet thereby resulting in the continuing search for political solutions 
to economic problems.
"There is conflict between the economic and political 
in Africa. These are countries which are predomin­
antly rural with a veneer of sophistication. There 
is an expectations gap on independence which is made 
worse by the departure of those who manage the 
economy and it becomes more difficult to operate."
(Ce-B)
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Because of the nature of the power base there is a general reluctance 
to bring about fundamental change to stimulate economic development.
"If the economy requires something different they 
have to be prepared to sacrifice the political for 
this. If prosperity means that this has to be 
done then the answer is no. They would rather 
keep the social structure the same." (Cn)
Thus, there is a greater politicisation of the economic parameters 
within which the firm operates in Africa. Strategy formulation, there­
fore, has to be considered not only in terms of its commercial and 
economic implications but also the political influence the state is 
likely to bring to bear in achieving its ideological goals.
"There is not so much political risk as political 
mismanagement." (Ce-B)
6.4.2 Political Stability
One of the major threats to political stability from the economic point 
of view is the expectations gap that emerges on independence. Zimbabwe, 
for example, faces a real threat in this sense in addition to the 
instability generated by the post-independence division of loyalties.
In the more established states the failure to meet the aspirations of 
the people over time has led to discontent.
"People want more immediately. There are limited 
resources, few management skills and (for political 
reasons) they make it more difficult to operate.
There is a danger of ending up like Zambia, or, 
worse, Tanzania. Kenya has done a remarkable job
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but the new rulers face terrible tensions because 
of this expectations gap. It is incredible that Ny- 
erere and Kaunda are still in power after making 
such a mess of their economies." (Ce-B)
In a negative sense, the lack of indigenous ideology to provide viable 
alternatives provides a degree of stability.
"The Zambian government is reasonably stable.
There were difficulties in the Rhodesian war.
There is no alternative. The people involved 
in the recent coup attempt had nothing substan­
tial to show that it could succeed." (Cn)
The preceding paragraphs suggest, therefore, that future leadership and 
stability will continue to be perceived by those in government as 
being determined substantially by political considerations. By con­
trast, those interviewed interpreted such questions in terms of the 
ability of the leadership to encourage the generation of wealth which 
would provide an economic rather than political answer to the aspira­
tions of the people of Central and Southern Africa.
6.4.3 Economic Development
While there may be consensus as to the nature of the economic difficul­
ties faced by the countries of Central and Southern Africa in the view 
of outsiders, there is considerable uncertainty as to the future of 
Zimbabwe.
"Co-B is very depressed about how Black Africa is going 
down. We are hoping that Zimbabwe will hold but it 
seems that there is little hope. Zambia is terrible.
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Tanzania is worse, Kenya is struggling, Zaire is a 
mess while Malawi is dependent on Banda. In Zambia 
there has even been a deterioration as regards 
people's physical safety. (Ce-B)
The reasons for such difficulties are varied. However, examples were 
readily cited:
- Transport costs:
"Zambia is well placed geographically. However, one 
of the major problems is that of communications and 
the impact of oil prices on the development process." (Cn)
- Social and economic attitudes:
"The economies are declining. There has been insufficient 
change in the economic fabric. Private enterprise is 
associated with colonialism and exploitation. However, 
people don't realise you cannot share wealth you don't 
have." (Cn)
- Political:
"Malawi relies on Zimbabwe for assistance. This is 
being turned off because Mugabe is not enamoured with 
its role during the war." (Cn)
- Lack of technical and management skills in government:
"On independence she (Zambia) had a good balance of 
payments surplus, a profitable mining industry and a 
high degree of optimism. Yet, through mismanagement 
it failed." (Cn)
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Numerous reasons may be listed for the economic failures of these 
economies. However, it is of more relevance to the ensuing paragraphs 
to examine the disagreement as regards the future of Zimbabwe.
"Mugabe will be successful if he is realistic. His 
infrastructure is far better." (Ch-F)
"In Zimbabwe
- there is the start of a deficit;
- Mugabe is severing relations with South Africa;
- an enormous amount of trouble is being caused by 
a breakdown in discipline;
- people are looking for the fruits of independence 
while living off political favours." (Cn)
This disagreement reflects the unique nature of the post-independence 
economic potential of Zimbabwe which is founded upon a well developed 
economy although tempered by deep tripartheid political divisions. In 
addition, because of the sanctions applied following the Rhodesian 
unilateral declaration of independence, the economy remains strongly 
dependent on South Africa although this is politically embarrassing 
for the Zimbabwean government and is being used by the South Africans 
to apply pressure to Prime Minister Mugabe. A recent example of this 
was the withdrawal of a large amount of South African rolling stock 
from Zimbabwe.
"South Africa and Zimbabwe have not realised that they 
have a common future and have been trying to score 
common political points. South Africa must be more 
mature in this as she has a tremendous interest in 
making Zimbabwe work." (Ch-F)
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Despite attempts to reduce the dependency on South Africa because of 
its internal policies and the fear of South African hegemony economic 
dependency remains as strong. While, therefore, from the point of 
view of policy it is necessary to regard each country on its own, the 
strategy adopted by the multinational corporation must of necessity 
recognise the large productive capacity, markets and efficient communi­
cations system of the South.
"We regard Zambia and the other Black African countries 
on their own. But, if you look at the interdependency 
it is part of Southern Africa with trade routes going 
south. You do not easily reverse the sensible facts 
of history. These countries do not want to trade with 
South Africa but they have to." (Ce-B)
The South Africans, in attempting to rationalise the economic interde­
pendency of the south, have proposed a "Constellation of Southern 
African States". Other countries in the region, partly fearing South 
African hegemony but also recognising the need for such rationalisation, 
have responded by forming the "Southern African Development Coordina­
tion Conference". Thus, where there is interaction this is because 
of economic necessity with political considerations preventing optimi­
sation of the Southern African economic system. As will be shown, 
this has major long term strategic implications for firms with signifi­
cant interests in both South Africa and Southern Africa.
"The constellation idea is sensible if South Africa 
gets in and makes it work. This is difficult, 
however, as most countries are trying to keep up 
with the OAU Jones’s. They jibe at South Africa
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but this does not put food into people's mouths.
Until apartheid is gone South Africa will never 
be accepted." (Ch-F)
6.4.4 Private Enterprise
Historical events have served to reinforce the view of the present 
generation of leaders that private enterprise is exploitative rather 
than creative of wealth. This has led to an ambivalent attitude in 
many countries to foreign direct investment resulting in policies based 
on the perceived exploitative nature of such activity.
"There is always conflict or ambivalence towards 
private enterprise. In Central Africa ministers 
see socialism as fitting in with African life and 
therefore such policies are more favoured as they 
are more comfortable." (Cn)
Despite this there is considerable optimism about commercial opportuni­
ties in Africa.
"Responsible companies have had a good time. There 
have been pressures, but that is natural. It is in 
Zambia and Tanzania that the biggest problems 
emerge. Big companies will not work within such 
constraints." (Ch-F)
One view was that such countries may offer greater opportunities to 
certain firms than the highly competitive markets in Europe and the 
United States.
163 -
"I personally believe that the opportunities for 
British companies are far greater in the less 
industrialised states than they are in the more 
heavily industrialised states of Europe or North 
America. I believe the opportunities for Co-C 
are far greater in the Third World." (Md-C)
However, it is clear that it requires a sound understanding of the 
conditions under which firms are required to operate as well as 
experience on the part of management in the home country. This will 
be discussed in relation to personnel development in ensuing chapters.
"Our new factories have been completed. It was a 
battle but we were determined to fight through.
Fortunately, we have people who know how to trade 
under these conditions." (Ce-B)
The preceding paragraphs discuss the issues seen as relevant by the 
interviewees in operating in Africa. Table 6.1, however, illustrates 
their subjective environmental evaluation of each country in which 
they have had experience. This demonstrates a broad consensus of 
opinion as to the major problems facing future African development and 
the implications of this for firms operating in these areas. The 
problems facing the firms are seen as essentially strategic.
By contrast, when examining the environment facing the international 
firm in South Africa, the discussion rapidly focused on such questions 
as political change and the role of foreign direct investment in this. 
Implicit in this, as will be demonstrated, was the ethical justifica­
tion of the firm operating in an economic system based on what is regar­
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While ethical considerations exercise a major influence on the percep­
tions of the individual it is necessary, for the purposes of analysis, 
separate the discussions on the individual's perceptions of South Africa 
and his ethical framework. Nevertheless, it is useful in the ensuing 
discussion to recognise that there may be a conflict facing individuals 
who may disagree with particular policies of the South African govern­
ment and yet are, through the operations of their companies, faced with 
the necessity of conducting their activities within the constraints of 
the system. Very little research has been devoted to this potential 
conflict between the ethical framework applied by the individual in 
the conduct of his daily activities and that of his organisation in 
the conduct of its operations.
The ensuing paragraphs, therefore, examine interviewee perceptions of 
the South African business and political environment before discussing, 
in general terms, the ethical and moral issues of investment in South 
Africa.
6.5 AN INTERVIEWEE EVALUATION OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
OF SOUTH AFRICA
6.5.1 Political Leadership and Political Change
Within the South African context it is extremely difficult, given the 
dynamics of the political development process, to separate the questions 
of political leadership and political change particularly as interviewees 
tended to perceive political change as taking place under White leader­
ship. For these reasons they are considered together in the ensuing 
paragraphs.
Because of the nature of its historical development and the recognition
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that political development is a dynamic process which, over the next 
decade, will increasingly involve Black citizens, interviewees consid­
ered South Africa to be far more highly politicised than many other 
Western-aligned countries at equivalent levels of industrial development
"Politics is written far larger on South African society.
South Africa still has to make the fundamental decisions 
other societies have already made - for example: the
type of constitution it is to have and its economic 
system." (Ed-E)
Abstracting from the role of outside pressure on firms investing in 
South Africa, this politicisation of the environment has direct impli­
cations for firms with interests in the region. However, those inter­
viewees in industry firmly rejected any positive political role for 
the firm in any host country.
"Business in South Africa must prevent itself from being 
used by politicians and resist allowing its use as an 
active agent of change. It is the kiss of death to 
be used as an instrument of change. The answer is to 
smile and find a way of not doing it." (Ce-B)
The consensus was that if the system was unacceptable the firm should 
not operate in the country.
"We (Co-E) attempt to find out as much as possible 
about the system within a country and then operate 
effectively within it. Wherever we go we are con­
scious we are guests and that any comment made must 
be directly related to our business activities. In
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South Africa we are a citizen and so we speak 
out." (Ed-E)
Such an approach is rejected by groups opposed to South Africa's inter­
nal policies and who reject the hedging of firms operating in an area 
where it is felt that the ethics of their presence may be questioned.
"Firms tend to hide behind the statement that in 
foreign countries you do not challenge the political 
system. It is argued that it is none of your busi­
ness. However, there is a danger that these firms 
are simply looking for the easiest solutions." (Kay)
However, firms will be drawn into greater political involvement. This
is best illustrated in terms of current developments in South African
industrial relations. The unregistered trade unions, as has been 
argued, have the potential to represent Black political aspirations.
"In South Africa in the next ten years the situation 
will be such that industrial relations will be fun­
damental to political development. The government
has granted full trade union rights to its Black
workers, while at the same time they are witholding 
political rights. Under such circumstances the 
unions will become the major political battleground."
(Ed-E)
Few firms and none of those interviewed conducted any formalised poli­
tical risk analysis, and appeared highly reactive in their strategic 
approaches.
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"You can only deal with the facts as they are.
When the situation changes you deal with it 
then." (Od-A)
Because of this reluctance to consider the question of political risk 
and the involvement of the firm in the political process at a formal 
level within the organisation, firms will find themselves reacting to 
increasingly complex and potentially embarrassing situations. Co-B 
demonstrates the point.
"We had problems in the Eastern Cape first. We 
either had to say no and be swept up in strife 
or recognise an unregistered union because it 
was the least bad and the best to negotiate with.
We had a vote in the factory and it was accepted.
If the government had said no it could have pre­
vented us. However, we had differing messages from 
different ministers. One said yes, another said 
no, while the police were against recognition.
Nevertheless, there was a wish clearly expressed 
by the workers and trade unions are going to be in
the vanguard of political change. We took a deep
breath and went in. I worried greatly about this
but, it was the right thing. For the last nine 
months it has been good. Fortunately, Barlow Rand 
followed within a week which took the pressure off 
us." (Ce-B)
This illustrates how foreign enterprise operating in countries such as
South Africa may be drawn into decisions with strong political implica­
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tions and adds an international dimension to the demonstration effects 
outlined in the conventional liberal argument discussed in preceding 
chapters. The situation is exacerbated by what at times appears to be 
a lack of definite policy by the South African government. One cause 
of this is the conflict between Nationalist political priorities and 
economic realities. To some extent, as is illustrated in the Co-B 
example, the government is losing control through its lack of a clear 
policy.
"South Africa has no option but to sacrifice the
political for the economic because the ball is
already rolling. The best the government can do 
is act as a brake." (Ce-B)
This is reflected not only in government policy but also in the atti­
tudes of people themselves to change, which has had a fundamental
effect on employment policies.
"There have been several changes in South Africa.
However, much of this has been cosmetic concerning 
petty apartheid. It is the change in attitudes 
that is most impressive. People are far more 
accommodating of change in the economy and in 
industry as regards opportunities for Blacks, 
wages, apprenticeships and improved wages." (Od-A)
The implications of this will be fully discussed when Co-B’s role in 
South African development is assessed.
The preceding paragraphs present a scenario in which those interviewed 
believed that South African political development would take place
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within the parameters of overall White control. Interviewees declared 
little knowledge of such political alternatives as the African National 
Congress or the Pan African Congress other than, in one case, to 
suggest that the exiled political leaders opposed to foreign direct 
investment in South Africa may be out of touch with Black workers on 
the issue.
"The nationalist movement in exile is not representative 
as regards investment. There is a division between the 
workers and the politically motivated leaders of the 
liberation movements who are laying down general 
principles rather than looking at particular predica­
ments." (Kay)
IVhether deliberately or not most interviewees did not see these move­
ments as playing a major role in the foreseeable future and appeared 
to be remarkably uninformed as to the nature of these organisations 
and the degree of support they may have in South Africa.
South Africa is considered to provide an economically stable environment 
for investment.
"Co-C considered South Africa to be a stable environment.
Not so much politically as economically and certainly 
far more stable than many other overseas operations."
(Md-C)
However, this may be because firms tend to perceive their risk exposure 
in what may be termed an "international geographical risk portfolio".
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"It is not true that South Africa is unstable.
Look at the other places we are operating in - 
Zaire, Uganda, Zimbabwe." (Ce-B)
Certain firms are nevertheless withdrawing for political reasons, 
although present indications are that these are a minority.
"Some U.K. companies have started to divest.
One or two are running scared. With the indus­
trial profits situation in the U.K. and the 
availability of money in South Africa as well 
as the overtures from South African companies 
have put firms in the position where they have 
had to sell. Some are running scared, but, 
they do need the money." (Ce-B)
The South African Reserve Bank has facilitated the outflow of cash and 
has encouraged the takeover of these firms by South Africans. However, 
this withdrawal is seen by many as being two edged. On the one hand, 
it is argued, it gives South Africans what is rightfully theirs. On 
the other, it is suggested that:
"Politically it is not good as continued 
involvement is important in getting continued 
British government support. There is far less 
pressure if we sell to South Africa. The Con­
servatives, for example, are making it quite 
clear that they w o n ’t go along with a boycott, 
although they are saying it quietly." (Ce-B)
Despite the withdrawal of such firms South Africa is seen as providing 
a favourable environment for private enterprise.
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6.5.2 Private Enterprise
Considerable emphasis in South Africa is placed on the role of private 
enterprise in the generation of wealth. Certain political developments 
such as the recognition of the permanence of the urban Black population 
have served to reinforce this view in government and to encourage 
foreign direct investment.
"The industrial relations environment has been the 
most important area of positive political change.
The second most important political change is more 
subtle and this is the acceptance that the urban 
African, despite government policy, is permanent.
As a result of this the government is attempting to 
develop an infrastructure for Blacks. They have to 
find the money to do this and this is one benefit 
of a profitable economy. The Prime Minister recognises 
this." (Ed-E)
While this may be seen in terms of the economic/ideological dichotomy 
discussed in preceding chapters it illustrates the point that the 
state sees itself as having a positive role to play in the encourage­
ment of private enterprise. Thus, while there is little direct 
intervention, government control over the activity of the private 
sector is never lost. All those interviewed saw this as facilitating 
their operations.
"The South African economy is what I would call 
a 'managed free enterprise economy'. It is 
mildly interventionist. It is certainly one of
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the easier countries to operate in in terms of 
government influence. This is good for invest­
ment and the manufacturing sector." (Od-A)
The importance of the attitude to enterprise was emphasised.
"The South Africans lie somewhere between the 
British and the Americans. They have a better 
attitude to business and the creation of wealth 
and are far more energetic than the people in 
Europe. You have a freer enterprise society and 
there is much thinking accordingly. It is a mixed 
economy but strongly private enterprise oriented.
Intervention is on balance favourable." (Ce-B)
However, despite the free enterprise approach, certain decisions have 
been taken within which military and strategic requirements have been 
given priority despite their costs. Thus, the motor industry has had 
to follow the government's local content programme. South Africa 
manufactures its own diesel units, etc.
'!There is encouragement for foreign investment, 
local content and local participation in the 
equity. However, the word does not come from 
on high. It is dropped by people to whom you 
know you should listen." (Od-A)
The South African style of business is mid-Atlantic in approach with 
American thinking having a strong influence on current management 
techniques.
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"South Africa is probably the easiest country to 
operate in. They operate in the Anglo-American 
way as regards :
- Systems management;
- Hierarchical relationships;
- Their way of doing things. In theory they 
are very democratic;
- Their financial institutions. Little Johannesburg 
has very sophisticated financial services;
- The climate of opinion which is more favourable 
to international firms.
It is easier to do business. If you know where you are 
heading you get very rapid movement. It is also very 
optimistic." (Ch-D)
The favourable environment discussed above received only one qualifica­
tion. /
"South Africa is one of the best places in the world 
to do business if you leave the question of apartheid 
out." (Ed-E)
"For political reasons many people stay out." (Md-C)
These observations as to the attitude to private enterprise in the 
South African economy imply a degree of sophistication in terms of 
economic development.
6.5.3 Economic Development
Perceptions as to the nature of South Africa as a developing nation 
differ. Interviewees regarded South Africa as a Western country.
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"South Africa is highly developed and aligns itself 
with the highly developed Western nations." (Od-A)
While it was realised that there was a dualistic economy discussion 
focused on the advanced sector and in particular the Pretoria- 
Witwatersrand-Vereeniging complex. South Africa is nevertheless 
highly dualistic. However, only one interviewee consciously pointed
to the existence of such dualism and related this to his firm's stra­
tegy in South Africa.
"South Africa lies somewhere between the industrialised 
world and the Third World in terms of its highly
developed infrastructure and industrial complex
although part of its population is clearly Third World."
(Md-C)
Thus, comments as to the nature of the South African economy and its 
developmental potential when examined in terms of overseas perceptions 
of this must be related to the advanced sector.
Within this context there is considerable optimism as to the develop­
mental potential of the South African economy.
"If South Africa can retain an orderly and disciplined 
society it has, because of its wealth, and population, 
all the ingredients for sustained growth. If South 
Africa can't there are precious few who can." (Ce-B)
Such statements of confidence in the developmental potential of the 
economy were, as above, always qualified by the assumption that the 
political parameters of such development would remain constant.
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Interviewees, therefore, appear to consider South Africa as a country 
presenting a number of opportunities to foreign enterprise, economically 
stable, having a record of rapid economic growth and, in terms of style 
of business and financial and legal infrastructure, remarkably similar 
to Anglo-American trends. However, the international firm is seen as 
being faced by a society facing fundamental political change where the 
firm may become enmeshed in the political development of the country. 
Each interviewee's perception of the South African environment is 
recorded in Table 6.2.
This, however, abstracts from the ethical considerations which, as has 
been stated, are of fundamental importance to the argument being devel­
oped. Having, thus far, merely outlined the perceptual framework within 
which strategy is developed as illustrated in Figure 6.1 it is, there­
fore, necessary to consider how the operations of firms are modified to 
take into account the moral issues raised by their presence in South 
Africa. In so doing it becomes extremely difficult to isolate the 
developmental role of the firm from the moral context within which the 
managements of many British multinationals see themselves as operating. 
The ensuing section examines this from the point of view of an ethical 
framework suggested by an ethicist with a specialist interest in inter­
national business ethics. This situational view is then used, when 
considering the strategies adopted by multinational enterprise, to 
examine the approaches taken by firms facing major ethical decisions 
as regards their operations in South Africa.
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6.6 INTERVIEWEE PERCEPTIONS OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE ETHICS OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA ON THE DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE OF THE 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
A discussion on the ethics of investment in South Africa presupposes an 
assessment of the morality of the policy of separate development. A 
formal assessment is, however, clearly beyond the scope of this disser­
tation. Nevertheless, fundamental to the argument being developed is 
the recognition of the inequalities in such social and political aspects 
as education, equal opportunities, the opportunity to participate in 
government, as well as the inequalities in the distribution of wealth.
As may be seen, these constitute the major part of the developmental 
objectives outlined in Chapter Two.
A study of the ethics of foreign direct investment, therefore, in effect 
examines a major aspect of the development problem - that of how to 
improve the living standards of the entire population through the 
interaction between the moral constraints on operating in an unaccept­
able system and benefitting from it and the benefits of the presence of 
foreign enterprise.
If, however, the political problem, by linking it with an assessment of 
the morality of foreign direct investment, is considered in economic 
terms it is suggested that the welfare of the people may be increased 
by the reaction of foreign investors to their perception of the ethical 
problem.
Therefore, it is possible to examine economic development from the 
point of view of the ethical perceptions of managers and the part these 
play in the potential development of South Africa through the multina­
tional corporation. This approach may be extended to consider the
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nature of the conflict between the individual manager and the firm on 
questions of ethics. This has not, to the knowledge of the researcher, 
been considered previously and represents a significant gap in both 
development theory and in writing on strategic planning.
The dilemma as regards foreign direct investment is of comparatively 
recent origins, having effectively emerged in the last ten years. 
However, in the last two years there appears to have been a reduction 
in the pressure on firms. None of the interviewees were clear as to 
the reasons for this.
"Criticism of firms operating in South Africa has 
recently been discussed at the United Kingdom- 
South Africa Society. We have letters coming in 
from church groups, trade unions and cranks. In 
the last eighteen months these pressures have 
diminished considerably while over the last two 
years not one shareholder has asked for information."
(Ce-B)
The questioning of the role of foreign enterprise in South Africa may 
be related to the overall trend in society's demands of its institutions 
for social responsibility and indeed the idea that enterprise should not 
function purely in the interests of profit. Other institutions reflect 
this trend - the catholic church, for example, when after the Second 
Vatican Council it was said that the church should not only be spiritual 
but that it also had to be seen to act in the service of the poor.
South Africa should, therefore, not be seen as an issue on its own.
It is part of a greater trend towards social responsibility and the 
criticism levelled against the power of the multinational corporation.
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"South Africa is not an issue on its own. It is part 
of the overall problem of the multinational corpora­
tion. There is a feeling that the multinationals 
have a record of exploitation." (Kay)
Operations in South Africa, it may be argued, are justified if outside 
participation in the economy brings about desirable economic and poli­
tical development in terms of the developmental goals listed in Chapter 
Two. Such an argument is based on the premise that operations in South 
Africa are justified as long as the firm, in achieving its declared 
objectives, simultaneously reduces the morally unacceptable element of 
the environment in which it operates.
"If you ask what are the moral issues, one has 
to look for the greater good. It is a matter 
of balancing the harm of action against long-term 
goals." (Kay)
If this principle of moral justification on the basis of what is in the 
interests of the greater good is accepted, the alternatives facing the 
firm must be isolated. These are, in effect:
a. putting into effect a strategy for withdrawal from 
South Africa;
b. continuing a strategy of involvement in South Africa.
6.6.1 Withdrawal
There is a fundamental misconception in any call for withdrawal from 
the South African economy.
"Nobody withdraws. You sell your holding. This may
- 181 -
Th
be to South Africans. Withdrawal achieves nothing."
(Kay)
is, however, only considers one aspect of the question of withdrawal 
In suggesting withdrawal on moral grounds it is necessary to answer 
three questions.
"I have to ask myself if withdrawal means that you 
sell to someone who is more of a pig than yourself.
You also have to assess the chances of success and 
whether or not the people who are going to suffer 
are going to applaud. The difficulty is that you 
cannot ask them." (Kay)
Each of these questions is considered in turn. Clearly, given the mis­
conception as regards the nature of withdrawal, such withdrawal is 
clearly self-defeating taking control of productive assets and the 
labour force out of, perhaps, more benevolent hands and placing them 
under the control of those who stand accused of repressive policies 
towards such workers.
"Withdrawal ....  gives the South Africans what is
rightfully theirs." (Ce-B)
Such withdrawal with its implications of isolation may be thought of 
as leading South Africa into a situation where there is a complete 
loss of support from overseas. However, several interviewees felt 
that while there might be a number of dangers from the South African 
point of view most South African purchasers had, in the past, been 
able to negotiate a number of agreements with overseas firms, particu­
larly in the area of technical assistance. However, there may be
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certain longer term effects to be considered. These include the inc­
reased cost of technology transfer and the willingness of firms to 
provide this without competitive pressure.
Perhaps of greater significance is the political isolation such with­
drawal would imply. A number of Western governments, while criticising 
South Africa's internal policies are nevertheless prepared to support 
business activities there. This has become even more apparent in the 
present recession and estimates that a trade boycott alone would inc­
rease Britain's unemployment by 75,000, Germany's by 80,000, and that 
of the EEC as a whole by 250,000, put this argument into focus, given 
the already record unemployment levels in the United Kingdom alone. 
(Spandau, A., 1979: p.9.)
"Politically it is not good as continued involvement 
is important in getting continued British government 
support. There is far less pressure if we sell to 
South Africa. The Conservatives, for example, are 
making it quite clear that they won't go along with 
a boycott, although they are saying it quietly."
(Ce-B)
Finally, the wishes of those who will bear the consequences of any 
action must be considered. The immediate consequence of a withdrawal 
of investment will be unemployment. Arndt Spandau, at a conference 
organised by Hugh Kay and cited in the interviews, estimated the rela­
tive shares in an increase in South African unemployment following a 
hypothetical 50% foreign investment boycott using 1976 data as follows: 
(Spandau, A., 1979: Op.Cit.)
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TABLE 6.3 EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF AN INVESTMENT BOYCOTT
Increase in White Unemployment 
Increase in Coloured Unemployment 
Increase in Asian Unemployment 





Total Increase in Unemployment 90,911 workers
It is not proposed to examine Spandau's method. However, it may be 
accepted that the Black worker will bear the brunt of any investment 
boycott and of any associated withdrawal of investment. On a number 
of occasions it was emphasised by Hugh Kay that in considering any 
calls for boycotts or withdrawal it is essential to consider the situa­
tions of individual workers and their ability to provide even the basic 
necessities in such a situation. South Africa provides no welfare. 
Unemployment implies three options:- starvation, crime, falling back 
on the support of the family or the tribe (both doubtful sources of 
support for those in urban areas).
Thus, it is not surprising that:
"During a meeting in Soweto, Buthelezi asked what 
the people thought about European investment.
The general trend was that they needed the job."
(Kay)
Particularly as:
"In Bophuthatswana I visited the Peugot bicycle 
factory. If Peugot pulled out there would not 
be anybody to take the plant over and 1,100 people 
would be without work or food." (Kay)
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This leads to the point raised in preceding paragraphs that in terms 
of the calls for the withdrawal of foreign investment the nationalist 
movements in exile may not represent the will of the people.
In considering the three questions raised therefore, calls for the 
withdrawal of foreign direct investment may not be as justifiable as 
first appears. The second alternative therefore is a continued presence 
in South Africa.
6.6.2 Continued Involvement
It is within the context of continued involvement that the role of the 
multinational corporation in South Africa in terms of its moral obliga­
tions becomes clear. It is also the area in which there is the greatest 
conflict between those urging business to adopt a positive role in poli­
tical change and managers who see such action as inimical to their acti­
vities and. who, together with the researcher, see the political benefits 
as flowing from their economic involvement in a country.
While the constraints placed on the development of South Africa's Black 
population have been severely criticised from abroad, there is also a 
need for certain pressures to be brought about by involvement in the 
country itself.
"The most sensible course for anybody with a stake in 
South Africa to follow is to work from the inside 
with what is available to pressure and persuade.
I believe in the liberal philosophy. There are two 
courses open. The one above and that of the prophet 
to stand out and denounce the wickedness of kings.
You need both. There has been a lot of the prophetic
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from outside but you need more. You need somebody 
to work from the inside." (Kay)
These approaches may be combined to produce both the changes listed as 
developmental prerequisites as well as the ethical justification of 
their presence to individual firms and their managements. Co-A demon­
strates the point. A number of church groups met with its chief 
executive and the interviewee, who found them to be "very sincere well 
informed people". As a result Co-A became more conscious of the wage 
levels in South Africa and became the first British firm to do so. 
Following this internal targets were established and were achieved. 
However, an interesting point emerges here, as it is necessary to 
utilise local management in achieving such goals.
"We established targets which we reached in our own 
time limits. In fact we could not have done this 
without our South African management. In reality 
you are faced by a problem. You cannot instruct 
your managers to do something because you, in effect, 
take away their profit responsibility. Two points 
emerge from what 1 am saying. Firstly, change 
tended to be instigated from outside. Secondly, 
such change would not have been possible without 
the support of the South African management." (Od-A)
While the questions of profit responsibility will be discussed in ensu­
ing paragraphs, it is suggested that outside pressure together with 
cooperation by the local management team may produce desirable change 
and the roles of prophet and citizen become mutually supportive. 
However, there is often conflict where firms are called upon to adopt
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a positive political role. It is in this that the differences in pers­
pective between prophets and managers become most apparent.
"I see the duty of the businessman in South Africa 
as being to encourage liberal politicians and to 
help fight apartheid. This is possible given 
the bigger opposition to Parliament." (Kay)
While this may apply to South African business:
"A number of us see it as a duty to be political 
in our spare time."
"In South Africa Co-E is a citizen and so we 
speak out. We see a need for ourselves to 
contribute to the political life of the country."
(Ed-E)
Such an approach was totally rejected by all interviewees when questioned 
about their activities abroad. The approach postulated is more subtle.
"Some firms are very pragmatic in realising the 
need for collaboration. There are some companies 
with a well developed system of participation for 
Black workers." (Kay)
The question may be set in terms of motive. However, if one is striving 
for the greater good in terms of the initial proposition this becomes 
largely irrelevant.
"I have been very outspoken on this point (with­
drawal of foreign investment). We feel that
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anyone who advocates this does not have South 
Africa's interests at heart. At present com­
panies with South African interests are falling 
over each other to improve conditions. Some
might say that this is for other reasons. This
is not important as long as the result is the 
same." (Ed-E)
Rio Tinto Zinc, a company that has been subjected to considerable
criticism concerning the nature of its operations in South Africa,
has attempted to improve its record.
"Chloride has an extraordinarily fine record on 
human rights. RTZ as a penitent has developed 
a better approach. RTZ in Namibia has set up a 
multinational approach. It is a very special 
set up. There are mixed villages with white and 
coloured residents. They have set up nurseries 
and so on. One can say that these companies are 
trying to justify themselves in the face of foreign 
criticism, but this is still better than not doing 
so." (Kay)
It is, therefore, possible to argue that:
" ..... It is possible to do good and still make a
profit although some say that it is immoral to 
draw a profit from something that is immoral." (Kay)
Firms operating in South Africa are extremely sensitive as to their 
reputation. In the past a number of firms have faced public disgrace
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as a sanction on poor social performance in South Africa. It was sur­
prising to find how sensitive firms are in this regard with all corres­
pondence relating to their Southern African operations being routed 
through the office of a senior executive. Once again, however, it may 
be argued that the motive is irrelevant as long as the effect is 
acceptable.
From the preceding paragraphs it may be concluded that foreign corpor­
ate involvement in the South African economy is ethically justifiable 
if it is accepted that, firstly, it is justifiable to seek the greater 
rather than the lesser good, secondly, that it is possible to do good 
and profit at the same time and, finally, that even if firms have 
other motives, if the effects of their actions bring about positive 
development they should nevertheless be encouraged. Clearly, such an 
approach is highly controversial.
The decisions facing each firm and their ethical foundations are illus­
trated in Figure 6.2 which considers, in terms of the argument presen­
ted above, the ethical justification for continued investment or with­
drawal. Figure 6.3, however, illustrates the implications of withdrawal 
or continued involvement from the points of view of those supporting 
disinvestment and an investment boycott and those urging greater 
involvement in the South African economy.
The preceding paragraphs examine the perceptions of the African and 
South African markets and the ethical justification for operating in a 
system which those interviewed considered politically unacceptable.
From this it has been possible to determine a role for the multinational 
corporation based on the politicisation of its mere presence in South 
Africa and the ethical dilemma facing its management. It is now
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possible to examine the strategies of the firms selected and in terms 
of these strategies assess the contribution of each to economic devel­
opment as defined.
6.7 INTERVIEWEE IDENTIFIED STRATEGIC DETERMINANTS
6.7.1 Introduction
The literature on multinational strategy is increasingly pointing to the 
fact that firms rarely practice the integrated or structured approach to 
strategic planning and management espoused by consultants and academics 
in the seventies. Indeed a number of firms may reject such an approach 
as irrelevant to their activities. In one interview, for example, it 
wasstated:
"The only common thread in Co-A's activities is 
electrical products. It is not a business therefore 
it cannot have strategic planning. Each business is 
taken on its own particularly given the high diversity 
of products - for example - from military missile 
systems to reactors or vacuum switches for the mines.
Co-A is highly decentralised. All companies are 
independently managed. Co-A is just a financial 
controller." (Od-A)
This, however, tends to reflect a definitional problem and, in many 
cases, a lack of understanding of what constitutes a strategic approach 
to both the local and international environment in which the firm oper­
ates . Despite Co-A's high degree of technological diversification 
which has led to a policy of decentralisation, it nevertheless operates 
strategically on a global scale through its centralised control over
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the budgeting processes of its constituent companies, its investment 
strategy, its undeclared policy of centralising all technical innova­
tions made by foreign subsidiaries, its personnel policies and its 
strong international coordinating role. In addition, in any merger 
or joint venture with firms abroad, Co-A insists on the right to 
appoint the senior financial director/manager.
Thus, while each of the 150 components of Co-A may exercise consider­
able autonomy as regards short- to medium-term operations, there is 
nevertheless a centrally determined group strategy in terms of finance, 
investment, technology, budgeting and senior personnel.
While it is acceptable, therefore, to argue that Co-A is not one busi­
ness but a number of businesses, it is not so to argue that it cannot 
thus develop a strategic approach to its activities.
The ensuing paragraphs, therefore, are based upon interviews in which 
the researcher attempted to determine what issues the interviewees 
themselves perceived to be important in their international and, more 
specifically, their South African operations. The discussion takes 
place under nine headings, each of which is designed to encompass a 
range of related issues raised by each interviewee over the period of 
research into each firm. From this a profile is developed which 
allows the development of a strategic taxonomy of the firms discussed 
and the basis of an analysis of the strategic-developmental interaction.
6.7.2 Entry into South Africa
In the cases of the firms interviewed, the locational decision was in 
most instances based upon a search, the parameters of which were 
largely determined by an empathy resulting from a knowledge, however
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limited, of particular geographical areas which have at various times 
in their history been subject to British influence.
"South Africa had the advantage of being an ex- 
British part of the pink coloured map as did 
other countries in which we invested. In addition 
it was a sound economy and had the English 
language." (Md-C)
The entry strategies of particular firms may, however, differ radically 
Co-C in South Africa, for example, followed the text book route of 
agency, licensing and, finally, manufacturing, facing the problems 
traditionally associated with each stage of this process. Co-B and 
Co-D established themselves directly, Co-D to protect its markets, 
while Co-A entered South Africa in the first decade of this century 
and acquired its holdings over time particularly following a merger 
with two other major members of the industry. Co-E, however, utilised 
a cash surplus generated as a result of new mines coming into produc­
tion to, firstly, move abroad and, secondly, to diversify into industry.
Despite the widely differing methods of entry into the South African 
market, certain similarities in the strategic approach adopted emerge:
(i) Product advantage
Each of the one-product firms, Co-B, Co-C and Co-D, argued that when 
moving overseas it was desirable to have a "bespoke" product which 
carried significant advantages given potential local competition with 
the advantages generated by a detailed knowledge and understanding of 
the market. This advantage was also needed to overcome unforeseen 
disadvantages and take the firm through an initial learning curve.
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"Our philosophy was that you needed a bespoke product 
which was better than that available locally. As one 
industry declined Co-D looked at others. For example, 
in miners lighting we developed a complete system.
This required a huge marketing effort. However, 
having set it up, it was very difficult for anyone 
else to compete. The market was protected by patents 
and by service networks as well as good contacts in 
the mining industry." (Ch-D)
"Our most important problem was that of establishing a 
brand name in South Africa." (Md-C)
Associated with this is the question of unfounded optimism when moving 
into new markets.
(ii) Optimism
It was suggested that a lack of fundamental research into new markets 
often led firms to consider foreign investment projects with an unfoun­
ded degree of optimism. Co-C, for example, found itself beset by major 
problems as its entry progressed. Firstly, despite market acceptance, 
retailers required assurances that Co-C was committed to the South 
African market. Secondly, the market was more competitive than anti­
cipated and new markets had to be found. A niche was established in 
the quality end of the women's market. Despite its initial knowledge 
of the market costs of entry were far higher than expected resulting 
in financial difficulties and the raising of R%m in loans. This, 
however, was paid back within two years as Co-C moved successfully 
into the new market.
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Such problems may be overcome by means of the utilisation of local 
promoters or what one interviewee appropriately termed "the wise owl".
(iii) Promoters
Co-B as well as Co-D employed indigenous senior management and a local 
chairman or promoter to advise the home country. It is interesting to 
examine their respective views on the roles of such promoters.
"There were cultural differences, differences in the 
ways of doing things and in the market. We tried 
to find bridges and in the control of the company 
we looked for a number of things:
Indigenous management:
We always went for a 'wise owl'
- a person we had a good personal relationship with;
- he must put us in the picture;
- he must give us advice on local affairs;
- he must have good contacts;
- his position would be chairman.
We really used the board which comprised:
- mainly nationals;
- holding company seats which were really used." (Ch-D)
"We always select non-executive directors who are 
not political but who are well connected. There­
fore, if you want to go into any government 
department they are instrumental." (Ce-B)
Co-A, following a similar approach to that of Co-B, has also appointed 
well connected non-executive directors to its board to provide access
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into government and state-managed enterprise. In countries where small 
groups have established political continuity and decision making is 
subject to political influence such appointees may be of considerable 
assistance gaining acceptance for the firm. However, this may also 
lead to difficulties. The researcher was made aware of a situation 
where two firms competing for a major project were utilising the same 
person to promote their interests. Such instances may arise where 
countries are governed by small political elites or where, as in South 
Africa, leading business management forms a small closely knit community
Despite, therefore, significant differences in the entry strategies 
adopted by firms there are important similarities in strategic approach 
which result in the involvement of local management and advisors to 
overcome common problems such as those of acceptance, cultural differ­
ences, learning, etc. However, the locational pattern of firms is 
determined by the parameters of their search which are established by 
knowledge based upon historical and present spheres of political and 
cultural influence. In addition the nature of the market as determined 
by the level of economic development acts as a fundamental determinant 
of the type of product introduced. It was argued that reciprocal 
effects exist between the nature of the entry strategy adopted, the 
nature of the product and the level of economic development of the 
country concerned. Certain products are more suited to particular 
levels of development and serve to determine the locational decision 
in conjunction with the geographical parameters outlined in the pre­
ceding paragraphs.
"Co-B went into South Africa in 1952. This was a 
natural progression. Batteries are easy to make
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in most countries and are a natural for developing 
countries." (Ce-B)
This argument is developed further when the organisational centralisa­
tion of technology and incremental technology transfer are discussed 
in Section 6.7.5 below.
6.7.5 Structure and Ownership Strategy
Associated with the entry strategy adopted are the decisions relating 
to the anticipated structure and ownership.
The structure and ownership strategies reflected by the firms inter­
viewed suggest that they are a function of management perceptions of 
political wishes and the level of economic development in addition to 
such conventional variables as product, technology, reporting systems, 
etc. In this respect it is particularly useful to examine the experien­
ces of a multiproduct high technology organisation such as Co-A and a 
single product intermediate technology firm such as Co-B.
"Structure will vary according to the actual nature 
of the operation and its size. You cannot have 
one uniform pattern and apply it everywhere." (Od-A)
Despite such variations in structure there remain within Co-A certain 
basic reporting requirements and individual activities are grouped in 
such a way that their performance may be readily monitored. This 
reflects the management philosophy upon which Co-A's success is sub­
stantially based. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation 
to examine the relationship between structure and management philosophy 
it would be interesting to relate this to Co-A's overseas strategy. 
However, the following quote must serve the purpose.
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"Co-A would not have happened without its chief 
executive and his immediate henchmen. Then it 
happened because of the way in which they set 
out to run the business and the structure is a 
consequence of that. The two things are part 
and parcel of the same thing. The man is a 
philosophy." (Od-A)
Despite there being no formal pattern other than that based upon 
reporting requirements and performance monitoring activities tend 
to be grouped around products which then become the focal point of 
the particular business. In effect, therefore, this structuring is 
technologically determined.
However, this structuring may also be determined by market size and 
level of economic development. Certain units, for example those in 
Black Africa, tend to be managed as simple multiproduct units, as the 
nature of the market does not permit detailed decentralisation.
By contrast Co-B's international operations are organised on a geogra­
phical basis, given its predominantly single product nature. Neverthe­
less, in South Africa it retains separate marketing functions for its 
battery and miners' lighting operations based on its constituent firms ■ 
Co-B and Co-D.
Both Co-A and Co-B have merged with South African partners although 
for different reasons. The nature of these mergers reflects the 
influence of the level of industrial development on structure and its 
effectiveness.
In both cases each sought an effective industrial partner. However,
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before commenting on this it is necessary to examine their respective 
reasons for desiring such mergers.
Co-A based its reasoning predominantly on its perception of the politi­
cal milieu.
"We did this because of the Climate of opinion.
We were a guest company and therefore much more 
sensitive. We knew it was the wish of the 
establishment that we should dilute." (Od-A)
It had been informed by means of the method outlined in the preceding 
paragraphs that it would be in their interests to dilute their holding 
by means of local participation in the equity of its South African 
operation. Reasons for South African insistence on this dilution are 
difficult to determine. It has been suggested that this was for 
strategic reasons given Co-A's involvement in the supply of equipment 
for a range of activities from defence to the generation of electricity
It is at this point, however, that the nature of the partner selected 
reflects the influence that high levels of industrial development may 
have on the structure of overseas operations. The decision was taken 
to combine with an organisation which would not simply provide a cos­
metic facade but which would make a positive contribution to Co-A's 
operations. As a result Co-A South Africa is now held in a 50:50 
partnership with Barlow Rand, a major South African industrial group. 
This decision was based on the fact that it was felt that Barlow Rand 
had demonstrated:
that its management's attitudes to decentralised profit 
responsibility and reporting methods were similar to those 
of Co-A;
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that it could promote Co-A's interests through its 
activities as a supplier to the South African government, 
thus acting as an effective means of market penetration;
that its management had an approach which on conjunction 
with its expertise was compatible with that of Co-A.
Co-B, by contrast, formed a partnership with Maggie although, for a 
brief period, a merger with Barlows was seriously considered. The 
reasons behind this lie not so much in South African economic national­
ism as political perceptions as the failure of Co-B in the United King­
dom and the United States as a result of which the Group required an 
inflow of cash. Co-B was faced by the choice of forming a partnership 
with Barlows or Maggie of which Anglo American and General Mining held 
37.5% each. Once again similar reasoning to that of Co-A prevailed. 
Like Barlows, Maggie were industrialists sharing compatible management 
attitudes and desiring a partnership. However, the decision was based 
on the fact that Anglo American, following its policy of industrial 
diversification, wished to enter into an agreement with the Carlton 
Group to manufacture batteries. This direct threat to Co-B's market 
was overcome by forming an agreement with Maggie whereby Maggie held 
49.9% of Co-B in South Africa while Co-B held 50.1% in exchange for 30% 
of Maggie. Co-B's position was further secured by the fact that
"Anglo became indirect shareholders and thus unless 
there was a good reason the mines would only pur­
chase our product." (Ce-B)
Thus, each firm sought an effective partnership in which there would 
be a direct contribution to the South African operation in terms of 
management expertise, market access, and active participation. While
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the benefits of such an arrangement are clear to both sides they remain a 
function of the level of South African industrial development
Co-E, in conclusion, demonstrates the influence of corporate ethos as 
structure through its activities as a mining finance house diversifying 
into industry:
"We have never aimed for a consistency of structure 
but rather a broad understanding of strategic goals."
(Ed-E)
6.7.4 Budgeting Procedures and International Financial Control
The budgeting procedures adopted by the interviewees demonstrated a 
remarkable consistency of approach. This may be attributed in part to 
certain national characteristics which, as argued in Chapter Four, 
suggest that it is possible to discern by the nature of the response 
to potential deviations from the budget the home country of the firm 
concerned. Thus, in terms of the financial controls and budgetary 
procedures adopted, financial management philosophy may be regarded as 
a function of national origin.
In each case, interviewees retained control over their South African 
operation through control over budgets, the technology utilised and 
the appointment of senior management. Thus, local management is given 
the responsibility of developing its budgets within preset strategic 
parameters which although not formally determined are informally accep­
ted. These are then presented to the home country where they are 
challenged.
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"The budget is developed in South Africa and challenged 
in the United Kingdom. The South African board must 
feel that the plan is right. It is debated and 
challenged over here. However, providing it falls 
within our overall strategy there is no problem.
Teams then go to South Africa and meet the South 
Africans to challenge them. It is a team challenge 
and a team commitment." (Ce-B)
Co-B’s insistence on commitment to budgeted targets is reflected by 
Co-A. While deviations may be accepted these must be fully justified 
and relate to new product investment rather than unforeseen outflows 
of capital. However, such deviations are in general unacceptable, 
the argument put forward being that:
"They produce a complete budget which is discussed 
and approved. Then it is over to South Africa.
The companies have to set their own targets and 
there is no comeback. They cannot say that Co-A 
has set unrealistic goals. The South African 
management must then carry out the task." (Od-A)
This approach to budgeting may have important effects on the role of 
the enterprise in development through its social performance. Where, 
for example, directives relating to the application of codes of con­
duct as social responsibility are issued from the centre the effect 
is to remove a degree of profit responsibility from local management. 
Thus, certain adjustments in central management procedures for the 
monitoring of financial performance may be necessary. While the 
firms interviewed were aware of this problem it did not appear that
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they had developed any approach to deal with it effectively. The 
importance of this may be seen by the emphasis on social responsibility 
and, in the case of merger partners, on the compatibility of management 
approach to employment practices.
Co-C and Co-D followed an annual budgeting cycle although Co-C never­
theless required its management to submit monthly reports in outline 
by telex and in considerable detail by post.
However, as may be seen, in each instance the nature of the budgetary 
processes were remarkably similar despite fundamental differences in 
management ethos. Co-A, reflecting a highly decentralised structure 
subject to performance monitoring in adherence to the management philo­
sophy of its Chief Executive, adhered to procedures which could equally 
be applied to Co-B, where greater emphasis is placed on the role of the 
individual in the organisation and, as will be demonstrated, social 
responsibility. These procedures represent one of three methods by 
which effective control of the enterprise may be exercised despite 
policies of decentralisation. Two order methods which will be discussed 
below are operated through the centralised control of technology and the 
appointment of senior management.
6.7.5 Technology, Production, and Research and Development
The nature of the technology inherent in the product mix of the organi­
sation has three important developmental as well as strategic implica­
tions in terms of product flow, technology diffusion and income dis­
tribution. (Thomas, R.E., 1983: pp.163, 204.)
(i) Product Flow
The nature of the technology employed determines the direction of the
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product flow. To determine the reasons for this it is necessary to 
examine the centralisation of the technology within the firm.
Within each of the organisations interviewed product technology is 
controlled from the centre. This control differs somewhat in Co-A 
and will be discussed separately. In no case did fundamental research 
take place in South Africa, and other than minor agreed adaptations 
for the local market, no deviations were allowed.
"As regards technology we exercised technological 
dictatorship. There was no unagreed deviation 
although there were some agreed deviations, because 
of the nature of the market." (Ch-D)
Similarly, Co-B allowed product innovation within a territory where 
that territory will form the major market.
"If we have a major project such as miners' lamps 
we agree that it (product innovation) should be 
done in the territory which is going to get most 
benefit." (Co-B)
Reasons for such centralisation may be attributed to a number of fac­
tors, for example:
Product performance
"Batteries are temperamental. We therefore needed 




"The South African Company is not large enough 
to finance R § D." (Ce-B)
Marketing
"The technical side was strictly controlled by 
head office. On the design side people were
sent back to England twice a year for short
periods to see the technology at home as well 
as to France, Italy and Germany." (Md-C)
Co-A, despite allowing management autonomy within the parameters of 
established reporting and budgeting procedures, nevertheless retains 
a technical director with two functions - that of responsibility for
fundamental research which is carried on within Co-A's central labora­
tories and that of technical audit.
"The technical director is responsible for 
finding out what companies are doing and then 
satisfying the chief executive that the 
operating companies are reacting to opportu­
nities becoming available." (Od-A)
Within the diversified structure of Co-A, however, there remains a 
flow of technology from the centre to operating companies around the 
world. This process is similar to those of the remaining interviewees 
although where high value high technology business is conducted local 
subsidiaries may function as little more than agents. This applies 
particularly in the case of, for example, the sale of large turbine
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generator sets and transformers
This centralised control over technology determines the direction of 
the product flow.
"South Africa supplies very little to us. By and
large they are already making what we make for
ourselves. Most of what they make is either by 
licence or some derived knowledge from the U.K." (Od-A)
"The technology we use determines the product flow.
Therefore, the South African company sells compara­
tively little to Europe although the miners cap lamp 
is an exception." (Ce-B)
The firms interviewed, therefore, imported little from South Africa. 
Direct investment was aimed at the establishment of plant to exploit 
the local or regional markets. Further, study to determine the nature 
of this relationship which is based on a wider sample would be of 
considerable importance. The preceding paragraphs suggest only a
relationship between fevel of development, the use of imported techno­
logy and the direction of product flow which has implications for the 
effect of foreign direct investment on the long-term balance of pay­
ments and, in the case of less developed countries, suggests that 
imported medium to high technology may result in a static equilibrium 
resulting from the inflow of technology and the manufacture to meet 
purely regional or local demand.
An important element of this product flow is the manner in which tech­
nology diffusion takes place within the firm.
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(ii) Technology diffusion
Despite the centralisation of technology the diffusion of new technology 
through the international operations of the firm is not subject to any 
predetermined process. Rather, it is the perceived applications by the 
local firm that determine whether such transfer takes place.
"Nothing is diffused centrally. If Co-A Switches 
have developments then the communication they have 
all the time with the overseas companies results in 
a flow of knowledge. The U.K. will not give tech­
nology away. The overseas company will have to buy 
it if, and only if, they want it." (Od-A)
Within Co-B there is a greater degree of control. However, this is 
not subject to any plan.
"If technical innovations which are in the nature 
of cost reductions or product effectiveness arise, 
they are made available fairly rapidly but then it 
is decided by every company, either themselves or 
with the help of a Chairman of Operations over here, 
which development makes sense and the time scale 
for applying it." (Ce-B)
However, to reduce risk, where such innovations become available but 
require operational testing, operating companies which have the great­
est interest in the development in conjunction with the highest poten­
tial return are permitted to apply it.
The effects of the mergers with Haggie and Barlows did not significantly
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affect this diffusion process, Co-B going so far as to open its 
research facilities to regular inspection by Haggie. The philosophy 
adopted is best represented by the following statement:
"We have nothing to hide and should not do so 
from those who are paying for it." (Ce-B)
The South African government has let it be known that it is prepared 
to accept such technology aid agreements. Indeed such agreements may 
ensure the survival of South African firms should there be a withdrawal 
of the parent companies from South Africa. This is in contrast to 
suspicions previously held that such technology aid agreements could 
be used, firstly, to exploit South African interests by charging exces­
sive fees for such transfers and, secondly, as a means of overcoming 
exchange control regulations.
"South Africa, like Australia, has taken a broad view 
that it is not against technical aid agreements pro­
viding companies get value for money." (Ce-B)
From the preceding paragraphs it may be seen that new technical devel­
opments are not thrust upon overseas operations. Rather, constituent 
firms are permitted to determine what they perceive to be applicable 
and once such technical innovations are applied they are subject to 
central control.
While the technical aspect determines the production process there are 
marginal differences which may have significant political effects.
(iii) Production methods
South Africa’s highly dualistic economic structure leads to a sensitivity
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to the relative costs of labour and capital. This may be utilised in 
periods of rapid economic growth where firms, such as those interviewed, 
retain the same pressures on productivity as in other areas of opera­
tion, to increase Black wage levels and pressure for the development 
of a skilled Black labour force with the consequent political effects 
this implies.
"The major problem is the shortage of skilled labour.
This is the main gripe. It pushes management into 
the use of more capital. However, it also pushes 
emancipation. We now have permission from the White 
unions to train Black apprentices and since last 
September we have been really pushing." (Od-A)
Thus, by determining the direction of the product flow, the nature of 
the diffusion process and the demand for skills in the South African 
context the technology inherent in the product mix has fundamental 
implications which go beyond the relatively straightforward concept of 
technology transfer.
6.7.6 Political Risk
The political risks faced by the firms operating in South Africa may 
be classified under three headings:
Risks to operations in third countries opposed to South 
Africa's internal policies;




The discussion relating to managerial perceptions of the African and 
Southern African environment has already indicated the lack of formal 
methods of political risk assessment by firms operating in South 
Africa. Such assessment as is undertaken is informal, tending to 
rely on the opinion of those with experience of conditions in particu­
lar geographical areas. The accuracy of such assessments is often 
compromised by those with such knowledge being prejudiced by the stakes 
they may hold in such countries. This applies particularly to local 
board members and consultants.
The vague nature of such assessments is demonstrated by the following 
statement :
"Going back to company philosophy and the main 
board, no one thinks that South Africa is going 
to go under in the next few years. It is longer 
term. They don't see it as a place where anything 
dramatic is going to happen in the short term.
However, no one is capable of looking into crystal 
balls. Anything might happen." (Md-C)
It is within this context, therefore, that it is necessary to examine 
corporate perceptions of political risk in relation to South Africa.
(i) Risk to operations in third countries opposed to South Africa's 
internal policies
This does not appear to be widespread and experience of such political 
leverage differs from firm to firm. In the case of Co-A, for example:
"There has been some sabre rattling in Nigeria 
although we haven't been singled out. Nigeria
- 211 -
has tried to impose its own form of boycott 
against those doing business with South Africa.
However, it is difficult to sustain because 
all the major firms in our industry are doing 
business with South Africa." (Od-A)
While the heavy electrical industry may have been selected because of 
its importance to South African economic development, it has, as will 
be demonstrated in the next chapter, considerable power to overcome 
such political threats through the participation of all major firms in 
the industry in the International Electrical Agency - an extremely 
effective and cohesive secret cartel.
Co-B, Co-C and Co-D faced little or no criticism.
"We have had no comments from other countries 
about our operations in South Africa. The 
crunch might have come in Nigeria, but our
factory is nearly complete now. There is no
problem if you keep quiet. We put down our 
South African interest when we were negotiating.
They never brought it up and we never said 
anything." (Ce-B)
This reflects Co-B policy which is reinforced by South African legisla­
tion making it an offence for local subsidiaries to provide information
which would compromise South African economic interests, to foreign 
holding companies.
"Our policy on our overseas companies is to 
retain as low a profile as is sensible. We
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are outsiders and it is not for us to get 
involved." (Ce-B)
Similarly, despite South African ownership and its widespread operations 
throughout the world, Co-E faces little criticism. However, the problem 
of reaction to South African policies on a purely personal level was 
raised. This, in the experience of the researcher, applies only to 
initial contacts on a personal level where questions as to South Africa’s 
internal policies may be raised.
"Criticism is not a severe problem when operating 
abroad. The one area of difficulty lies in 
dealing with other nationalities. People may be 
embarrassed by the South African political 
situation." (Ed-E)
Co-E illustrates further how South African multinationals may be drawn 
into regional political negotiations. This leads to the second element 
of political risk that may be discerned by the responses of interviewees - 
that of:
(ii) Risk generated by changes in relations between countries in 
Southern Africa
As demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, Co-E's management philoso­
phy regarding social responsibility permitted direct participation by 
its executives in South African party politics. However, in certain 
cases this approach to political participation has been extended to 
involvement in regional affairs through its interests in Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Botswana and South Africa. Such involvement is atypical of the approach 
of European and South African multinationals to international affairs.
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In the case of Co-E such involvement is facilitated by size, the closed 
and cohesive structure of the industrial and political elites in South­
ern Africa, and the participation by certain executives in the South 
African parliament.
However, despite persistent rumours to the contrary, Co-E managers did 
not mediate in the meetings between Prime Minister Vorster and President 
Kaunda. Nevertheless, such executives as the interviewee did carry 
messages between the two governments and one senior manager received a 
CBE for his negotiations between Prime Minister Smith and President 
Kaunda, and also played an important part in the Lancaster House agree­
ment .
Such involvement is, as stated above, unique even in terms of South 
African organisations active within the region.
The firms interviewed adopted extremely reactive strategies to events 
affecting relations between states in the region. An exception to this 
was Co-B, which demonstrated how firms may adjust their geographic 
structure to accommodate such changes in political relationships and 
reduce the potential effects of exposure to political risk.
In anticipation of problems in political relations within the region 
Co-B, at its Chief Executive's instigation, restructured its operations 
to reduce the political risk to its operations generated by the elec­
tion of Prime Minister Mugabe. This resulted in the operation in 
Malawi being separated from those in Zimbabwe and Zambia. This was 
necessary, it was felt, because of possible economic retaliation by 
Zimbabwe against Malawi following its refusal throughout the guerilla 
campaign to offer any assistance or bases to the liberation movements
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while at the same time trading with the Smith regime in defiance of 
sanctions.
Secondly, it was felt that central African dependence on the South 
African operation for rubber containers could jeopardise Co-B's opera­
tions if there was conflict or, even simply, border closures. The 
Zimbabwean and Zambian operations were therefore asked to submit their 
cases for the location of the plant and on the basis of these it was 
located in Harare.
This also illustrates how by managing political risk firms may gain 
certain "good citizenship" credits while operating in Africa.
"It would be hard for us if the border were closed 
but it would not bring the operation to a halt.
This also shows that we save foreign exchange and 
that we are good citizens." (Ce-B)
The third form of political risk identified is that generated internally 
within nations.
(iii) Internal political risk
Political risk generated within nations may take many forms. Thus, the 
industrial relations environment in South Africa is regarded by many 
firms as containing all the elements of potential internal political 
risk following the emergence of politically active Black trade unions 
as outlined in preceding paragraphs.
However, within the South African context it is useful to note an addi­
tional aspect of political risk resulting from the fear of South Afri­
cans that given the nature of the political situation firms do not
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regard their interests there as long term commitments. This leads to 
difficulties in gaining acceptance and, at times of high political 
tension, a degree of xenophobia, particularly where home countries are 
critical of South African policy.
"There is the problem of whether your customers 
believe you to be South African. People ask 
you if you are just trying to make a bit of 
money and then get out." (Md-C)
The firms interviewed did not, however, appear to be significantly 
affected by such attitudes although Co-A did require British government 
aid to overcome South African doubts about its ability to perform in 
the face of political attitudes in Britain when tendering for a major 
parastatal contract. However, discussion on the tendering for major 
contracts is relegated to Volume II which examines other aspects of 
political risk and the ability of firms to control their environment 
through the operation of the International Electrical Agency.
Of immediate relevance, however, is the effect of the South African 
industrial relations environment on the strategic approach of firms 
operating in South Africa.
6.7.7 Industrial Relations and Codes of Conduct
The response to the industrial relations environment is not only deter­
mined by the strategic approach to political risk but also by the 
management ethos of the firm concerned. This was strongly reflected 
in the approach of each interviewee when questioned in detail. Co-B's 
policy, for example, is to remain within the top 10 percent of good 
employers in each country in which it operates in terms of wages,
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pensions, working conditions, etc. To this extent it may be argued 
that its strategy reflects its attitude to social responsibility. 
However, where there is any government interface firms are extremely 
reluctant to be in the vanguard of any change that could be seen to 
challenge the established political structure. Thus, Co-B found 
itself with no cohesive strategic approach to the challenge by Black 
unions in Port Elizabeth, and was forced to react to a series of 
events beyond its control which, had Barlow Rand not been forced to 
follow a similar course, could have led to a direct conflict with the 
South African government.
Co-A and Co-C both reflect a similar lack of anticipation.
"You have to recognise that it exists and cope 
with it as best you can." (Od-A)
Comments reflected a degree of naivete as regards the politicisation 
of the work force that has already taken place which, as has been 
demonstrated, will have fundamental effects on the development of 
South Africa and the role of private enterprise in this.
"We welcome trade unions in South Africa so 
long as they don't lose sight of the reason 
for their existence. It's when they become 
political that problems arise." (Od-A)
At the same time as these interviews were conducted, Co-A was resisting 
recognition of a new unregistered union. In a later interview it was 
concluded that:
"The unregistered trade unions will gain in 
strength. It is one of the ambitions of the 
Blacks." (Od-A)
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In developing acceptable employment practices, including the recogni­
tion of Black unions, codes of conduct were regarded as being useful. 
However, it did not appear to the researcher that there was any 
attempt to apply them. Each interviewee claimed to follow one of the
codes of conduct - Co-E, SACCOLA; Co-A, EEC; Co-B, EEC. However,
such acceptance merely served to reflect overall management ethos in 
relation to its responsibilities in South Africa.
"When you write something down it is helpful to
concentrate the mind. It is not the code, it
is the spirit of the code." (Ce-B)
Thus, while codes may be presented to firms they often serve to rein­
force present policies based on management ethos relating to social 
performance. However, such codes, as has been argued, may serve to 
provide firms with targets behind which they may hide. Such codes 
also lose credibility with Black workers whose cooperation is not 
sought in this development and who are patronisingly informed that 
firms will in future be guarding their interests by applying such 
codes. The Sullivan and EEC codes may be readily criticised from 
this point of view.
6.7.8 Personnel Considerations
While in South Africa the researcher was aware of consistent criticism 
of the unsuitability of many of those appointed abroad to management 
positions in South Africa, Interviews suggested that firms did not 
adopt formal assessment procedures for managers they intended sending 
abroad until some crisis forced recognition of this problem. Thus, 
Co-A does not have any formal selection or briefing procedure, basing 
their decision as to an individual's suitability on his technical
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competence, this approach being similar to that formerly adopted by 
Co-D. Co-C, however, following difficulties resulting from the appoint­
ment of a managing director with little or no empathy towards South 
Africa's problems, examined the problem of selection extremely carefully 
(Such empathy does not imply an uncritical acceptance of South Africa's 
present problems but rather an understanding of the role of the firm in 
terms of the ethics of involvement as set out in Section 6.6.) Consid­
eration was given to the role of the wife and family as well as the 
role of such appointments in the career path of the individual. The 
effect of this has been to improve both the professional quality of 
managers posted to South African operations as well as the quality of 
the social interaction which, as will be shown, plays an important role 
in the conduct of business in South Africa.
"Before we send people abroad we select them very 
carefully and brief them. Wives are very import­
ant . She must have some sort of empathy for the 
country she is going to. Some companies do this 
much more formally than others. Co-C did it very 
informally but you can be certain she was assessed 
particularly on the social side to see if she 
would be acceptable to the local nationals." (Md-C)
"Co-C brief the husband on South African social 
customs and ways of doing business." (Md-C)
Co-B, however, regards such appointments as being directly related to 
its success abroad, giving emphasis to the importance of the ability 
to readily recognise the underlying ethos of a country. The specifica­
tions for the job are consequently more formally determined than in 
the case of Co-C.
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"For the post of manager or director overseas I 
wrote the profile. Firstly he must have managed 
a company while secondly he must have lived in a 
developing country for a number of years. He 
must have a feel for it. It is important to 
know what is the same and what is different, 
and develop a 'feel' for a country." (Ce-B)
The potential of the expatriate to do damage to the firm abroad was 
emphasised. However, where such an individual remains in a country 
for a period of time and develops an empathy for it he may not only 
act in the interests of his firm, but also assist in the development 
of relations between enterprise in that country and the home country, 
provide advice and expertise to local industry, etc. This has occurred 
in the case of certain German and Swiss firms.
An essential element of such an understanding is the recognition of 
different business styles as determined by the cultural parameters of 
the society.
6.7.9 Cultural Parameters and Business Style
While, as has been suggested, the South African style of business is 
perceived by interviewees to be mid-Atlantic the interviews reflected 
a lack of detailed knowledge. This lack of understanding by firms in 
part reflects the level of South African economic development with its 
consequent implications for high levels of management education and 
development permitting effective decentralisation from the United King­
dom in a number of decision areas.
While it may be argued that it is possible to adapt the style of
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management, within the parameters of certain basic principles, to suit 
particular national situations, only one company appeared to have given 
this detailed consideration ascribing to it a great deal of the success 
of its international operations.
"This is the key to why Co-B has been so successful.
There is one way in which you manage in the West.
However, you must tailor this to each of the coun­
tries in which you operate. You start off by saying 
that this is the way to manage an enterprise but we 
will adapt if there is good reason to do so - not 
the other way around." (Ce-B)
The differences in the approaches to management and business may be 




Two aspects of management style were discerned during the interviews. 
The first of management approach was described succinctly by one inter­
viewee and echoed by a second.
"South African management is informal and adventurous, 
perhaps slap dash which is the other side of the 
same coin. They tend to concentrate on one or two 
things and forget about the detail. When the South 
African manager turns up abroad his subordinates see 
him as a bull in a china shop while he sees them as 
sheep." (Ed-E)
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"The South African management style is harsh and 
it tends to frighten the English." (Ce-B)
The second element of this may be described as attitude. This was 
strongly emphasised during the discussions with Co-B when it was 
suggested that South African, Australian and United States' attitudes 
to profit and new opportunities were similar. While the question was 
framed in terms of the continuity of management strategy between the 
two South African chief executives, the answer is of interest.
"Both of us come from an environment where the 
making of profit and one's attitude to this is 
important. My predecessor could be American 
or Australian and I South African, but it is 
the attitude that is important. We come from 
an environment where one is more inclined to 
say why you are going to do something than why 
you cannot." (Ce-B)
The informal approach of South African management is based to a large 
extent on the social aspect and its importance to the conduct of 
business.
(ii) The social aspect
The informality of business in South Africa may be ascribed to three 
factors :
a. business operates at higher profit levels than in 
European countries;
b . the business community is smaller, as are the cities 
apart from Johannesburg;
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c. the climate allows considerable social interaction.
However, South African management does often face criticism from home 
countries reflecting suspicion of the importance attached to this ele­
ment of the conduct of business which is clearly open to abuse.
"My criticism is that there is a danger of people
using the company's money for business that is
not business. People are well paid and there is 
a low tax rate. There is a tendency to overdo it.
I notice it and it worries me a little. In general 
the business is less formal as it is in America 
and that is not a bad thing." (Ce-B)
The importance attached to social interaction does reflect South African 
management philosophy as regards both inter- and iritra-organisational 
interaction.
"IVhoever the people are, it is essential to win 
their personal confidence. You do this by taking 
a genuine interest in them and spending time with 
them. This includes the much criticised business 
lunch, drinks, etc. If you are not prepared to 
do this you will lose them. You must be friendly 
to the extent you make people feel that you care 
about them." (Ed-E)
Such changes in emphasis in the conduct of business or managerial 
activities may, even in smaller firms, lead to conflict with overall 
policy.
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"South Africa was very important. Therefore, we 
did things we would not do in other countries.
For example, in mining we organised golf matches 
for mine managers and executives. The Rand and 
Country Clubs were also important." (Ch-D)
6.8 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has attempted, by means of a series of semi-structured 
interviews, to allow those interviewed to isolate the strategic deter­
minants perceived to be of greatest significance to the strategic 
approach adopted by their organisations when operating in South Africa. 
This is illustrated in Table 6.4.
Table 6.5 relates these interviewee identified strategic determinants 
of strategy to the trichotomous strategic classification proposed in 
Chapter Five. In this table each of the strategic determinants is 
listed under three generic headings and related to the response it 
engendered in the organisation. In terms of the overall strategic 
response adopted by the firms interviewed it may be seen that a pre­
dominantly integrative approach was followed as regards the inherent 
technical and research and development requirements. Examination of 
each firm's response to other elements of strategy such as those 
directed at the management of political risk suggest that Co-B adopted 
a strategic approach which was predominantly one of national respon­
siveness. By contrast, Co-A, Co-C and Co-D, as demonstrated, adopted 
strategies of administrative coordination, while Co-E, operating in 
its home country, preferred to anticipate and adapt to situations based 
upon its detailed knowledge, understanding and political involvement in 
its environment. It is within this context that it is interesting to
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note how each of the firms interviewed attempted to cope with the 
politicisation of the organisation by means of strategies tending 
to international integration, as was indicated by their highly reac­
tive approaches to political parameters based on home country per­
ceptions of the role of the firm as guest in the host country.
In terms of market characteristics, firms showed themselves to be far 
more adaptable to the characteristics of the host country with only 
Co-A adopting a consistently more integrative approach and other 
firms following more strategies of national responsiveness.
This classification will be made more explicit in the next chapter 
when each firm is classified in terms of its strategic approach. It 
is important, however, to emphasise that the strategic response of 
the firm in this classification relates specifically to its operation 
in South and Southern Africa.
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TABLE 6.4 INTERVIEWEE IDENTIFIED STRATEGIC DETERMINANTS
Co-A Co-B Co-C Co-D Co
STRATEGIC APPROACH
I. ENTRY INTO SOUTH AFRICA
A. Geographic Spread
Predominantly Commonwealth P P P P P
Europe N P N P P
United States P P N P P
B. Entry Method into South Africa^
Progressive involvement P N P N N
Direct investment in Plant N P P P P
C. Reasons for Entry
New market development P P N N N
Protection of markets N N N P N
Failure of licencing and D
other agreements IN IN r N N
Cash surplus N N N N P
D. Perceived Advantages
Product N P P P N
Finance P N N N P
Technical P P P P P
Organisational P N N N N
Management style P P N N N
E. Development of Local Knowledge
Appointment of local management P P N P P
"Wise-owl" N N P P N
Utilisation of non-executive
directors r P N P r
Consultants/Merchant Bankers P P N P P
JI. STRUCTURE AND OWNERSHIP STRATEGY
A. Structure
International structural
consistency aimed for N P P P N
Geographic based structure N P P P N
Product based structure P N N N P
B. Structural Determinants
Product mix P N N N P
Technology P N N N P
Reporting requirements P P P P N




Co-A Co- B Co-C Co-D Co- E
C. Merger Participation
By Government hortation P N N/A N N/A
U.K. cash shortage N P N/A P N/A
Take-over of U.K. company N N N/A P N/A
Sale by home company N N N/A P N/A
Protection of markets P P N/A N N/A
Market access P P N/A N N/A
D. Predominant Partnership
Attributes Sought
Compatibility of management P P N/A N N/Aphilosophy
Active participation P P N/A N N/A
Industrial organisation P P N/A N N/A
Cash payment in U.K. P N N/A P N/A
III. BUDGETARY PROCEDURES
A. Budget
Developed in U.K.^ N N N N P
S.A. P P P P N
Challenged in U.K.^ P P P P N
S.A. N N N N P
B. Budgetary Cycle
Annual P P P P P
Weekly reporting requirements N/A N/A P N/A N/A
Monthly reporting requirements N/A N/A P N/A N/A
C. Decentralised Profit
Responsibility P P P P P
D. Deviations Permitted
Capital expenditure N N N N N
New product development N N P N P
Unforeseen non-capital outlays P P P P P
IV. TECHNOLOGY, PRODUCTION AND R S D
A. Product Technology
High P N N N N
Medium N P N P N
Low N N P N P
B. Production Technology
High P N N N P
Medium N P P P N
Low N N N N N
C. Centralisation of
Technology P P P P P




Co-A Co-B Co-C Co-D Co-E
D. Reasons for Centralisation
Production efficiency P P P P P
Product performance P P N P N
Market size P P P P N
Marketing P P P P N
E. R G D Facilities
In Third Countries N P N N N
Open to inspection by South N P N/A N/A N/AAfrican partners 
F . Technology Diffusion
Centrally controlled P P P P P
Incremental P P P P P
Formal technical aid agreements P P N/A N P
V. POLITICAL RISK
A. Assessment Procedures
Formalised methods N P N N P
Informal methods:-
Reliance on local management P P P P P
Use of the home expertise P P P P P
Consultants/Other P P N P P
B. Nature of Risk Perceived
To operations in Third Countries 
resulting from:-
NInvestment in South Africa P P N P
Changing regional relationships P P N N P
Changes in regional political P P N N Pstructure
Internal Political Risk 
(refer also to Table 6.2)
NInternal political stability N N N P
Trade Union politicisation P P N N P
Politicisation of Decisions
Investment decisions P N P P N
Labour relations P P N N P
Personnel policies N N N N P
Training P N N N N
Utilisation of capital and P N N N Nlabour
Criticism of Operations in S.A.
In the United Kingdom P N N N P
In South Africa N N N N P




Co-A Co- B Co-C Co- D Co- E
C. Strategies Adopted
Formal strategy N P N N N
React to events P N P P P
Anticipatory N P N N N
Regional reorganisation N P N N N
Low profile P P N N N
VI. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND
CODES OF CONDUCT
Union Recognition
Registered P N P N/A P
Unregistered N P N N/A N
Unregistered Union Activity P P N N P
Political Role of Unions Perceived P P P N/A Pto be Important
Major Industrial Disputes with N p N N/A pPolitical Element
Codes Applied
EEC P P P N/A N
Saccolla N N N N/A P
Sullivan N N N N/A N
Interwac. Policies/Codes P P N P N
Codes Considered to be Effective N N N N P
Corporate Philosophy more Important P P P P P
Approach to Workforce in N N N N NImplementation
VII. PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS
Personnel Failures Leading to:
Formal assessment procedures N P P N N
Informal assessment procedures N N P N N
Overseas Service
Work profile available N P N N N
Integrated into career path N P P N N
Criteria for Selection
Technical/Commercial P P P N N
Managerial skills P P P N N
Political attitudes/activity N P P N N
Social skills N P P N N
Wife/family N P P N N




Co-A Co-B Co-C Co-D Co-E
Briefing
Social/Political N P P N N
Management/Economic N P P N N
Technical P P P N N
VIII. SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESS STYLE
Positive attitude to profit P P P P P
Ability in relation to P N P N/A Pappointment
Informal P P P P P
Adventurous N/A P P N P
Emphasis on role of individual N/A N N/A N P
Ignore detail N/A N N/A N/A P
"Harsh" N/A P N N/A N
/
^In the case of Anglo American Corporation read 




N/A = not applicable/information not available
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TABLE 6.5 A STRATEGIC CLASSIFICATION





I. POLITICAL RISK/MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. External to South African Operations
Home/Third Country Criticism A B C D E
Home Government Support A B C D E
Regional:
Military Tension A C D B E
Ideological Tension A C D B E
Economic Dependency C A B D E
Pressure for Withdrawal B C D A E
Ethical Parameters 
Comparative Risk Exposure A C
A B C D E 
D B E
B. Internal South African Political Risk
High Levels of Societal Politicisation A C D B E
Politicisation of the Firm D E A B C
Government Decision Prediliction (Economic/Political) C D A B E
Societal Approbation of Socio-Political Change A B C D E
Existence of Political Alternatives A B C D E
Political Attitudes to Private Enterprise B C D E A
State Economic Intervention C D A B E
Policy Consistency 
Political Continuity A C
A B C D E 
B D E
Increasing Union Politicisation A B C D E
II. MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
A. Regional Relationships
Exports to Africa C B D A E
Regional Economic Groupings C D B E A
Economic Dualism (Regional) D A B C E
B. The Government Interface
State Economic Intervention C A B D E
Dependence on State Purchases C D E A
Political/Economic Interaction A C B D E
C. National Characteristics
Societal Attitudes to Private Enterprise B C D E A
Level of Economic Development A B D E C
South African Economic Dualism A C D B ECultural Parameters A B C D E
Degree of Competition C B D A E
D. Organisational Aspects
Opportunities Perceived in LDC's C A B D EProduct Mix C A B D ERelative Importance of the South African Operation A C D B Eto the Firm
Mergers to Protect Markets and Secure Funds 
Mergers Resulting from Political Pressure A
A B D E
III. TECHNOLOGY
Inherent Product Technology 
Inherent Production Technology 
Perceived Technical Advantage 
Research and Development Requirements 
South African Skill Shortages A B D
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
C ESensitivity of Production Techniques to Capital/Labour B C D A ESubstitution
Technical Aid Agreements E A B C DMerger Obligations E A B D
APPENDIX 6.1
INTERVIEW METHOD
Because of the sensitivity of the topics under discussion, the initial 
interview with each interviewee was used by the researcher as a famil­
iarisation exercise, the objectives of which were to establish a certain 
rapport upon which to base future discussions and define in more detail 
the parameters and goals of the proposed study.
To allow the interviewee to present his own ideas rather than comment 
on those of the researcher, thereby giving a false impression of what 
he perceived to be the relevant issues, interviews were conducted on a 
semi-structured basis. The researcher initiated the discussion with a 
plan of the interview containing a list of topics and relevant open 
ended questions. This allowed the interviewee to digress and present 
his own ideas. Nevertheless, at no time was the discussion allowed to 
degenerate into a talk about issues of interest but not of relevance. 
Each interview lasted for between one and two hours and, with three 
exceptions, took place in the office of the executive concerned.
As may be seen, this approach was extremely effective if judged by the 
amount of information generated within a short period of time.
However, while these interviews were also successful in that those 
agreeing to assist with the study gave their full cooperation and pro­
vided the researcher with a sound overview of the strategic issues 
involved in foreign direct investment in South Africa and its political 
and economic implications, it became increasingly apparent that it 
would be necessary to focus on specific aspects of the operations of 






The preceding chapters attempt to combine practical relevance with 
analytical and methodological clarity to provide an insight into the 
interrelationship between foreign direct investment, the strategic 
approach of the firm and the development of the host nation, which 
will be of interest to those conducting business operations in South 
Africa as well as to students of strategic planning and economic 
development. To achieve this two-fold objective a discursive approach 
was utilised to examine the literature while the empirical content was 
founded upon a series of semi-structured interviews with senior execu­
tives having considerable experience of the management of the Southern 
African element of their international operations and whose position 
in their respective organisations provided them with an overview of 
the firm which was not constrained by various structurally related 
perceptions.
The central argument was founded on the liberal approach relating to 
the economic and political elements of the development process focus­
ing on the role of foreign direct investment by means of the strategic- 
developmental interaction. The discussion was limited to firms with 
a long-term commitment to the South African market and as such does 
not consider the developmental effects of the participation of overseas 
organisations in short to medium term projects such as, for example, 
power station construction or other infrastructural projects. Neither 
does it consider the role of such international service agencies as, 
for example, management and technical consultancies or banks.
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However, for the sake of completeness, the discussion of Volume II 
contains a brief assessment of the roles of such organisations in 
the South African context.
The preceding chapters have thus focused on the overall philosophical 
approach of each organisation and the role of the firm in the develop­
mental process was considered in terms of the modernisation ideals 
set out in Chapter Two. This introduced the political element into 
the discussion and widened the scope of the study, illustrating many 
significant gaps in the literature, suggesting a number of areas for 
further research. This applies particularly to the examination of the 
politicisation of the organisation in countries such as South Africa 
where fundamental decisions have yet to be made as to the future 
economic and political structure and where managers are faced by a 
number of issues of a casuist nature.
This chapter now discusses the reistic structure and the conclusions 
of this study as well as their wider implications. Finally, further 
areas for research are suggested.
7.2 THE ERISTIC STRUCTURE AND ILLATIONS
The argument of the preceding chapters is divided into four parts:
The first is concerned with the relevance of 
contemporary orthodox economic analysis to the 
problems of the developing world.
The second relates to the objectives of economic 
development drawing attention to the relationship 
between the economic and political elements of 
these by means of the liberal interpretation.
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The argument is then focused onto the nature 
of development in South Africa and the role 
of foreign direct investment in this.
Finally, the empirical element examines the 
role of five multinationals in this development 
process by means of an investigation into the 
strategic approaches adopted by each and the 
interpretation by a policy influencing executive 
of the roles of such firms in South Africa.
The conclusions of the study are now discussed in terms of this four­
fold breakdown.
7.2.1 The Relevance of Contemporary Orthodox Economic Analysis
The discussion shows that a number of criticisms may be levelled 
against the indiscriminate application of theoretical techniques of 
analysis developed in relation to the economies of the advanced 
nations and of greater relevance to what has been termed "the special 
case". However, while the basic tools of analysis must be retained 
as they form the foundation upon which any model of development must 
be based, any sound theory pertaining to the nature of development 
must take fully into account the characteristics of the country con­
cerned. There must exist a full understanding of the economic, poli­
tical, cultural and historical dimensions of a society before there 
can be an effective statement of the development problem.
Thus, constraints on the analysis of development engendered by ques­
tions as to the relevance of current theoretical approaches are 
serious and must be given serious consideration. Once this principle
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is recognised it is possible to advance to a more successful attempt 
to develop an approach which gives due recognition to the nature of 
the development problem faced.
While there exists considerable controversy as to the relevance of 
current theoretical approaches there is broad consensus as to the 
objectives of development.
7.2.2 The Objectives of Development
Development, it has been argued, may be considered as a process of 
improvement with respect to a set of values relating to the desired 
conditions within a society. Thus, it is suggested that development 
is a normative concept, its definition and measurement depending on 
the analyst involved. However, while there are divergent opinions 
as to the causes of development and the weights that should be attached 
to specific goals, there is a broad consensus as to what these goals 
are, particularly when, as was suggested, it is recognised that such 
development is concerned with the achievement of the full potential 
of the human personality.
The implication, however, is again that it is necessary to have a 
sound knowledge of the conditions existing within the society under 
examination - its socio-political and economic structure, the differ­
ing aspirations of its people, the constraints imposed by geography, 
climate, etc., as well as its external economic and political rela­
tions. On the basis of these arguments the study focused on the 
Republic of South Africa and adopted an eclectic approach to the role 
of foreign direct investment in its development in terms of these 
objectives.
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These objectives were not purely economic. A substantial proportion 
were political in essence and within the context of South Africa it 
is suggested that changes in the economic parameters of the society 
will have substantial political effects.
7.2.3 The Development of South Africa
South Africa, by the combination of its history, its rapid economic 
growth and its geographical location, has the potential for high levels 
of economic achievement in conjunction with the potential for consider­
able conflict. This has both national and regional implications which 
serve to determine the nature of the strategic approaches adopted by 
international firms operating in the region.
The roots of this conflict lie in the history of South Africa and 
particularly in the two Anglo-Boer Wars which have had lasting effects 
on the political and economic structure. Predominantly as a result of 
Lord Kitchener's scorched earth policies creating an unskilled land­
less class with few prospects in cities controlled by foreign interests, 
the foundation was laid for an extreme form of nationalist response.
Throughout the period of this response political control in South 
Africa remained in the hands of the Afrikaner while economic control 
has been retained by English speaking South Africans. However, the 
nationalist philosophy has been conducive to economic growth in its 
acceptance and encouragement of free enterprise and the drive for 
effective Afrikaner economic participation in future development.
This is illustrated by the fact that while it has been argued that 
in terms of Hymer's three level scheme for the analysis of corporate 
structure South Africa lies between levels II and III, it cannot be
- 237 -
denied that it has undergone phenomenal economic and industrial 
growth in its own right since 1960. Instances of such development 
were readily cited - the establishment of the first commercial coal 
to oil plant, the Orange River Scheme, the industrialisation making 
the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging Triangle the most productive 
industrial area in Africa, the indigenous development of a successful 
uranium enrichment process, etc.
In conjunction with this Black South Africans are demanding greater 
participation in the political and economic development of the coun­
try. With increased economic growth these pressures have become 
greater. This has resulted in numerous anomalies in the political 
and economic life of the country which are well illustrated by, for 
example, the role of trade unions. In the face of restrictions on 
political institutions in conjunction with the relative freedom 
allowed by industrial relations legislation, unregistered trade unions 
have emerged at the forefront of Black political comment.
The result of this interplay is a highly politicised society with the 
appearance of considerable continuity but which is undergoing rapid, 
potentially destabilising, economic and political change.
The results of this interaction between the economic and political 
elements of development have created an ideological crisis for the 
Government of South Africa which on the basis of its present philoso­
phical framework cannot contain the change taking place and is there­
fore finding itself in the position of making an increasing number of 
reactive adjustments to the situation. At the same time there is 
recognition of the fact that sustained growth at levels above S% per 
annum are needed to ensure continued white domination. This crisis
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may be readily perceived in the survivalist approach that has been 
adopted.
Thus, as development has taken place so trends have tended to follow 
the conventional liberal approach as defined in Chapter Three. How­
ever, this has been based upon the inherent potential for conflict 
within the society resulting in a highly politicised environment.
The difficulty in terms of political risk analysis lies in attempts 
to determine which of the forces discussed will gain predominance and 
those leading to destabilising conflict or those tending to utilise 
these inherent forces to achieve their goals on the basis of future 
economic development.
This has fundamental implications for the other countries of the 
region which are economically dependent on South Africa. On the basis 
of a rejection of South African economic hegemony they have attempted 
to form a unified economic and political grouping - the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference. It is difficult to 
assess the successes in this direction at this early stage. However, 
the effects have not been to reduce the dependency of the participat­
ing countries on South Africa's food exports, technology or transport 
system. This it was argued is due to the difficulties in overcoming 
the realities of geographical location and economic strength. Indeed, 
industry tends to regard such countries as Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland as being on the South African industrial periphery and 
international firms tend to locate in South Africa utilising it as a 
base for operations in other countries in the region.
The reality of the political and economic relationships is reflected 
in the pragmatism of economic cooperation at one level despite heated 
political rhetoric at another.
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It is within the context of this uncertain and highly politicised 
environment that the role of the multinational corporation must be 
considered.
The dependence of the South African economy on foreign direct 
investment is, as demonstrated, difficult to estimate given the 
constraints on research in this area. Nevertheless, the studies 
cited suggest that South Africa is heavily dependent on such outside 
involvement in its economy. However, it was the contention of this 
dissertation that such dependence should not be seen in terms of 
purely economic parameters. Rather, it has illustrated the need to 
consider the wider implications of such investment within the context 
of the normative framework provided by the range of developmental 
objectives and the economic-political interaction which was found 
to exist.
The presence of the multinational corporation is perceived to be 
beneficial by a number of disparate interest groups within South 
Africa. The South African government encourages direct investment as 
an indication of foreign confidence in the future direction of its 
rule in South Africa while a number of Black South Africans see such 
firms as, for example:
providing work within organisations which are 
sensitive to the considerable pressure abroad 
to improve both working conditions and employ­
ment practices;
presenting greater opportunities for advancement 
within the organisation;
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allowing political pressure to be exerted on 
the South African government by means of the 
leverage created by the threat of withdrawal ;
creating demonstration effects as regards 
employment practices, union recognition, etc.
Withdrawal, it is argued, would increase unemployment thereby either 
creating increased pressure on the extended family system or starva­
tion while placing the assets of these industries in the lands of 
white South Africans thereby defeating the purpose of the original 
decision to disinvest.
Other interested groups suggest that the social and economic upheaval 
engendered by such withdrawal would serve to stimulate the violent 
overthrow of the South African government.
Because of outside pressure firms have been encouraged to make posi­
tive improvements in their social performance as well as their 
employment practices. However, there have been calls for foreign 
enterprise to make a positive contribution to the political and 
economic development of South Africa. This is categorically rejected 
by management in the home countries as was demonstrated in the pre­
vious chapter.
It is clear that the conflict between the expectations of political 
leaders and management will not be easily resolved because of this. 
Thus, the role of the enterprise must be examined within the context 
of the pursuit of its commercial objectives, and the multinational 
corporation must be regarded as a passive agent of development as 
defined in Chapter Two. Its role in South Africa is that of catalyst
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rather than active agent of development. It can only operate within 
the constraints of the environment as it finds it and not attempt in 
areas of high societal politicisation to act in a positive manner. 
Within the South African framework this flows from its normal strate­
gic interaction within the social, economic and political milieu in 
which it finds itself.
However, the conduct of operations in South Africa leads to the 
inherent politicisation of the firm’s activities. Despite this, 
there is little or no political risk planning.
IVhen, therefore, examining the contribution of the multinational 
corporation this must be done through a detailed examination of the 
strategic-developmental interaction, as was done in the empirical 
element of the discussion. The results of the study suggested how 
this occurred through both the process of strategy formulation as well 
as in its implementation.
7.2.4 The Strategic-Developmental Interaction
The interviews conducted suggest that the contribution of the multi­
national corporation to economic development through the strategic 
interaction is substantially determined by the perceptions of the 
home office of South Africa’s economic and political position in 
Southern Africa as well as the casuist nature of the ethical issues 
facing the individual manager.
South Africa was seen as providing a sound environment for foreign 
direct investment given:
its encouragement of free enterprise;
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its relatively sophisticated financial system; 
the high level of infrastructural development; 
the large concentrated industrial and consumer 
markets of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging 
Triangle;
the continuity of its economic policies.
In addition. South Africa was perceived as providing a base for 
operations in other countries of the region which did not have such 
advantages and which were economically dependent on South Africa.
Thus, to a degree development in the area has become self generating. 
However, a number of questions have been raised as to the nature of 
the changing political relationships in the region although most 
firms had no systematic form of political risk assessment and planning 
Only one of those firms interviewed could be demonstrated to be adopt­
ing a pro-active stance in relation to such risk.
Thus, South Africa has major locational advantages resulting increas­
ingly in the reinforcement of such regional economic dualism as 
already exists.
It was argued that the strategic approach adopted by firms operating 
in South Africa is based substantially on these overall perceptions 
in conjunction with the ethical framework of the individual manager. 
This is an area which is largely ignored in the literature and yet 
represents to the researcher one of the more important aspects of the 
firm's operations in South Africa.
The interviewees appeared to have given the ethics of investment in 
South Africa much consideration and on the basis of this concluded 
that such investment was ethically justified in terms of the overall
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benefits it provided. However, this has had the effect of giving 
decisions an almost dualistic structure by giving consideration
both to commercial implications as well as to the individual's
increased awareness of the socio-political implications. This leads 
to the conclusion that in many instances codes of conduct are super­
fluous as management is acutely aware of the ethical implications of 
their decisions in the South African context. Interviewees argued 
that while codes of conduct served to concentrate the mind, firms
were doing what was required in any case.
There was no evidence of a conflict between the ethical framework of 
the individual manager and that of the organisation as reflected in 
its strategic approach.
The socio-political imperative, as defined in Chapter Five, is, 
therefore, given detailed consideration in the strategy formulation 
process as is reflected in the perceptions of both the regional 
economic milieu and the ethics of investment in South Africa.
It is now useful to examine the economic imperative in more detail.
The organisational structures of the firms interviewed tended to 
reflect the nature of the products with single product firms organised 
on a geographical basis while the diversified firms were structured 
on the basis of product technology and geographical spread with the 
former predominating. Each of these was highly decentralised, 
although effective control over major strategic issues was exercised 
through strict budgetary control and what was in one case termed 
"technological dictatorship", as well as the appointment of senior 
management.
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The researcher gained the impression that in certain instances this 
arms length relationship was the result of political expedience.
This, however, did provide South African management with greater 
autonomy, particularly as management styles were compatible although 
it was suggested that the South African Anglo-American style of 
management was more adventurous and not as controlled as that in the 
United Kingdom.
Technology transfer tended to be incremental with holding companies 
dealing on an arms length basis with their South African subsidiaries. 
Where mergers had taken place, technical aid agreements were signed 
which were rigidly observed and which met government requirements.
Mergers with South African firms took place for numerous reasons - 
political pressure, market penetration, market protection, etc.
South African industry gained considerable benefits from this in terms 
of technology transfer and market expansion.
While preceding paragraphs comment upon the analysis of political 
risk in relation to the changing political structure of Southern 
Africa particularly following the independence of Zimbabwe, it is 
necessary to examine this in relation to such risk within South 
Africa. The lack of such analysis and planning was surprising. 
Initially the researcher felt that firms were reluctant to discuss 
this issue. However, research suggested that there was a degree of 
naivete as regards planning for such risk. IVhere, for example, one 
firm had given careful consideration to the changing relationships 
between states in the region, it was placed in a potentially embarras­
sing situation by changing trends in South Africa when it was faced 
by demands for union recognition and was forced to act against
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official advice and recognise an unregistered trade union. Other 
firms adopted highly reactive strategies. This appeared to be a 
major weakness of all of the firms interviewed.
The study, therefore, indicates that while there are similar high 
demands in terms of economic performance by all the firms involved, 
there is also considerable emphasis on the socio-political aspect 
both in relation to formal strategy development and implementation
i
as well as in relation to the cognitive and ethical framework of the 
individual within such organisations. Thus, in terms of the three- 
dimensional strategic taxonomy proposed in Chapter Five, it may be 
concluded that the firms interviewed fall into the area shown in 
Figure 7.1, and that long term foreign direct investment by British 
firms makes a positive contribution to the development of South Africa 
defined in terms of the developmental objectives proposed in Chapter 
T w o .
7.3 THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The analysis of this study illustrates that it is possible to overcome 
the theoretical objections raised by such economists as Seers and 
Streeten by means of a restructuring of the analytical and methodolo­
gical framework within which development is currently examined.
(Seers, D ., 1963; Streeten, P., 1972.) Essentially, this may be 
done by utilising the normative approach, recognised by Myrdal to be 
of significance and not necessarily an analytical weakness, in examin­
ing development in specific countries. (Myrdal, G ., 1968.) The 
method proposed, however, requires the analysis of the effects of 
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The analysis of the preceding chapters therefore utilises and extends 
the strategic taxonomy proposed by Doz to discuss the role of British 
long term manufacturing investment in South Africa. (Doz, Y.C., 1980.) 
The study shows that it is necessary to bring together a number of 
disparate approaches to the examination of such direct investment 
strategy. To this extent the analytical and methodological framework 
is founded upon the wider issues raised by such writers as Gladwin 
and Walter in their comprehensive analysis of conflict management and 
Marsh in the questions he raises as to the role of ethics in business. 
(Gladwin, T.N. and Walter, 1., 1980; Marsh, P.D.V., 1980.)
However, in the past these studies have not been utilised in terms of 
their implications for the analysis of development and appear to have 
been given only limited recognition in the literature on strategy.
The study suggests that consideration needs to be given to such stud­
ies within the context of a wider cross-discipline approach.
Thus, the study of development economics and multinational corporate 
strategic planning implies a wider knowledge base than has been con­
sidered necessary in the past and it is important to give detailed 
consideration to the analytical approaches which are now available as 
a result of the work of such writers as this study has attempted to do.
Thus, as an exploratory study of a wide-ranging and complex subject, 
this investigation encountered a number of areas which would benefit 
from further research. It is, however, important to distinguish 
between areas of interest and those in which there are definite gaps 
in the knowledge of multinational corporations, strategic planning 
and economic development. A selection of these are proposed in terms 
of the following questions:
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- How should current methods of economic analysis 
be applied to the study of economic development 
in Southern Africa given the social, political, 
cultural and economic complexity of the region?
What is the impact of foreign direct investment 
on the socio-political parameters of development 
where firms reject a positive role other than in 
commercial issues?
What effects does the economic-political conflict 
in South Africa have on the operations of the firm 
in other areas of Southern Africa?
In what ways does the ethical framework applied 
by individual executives to operations in the less 
developed countries differ from that applied in 
developed countries?
How do these differences affect the implementation 
of strategy in these countries?
This set of questions constitutes only a brief outline of the topics 
which may be explored.
- 249 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADAM, H. (1977) "Interests behind Afrikaner Power", Social Dynamics, 3, 
No.l, June 1977.
ADAM, H. § GILIOMEE, H. (1979) The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power,
David Philip, Cape Town, 1979.
ADELMAN, I. (1975) "Growth, Income Distribution and Equity-Oriented 
Development Strategies", World Development, February-March 1975.
AGODO, 0. (1978) "The Determinants of U.S. Private Manufacturing Invest­
ments in Africa",Journal of International Business Studies, Winter 
1978.
AHLUWALIA, M.S. (1974) "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the 
Problem". Finance § Development, September 1974.
ANDREWS, K.R. (1971) The Concept of Corporate Strategy, Dow-Jones-Irwin, 
New York, 1971.
ANSOFF, H.I. (1968) Corporate Strategy, Pelican, London, 1968.
ANSOFF, H.I. (1977) "The Pathology of Applied Research in the Social 
Sciences", European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, 
Working Paper No.77-28, Brussels, December 1977.
ARKIN, M. (1956) "The Economic Writings of David Hume - A Reassessment", 
South African Journal of Economics, 1956.
ARNOLD, M. (1978) Steve Biko: Black Consciousness in South Africa,
Random House, New York, 1978.
ARRIGHI, G . S SAUL, J.S. (1973) "Essays on the Political Economy of 
Africa", Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973.
ARROW, K.J., CHENERY, H.B., MINHAS, B.S.  ̂ SOLOW, R.M. (1961) "Capital- 
Labour Substitution and Economic Efficiency", Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol.43, August 1961.
ATKINSON, A.B. (1970) "On the Measurement of Inequality", Journal of 
Economic Theory 2, 1970.
- 250 -
BALDWIN, R.E. (1972) Economic Development and Growth, 2nd edition,
John Wiley, New York, 1972.
BARBER, J ., BLUMENFELD, J. § HILL, C.R. (1982) The West and South Africa, 
Chatham House Papers U.14, London, 1982.
BARCLAYS BANK (1978) "An Economic Survey of Lesotho", Business Informa­
tion Services, Barclays Bank, London.
BARCLAYS BANK INTERNATIONAL, "An Economic Survey of Botswana", Business 
Information Services, International Division, Barclays Bank,
London.
BARCLAYS BANK INTERNATIONAL, "An Economic Survey of Swaziland", Business 
Information Services, International Division, Barclays Bank,
London.
BARCLAYS NATIONAL BANK (1979) "South African Exchange Control Require­
ments Relating to the Introduction of Foreign Capital, Local 
Borrowings, Acceptance and Repayment of Loans, Dividends, Disin­
vestment by Non-Residents, Royalty and Management Agreement", 
International Division, November 1979.
BARCLAYS NATIONAL BANK (1980) "Exchange Control", International Division, 
August 1980.
BARNET, R.I. § MULLER, R.E. (1975) Global Reach, Jonathan Cape, London,
1975.
BARRATT, J., BRAND, S., COLLIER, D.S. § GLASER, K. (editors) (1974)
Accelerated Development in Southern Africa, Macmillan in associa­
tion with the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Randse Afrikaanse 
Universiteit and the South African Institute of International 
Affairs, London, 1974.
BASTER, N. (editor) (1972) Measuring Development, Cassells, London, 1972.
BAUER, P.T. (1967) "Economics as a Form of Technical Assistance", 
Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies, May 1967.
- 251 -
BECKERMAN, W. ^ BACON, R. (1966) " International Comparisons of Income 
Levels: A Suggested New Measure", Economic Journal, LXXVI 303, 
September 1966.
BECKERMAN, W. (1966) International Comparisons of Real Incomes, Develop­
ment Centre, O.E.C.D., Paris, 1966.
BEER, M. (1974) "S.A.'s Economic Prospects: Prosperity or Catastrophe?", 
Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1974.
BELL, R.T. (1975) "Productivity and Foreign Trade in South Africa's 
Development Strategy", South African Journal of Economics,
December 1975.
BHAGWATI, J.N. (editor) (1970) Economics and the World Order, World Law 
Fund, New York, 1970.
BISSELL, R.E. (1978) "American Leverage in Southern Africa", South 
Africa International, Vol.IX, No.2, October 1978.
BISSELL, R.E. § CROCKER, C.A. (1979) South Africa into the 1980's, 
Westview, Boulder, 1979.
BLAUG, M. (1968) Economic Theory in Restrospect, 2nd edition, Heineman, 
London, 1968.
BLAUSTEW, R. (1976) "Foreign Investments in the Black Homelands of 
South Africa", African Affairs, April 1976.
BOLTON, B. § ROGERS, B. (1981) Sanctions against South Africa,
Manchester Free Press, Manchester, 1981.
BROOKE, M.A. ^ REMMERS, H.L. (1977) The International Firm: a study
of management across frontiers - trade and investment. Pitman, 
London, 1977.
BROOKE, M.Z. 5 REMMERS, H.L. (1978) The Strategy of Multinational 
Enterprise, Pitman, London, 1978.
BROOKE, M.Z.  ̂ VAN BEUSEKOM, M. (1979) International Corporate Planning, 
Pitman, London, 1979.
- 252 -
BUCKLEY ^ CASSON (1976) The Future of Multinational Enterprise, 
Macmillan, London, 1976,
BUSINESS WEEK (1977) "World Trade: South Africa Tightens its Grip on 
Capital", Business Week, April 18 1977.
BUSINESS WEEK (1979) "South Africa: A Drive for Strength to Offset 
Sanctions", Business Week, May 21 1979.
BUTLER, J., ROTBERG, R.I. & ADAMS, J. (1977) The Black Homelands of 
South Africa: The Political and Economic Development of 
Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1977.
CALLINCOS, A. (1981) Southern Africa after Zimbabwe, Pluto Press,
London, 1981.
CARTER, G.M. 5 O'MEARA, P. (editors) (1979) Southern Africa: The Con­
tinuing Crisis, Macmillan, London, 1979.
CASTLE, E.N. (1972) "Economics and the Quality of Life", American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, December 1972.
CHANDLER, A.D. (1962) Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History 
of Industrial Enterprise, M.l.T. Press, 1962.
CHANNON, D.G. § JALLAND, M. (1979) Multinational Strategic Planning 
Macmillan, London, 1979.
CHENERY, H.B. (1971) "Growth ^ Structural Change", Finance and Develop­
ment Quarterly, Vol.8 No.3, 1971.
CHENERY, H.B. § TAYLOR, L. (1968) "Development Patterns: Among Countries 
and Over Time", Revue of Economics § Statistics, Vol.L No.4, 
November 1968.
CHILD, J. 5 MANSFIELD, R. (1972) "Technology, Size and Organisation 
Structure" , Sociology, September 1972.
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES (1974) A Code of Business 
Ethics, C.A.B.E., London, September 1974.
- 253 -
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES (1979) South Africa:
Sanctions and Disinvestment, C.A.B.E., London, 1979.
CLEE, G.H. (1966) "Guidelines for Global Business", Columbia Journal of 
World Business, Winter 1966.
CLIFFORD-VAUGHN, F.McA. (1978) International Pressures and Political 
Change in South Africa, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1978.
COASE, R.H. (1937) "The Nature of the Firm", Economica, New Series, 1937
COETZER, W.B. (1976) "Some Merits of the S.A. Investment Scene",
South Africa International Quarterly, January 1976.
COHEN, J.B. (1982) Industrial South Africa, 6th edition. Industrial 
Publishing Corporation, Johannesburg, 1982.
COLCLOUGH, C. § McCARTHY, S. (1980) The Political Economy of Botswana:
A Study of Growth and Distribution, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1980.
COLMAN, D. GNTXSON, F . (1978) Economics of Change in Less Developed 
Countries, Philip Allan, Oxford, 1978.
CRONJE, S., LING, M. § CRONJE, G. (1976) Lonrho, Julian Friedman Books, 
London, 1976.
CROOKELL, H. (1975) "Investing in Development - A Corporate View", 
Columbia Journal World Business, Spring 1975.
DAGUT, M. (1977) South Africa: An Appraisal - A Sovereign Risk Analysis, 
Nedbank, Johannesburg, 1977.
DANERT, G. (1977) "Intercompany Strategies of Multinational Companies G 
National Economic Policy", Financial Executive, October 1977.
DASGUPTA, A.K. (1980) Economic Theory and the Developing Countries, 
Macmillan, London, 1980.
DAVENPORT, T.R.H. (1977) South Africa - A Modern History, 2nd edition, 
Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1977.
- 254 -
DAVIDSON, B. (1974) Africa in History, Paladin, London, 1974.
DAVIDSON, B., SLOVO, J. & WILKINSON, A. (1976) Southern Africa:
The New Politics of Revolution, Penguin, 1976.
DE BLIJ, H. § MARTIN, E. (1981) African Perspectives: The Economic 
Geography of Nine African States, Methuen, New York, 1981.
DE CRESPIGNY, A. § SCHRIRE, R. (1978) The Government and Politics of 
South Africa, Juta, Johannesburg, 1978.
DE KLERK, W.A. (1976) The Puritans in Africa, Pelican, Yew York, 1976.
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION (1978) "Business Opportunities in South
Africa", Special Advertising Section, Business Week, October 9 1978
DE VILLIERS, L., MARAIS, J.S. § WIEHAHN, N.E. (editors) (1981) Doing 
Business with South Africa, De Villiers Inc., New York, 1981.
DOZ, Y.L. (1980) "Strategic Management in Multinational Companies",
Sloan Management Review, Winter 1980.
DRAKE, K.L. § PRAGER, A.J. (1977) "Floundering with Foreign Investment 
Planning", Columbia Journal of World Business, Summer 1977.
DUNNETTE, M.D. (editor) (1976) Handbook of Industrial and Organisation 
Psychology, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1976.
DUNNING, J.H. (editor) (1971) The Multinational Enterprise, Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1971.
DUNNING, J.H. (editor) (1972) International Investment, Penguin, 1972.
DUNNING, J.H. (1974) Economic Analysis and the Multinational Enterprise, 
Allen and Unwin, London, 1974.
DUNNING, J.H. (1979) "The U.K.'s International Direct Investment 
Position in the mid-1970's", Lloyds Bank Revue, April 1979.
DUNNING, J.H. (1981) International Production and the Multinational 
Enterprise, Allen and Unwin, London, 1981.
DYMSZA, W.A. (1972) Multinational Business Strategy, McGraw-Hill, New 
York, 1972.
- 255 -
ECONOMIST (1979) "Investment in South Africa: Two-Way Traffic",
The Economist, September 1 1979.
ECONOMIST (1980) "South Africa's Investment Boom", The Economist,
March 8 1980.
EELLS, R. (1972) Global Corporations: The Emerging System of World 
Economic Power, Free Press, New York, 1972.
ENGINEERING WEEK (1982) S.A. Capital Projects Register '82, Systems 
Publishers, Johannesburg, 1982.
EPSTEIN, B. (1971) Politics of Trade in Power Plants, Atlantic Trade 
Study, Trade Policy Research Center, London, 1971.
EPSTEIN, B. ^ NEWFARMER, R. (1980) "International Electrical Associa­
tion: A Continuing Cartel", Report prepared for the use of the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and its Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives,
96th Congress, 2nd Session, Government Printing Office, Washington 
D.C., 1980.
EPSTEIN, E.J. (1982) The Diamond Invention, Hutchinson, London, 1982.
FAIR, T.J.D., MURDOCH, G . § JONES, H.M. (1969) Development in Swaziland: 
A Regional Analysis, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 
1969.
FALKENA, H.B. (1980) The South African State and its Entrepreneurs: a 
study of the macro-economic relationship between the public and 
private sectors in South Africa, Ad Donker, Johannesburg, 1980.
FARMER, R.N. ^ RICHMAN, B.M. (1966) Comparative Management and Economic 
Progress, Richard Irwin, Homewood, 1966.
FAYERWEATHER, J. (1969) International Business Management, McGraw-Hill, 
New York, 1969.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1948) "Report of the Federal Trade Commission 
on International Electrical Equipment Cartels", Government Printing 
Office, Washington D.C., 1948.
- 256 -
FINANCIAL MAIL (1980) "Multinationals: A Survey", Financial Mail, 
Johannesburg, June 27 1980.
FINANCIAL MAIL (1982) "Foreign Trade: A Survey", Financial Mail, 
Johannesburg, July 30 1982.
FIRST, R ., STEELE, J. & GURNEY, C. (1973) The South African Connection: 
Western Investment in Apartheid, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973.
FOSTER, G . (1978) "The South African Connection", Management Today,
April 1978.
FRANKO, L.G. (1976) The European Multinationals, Harper and Row, London,
1976.
FRY, E.H. (1983) The Politics of International Investment, McGraw-Hill, 
New York, 1983.
GABRIEL, P.P. (1972) "M.N.C.'s in the World: Is Conflict Unavoidable?", 
Harvard Business Review, July/August 1972.
GAUSHON, A. (1981) Crisis in Africa, Penguin, London, 1981.
GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, N. (1960) "Economic Theory and Agrarian Economics", 
Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.12, No.l, February 1960.
GILBERT, M. (1961) "Quality Changes and Index Numbers", Economic Devel­
opment and Cultural Change, Vol.IX, No.3, April 1961.
GLADWIN, T.N. § WALTER, I. (1980) Multinations under Fire: Lessons in 
the Management of Conflict, John Wiley, New York, 1980.
GLASER, B.G. § STRAUSS, A.L. (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory, 
Aldine Publishing, New York, 1967.
GOTCHER, W.J. (1977) "Strategic Planning in European Multinationals", 
Long Range Planning, October 1977.
GRAY, H.P. (1972) The Economics of Business Investment Abroad,
Macmillan, London 1972.
GRUSKY, 0. S MILLER, A. "The Sociology of Organisation", The Free Press, 
New York, 1970.
- 257
HALL, D.J. ^ SAIAS, M.A. (1980) "Strategy Follows Structure",
Strategic Management Journal, April/June 1980.
HAMERSMA, A.  ̂ CZYPIONKA, N. (editors) (1976) Essays on the South
African Financial Structure, The Standard Bank of South Africa, 
Johannesburg, 1976.
HARVEY, C. (1974) "BritishtInvestment in Southern Africa", Journal of 
South African Studies, October 1974.
HAWKINS, R.G. (editor) (1979) The Economic Effects of Multinational 
Corporations, Research in International Business and Finance,
Vol.I, Jai Press, Greenwich, 1979.
HERBSTEIN, D. (1978) White Man, We Want to Talk to You, Penguin, 1978.
HERRICK, R.W. (1968) Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and 
Practice, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1968.
HIGGINS, J.C. (1980) Strategic and Operational Planning Systems, 
Prentice-Hall, London, 1980.
HOBART HOUGHTON, D. (1964) The South African Economy, Oxford University 
Press, Cape Town, 1964.
HOEK, P.W. (1980) Southern Africa Now and in the Future, Haum, Pretoria, 
1980.
HOOD, N. S YOUNG, S. (1979) The Economics of Multinational Enterprise, 
Longman, London, 1979.
HORWITZ, R. (1967) The Political Economy of South Africa, Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, 1967.
HOSELITZ, B.F. (1957) "Non-Economic Factors in Economic Development", 
American Economic Review, Vol.47, 1957.
HOUTHAKKER, H.S. (1957) "An International Comparison of Household 
Expenditure Patterns", Econometrica, Vol.25, October 1957.
HUSSEY, D.E. (1972) "Strategic Planning for International Business",
Long Range Planning, June 1972.
- 258 -
HYMER, S. (1970) "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven 
Development", in BHAGWATI, J.N. (editor) (1970).
HYMER, S. The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of 
Direct Foreign Investment, M.l.T. Press, London.
INFORMATION SERVICE (1979) South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the 
Republic of South Africa, Chris van Rensburg, Johannesburg, 1979.
INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN UNION OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES (1979) Ethics of 
Business in Developing Countries, Uniapac, 1979.
INTERNATIONAL MONEY MANAGEMENT (1979) "A Cheap Way to Invest in South
Africa", Business Week, November 26 1979.
JACOBY, N.H., NEHEMKIS, P. § EELLS, R. (1977) Bribery and Extortion in
World Business, Macmillan, New York, 1977.
JOAQUIM, M.E. (1979) "Planning in an International bivision".
Managerial Planning, January/February 1979.
JONES, R. § MARRIOTT, 0. (1970) Anatomy of a Merger, Jonathon Cape,
London, 1970.
KANTOR, B. S REES, D. (1982) South African Economic Issues, Juta,
Cape Town, 1982.
KENNEDY, E.A. (1978) The Emerging States in South Africa, Barclays Bank, 
Johannesburg, 1978.
KINDLEBERGER, C.P. (1965) Economic Development, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill, 
New York, 1965.
KINDLEBERGER, C.P. (1969) The International Corporation: American 
Business Abroad, Yale, New Haven, 1969.
KINDLEBERGER, C.P. ^ HERRICK, B. (1977) Economic Development, 3rd edition, 
McGraw-Hill Kogakusha, Tokyo, 1977.
KNIGHT, R. (1980) "Crucial Stakes for United States Firms in South Africa", 
U.S. News, April 28 1980.
- 259 -
KOENDERMANS, T. (1982) Sanctions - The Threat to South Africa, Jonathan 
Ball, Johannesburg, 1982.
KRAVIS, J.B. (1975) A System of International Comparisons of Gross 
Product and Purchasing Power, John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1975.
KUYPER, A. (1943) Calvinism, Six Stone Lectures, Grand Rapids, 1943.
LAGOUSKII, A. (1960) "Ekonomika i sposoky voorhuzhennoi bor'by", 
(Economics and Modes of Armed Conflict), Sovetskii Flot,
February 6 1960.
LALL, S. ^ STREETEN, P. (1977) Foreign Investment, Transnationals and 
Developing Countries, Macmillan, London, 1977.
LANNING, G . § MUELLER, M. (1979) Africa Undermined, Penguin, 1979.
LATHAM, Sir J. (1969) Take-Over, Iliffe, London, 1969.
LIPSET, S.M. (1970) "Generalising from a Case Study: Problems of 
Analysis", in GRUSKY, OSCAR § MILLER, A. (1970).
LIVINGSTONE, J.M. (1975) The International Business Enterprise,
Associated Business Programmes, London, 1975.
LOMBARD, J.A. (1978) Freedom Welfare and Order, Benbo, Pretoria, 1978.
LOMBARD, J.A. (editor) Economic Policy in South Africa (Selected Essays), 
Haum, Cape Town.
LOMBARD, J.A., STADLER, J.J. § DU TOIT, E.J. "Government Participation 
in the South African Economy", Bureau for Economic Policy and 
Analysis, University of Pretoria.
LORANGE, P, (1973) "Formal Planning in Multinational Corporations", 
Columbia Journal of World Business, Summer 1973.
LORANGE, P. (1975) "Divisional Planning: Getting Effective Direction", 
Sloan Management Review, Fall 1975.
LORANGE, P. S VANCIL, R.G. (1976) "How to Design a Strategic Planning 
System", Harvard Business Revue, September-October 1976.
- 260 -
LORANGE, P. 5 VANCIL, R.E. (1977) Strategic Planning Systems, Prentice- 
Hall, New Jersey, 1977.
MACDOUGALL, G.D. (1960) "The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment 
from Abroad: A Theoretical Approach", Economic Record, March 1960.
MAGUBANE, B.M. (1979) The Political Economy of Race and Class in South 
Africa, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1979.
MALAIS, D. § RIEKERT, D. (1981) Constitutional Development of South 
Africa, Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1981.
MANDELA, N. (1978) The Struggle is My Life, International Defence and 
Aid Fund for Southern Africa, London, 1978.
MARAIS, J.S. (1972) "Investing in South Africa", Le Monde Moderne,
Autumn 1972.
MARSH, P.D.U. (1980) Business Ethics, Associated Business Press, London, 
1980.
MARTIN, K. § KNAPP, J . (editors) (1966) The Teaching of Development 
Studies, Frank Cass, 1966.
Mc Do n a l d , j . (19S0) strategy in Poker, Business and War, W.W. Norton,
New York, 1950.
MEIER, G.M. (1968) The International Economics of Development, Harper 
and Row, New York, 1968.
MEIER, G.M. (editor) (1976) Leading Issues in Economic Development,
3rd edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1976.
MENDELSOHN, M.S. (1980) "South Africa Becomes less Cramped", The Banker, 
April/May 1980.
MINHAS, B.S. (1963) An International Comparison of Factor Costs and 
Factor Use, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1963.
MIROW, K.R. (1977) A Ditadura dos Cartels, cited in MIROW, K.R. ^
MAURER, H. (1980).
- 261
MIROW, K.R. (1979) Condenados ao Subdesen-voluimento?, cited in 
MIROW, K.R. ^ MAURER, H. (1980).
MIROW, K.R. § MAURER, H. (1982) Webs of Power: International Cartels 
and the World Economy, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1982.
MONOPOLIES AND RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES COMMISSION (1957) Report on the 
Supply and Exports of Electrical and Allied Machinery and Plant, 
H.M.S.O., London, 1957.
MORGAN, E.P. (1979) "Botswana: Development, Democracy and Vulnerability", 
in CARTER, G.M. 5 O'MEARA, P. (1979).
MORRISON, T.K. (1976) Manufactured Exports from Developing Countries, 
Praeger, New York, 1976.
MULLER, R. § MORGENSTERN, R.D. (1974) Multinational Corporations and 
Balance of Payments Impacts in L.D.C.'s: An Econometric Analysis 
of Export Pricing Behaviour", Kyklos, 1974.
MURAPA, R. (1977) "Political Economy of U.S. Policy in Southern Africa", 
Review of Black Political Economy, Spring 1977.
MUTISO, G-C.M. ^ ROHIO, S.W. (editors) (1975) Readings in African 
Political Thought, Heinemann, London, 1975.
MVUBELO, L. (1980) "A Black South African Trade Union Leader Looks at
the Role of American Companies in South Africa", Munger Africana
Library, Vol.X, No.51, January 1980.
MYERS, D. (1977) Labor Practices of U.S. Corporations in South Africa, 
Praeger, New York, 1977.
MYERS, D . , PROPP, K., HAUCK, D. & LIFF, D.M. (1980) U.S. Business in 
South Africa: The Economic, Political and Moral Issues,
Rex Collings, London, 1980.
MYINT, H. (1958) "The Classical Theory of International Trade and 
Underdeveloped Countries", Economic Journal, June 1958.
- 262 -
MYINT, H. (1967) "Economie Theory and Development Policy", Economica, 
Vol.34, No.134, May 1967.
MYINT, H. (1973) The Economics of the Developing Countries, 4th edition, 
Hutchinson, London, 1973.
MYRDAL, G . (1968) Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 
Allen Lane, London, 1968.
MYRDAL, G . (1970) The Challenge of World Poverty, Penguin, 1970.
NAYLOR, T.H. (1979) "Organising for Strategic Planning", Managerial 
Planning, July/August 1979.
NEWBY-FRASER, A.R. (1979) Chain Reaction: Twenty Years of Nuclear 
Research and Development in South Africa, Atomic Energy Board, 
Pretoria, 1979.
NEWFARMER, R. (1980) Transnational Conglomerates and the Economics of
Dependent Development: A Case Study of the International Electrical 
Oligopoly and Brazil's Electrical Industry, Jai Press, Greenwich, 
1980.
NICKEL, H. (1978) "The Case for doing Business in South Africa",
Fortune, June 19 1978.
NSEKELA, A.M. (editor) (1981) Southern Africa: Toward Economic 
Liberation, Rex Collings, London, 1981.
NUTTER, G.W. (1957) "On Measuring Economic Growth", Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol.65, February 1957.
O'BALLANCE, E. (1979) "The Value of the Cape Route to Nato", Foreign 
Affairs Research Institute, 4/1979, Lowmon, 1979.
OKUN, B. § RICHARDSON, R. (editors) (1961) Studies in Economic 
Development, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1961.
OKUN, B.  ̂ RICHARDSON, R. (1961) "Economic Development: Concepts and 
Meaning, in OKUN, B. ^ RICHARDSON, R. (editors) (1961).
- 263 -
OLIVIER, H. (1977) "Engineering for Independence in Southern Africa",
Address to: The Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings
of South Africa, East London, May 23-26 1977.
OLIVIER, H. (1979) "Engineering for Peace", The Civil Engineer in 
South Africa, March 1979.
OPEN UNIVERSITY, "International Comparisons of Levels of Development", 
Social Sciences 2nd Level Course, Statistical Sources, Unit 15.
OPPENHEIMER, H. (1978) "South Africa - Scope for Investment", Address 
to: The International Monetary Conference in Mexico City on
May 22 1978.
PARRY, A. (1978) "The Growing Vulnerability of Oil Supplies", Foreign 
Affairs Research Institute, 18/1978, London.
PATEL, S.J. (1964) "The Economic Distance Between Nations: Its Origins 
Measurement and Outlook", Economic Journal, March 1964.
PELISSIER, R.G. (1972) "American Private Enterprise in South Africa", 
California Management Review, Summer 1972.
PENROSE, E. "The State and Multinational Enterprises in Less Developed 
Countries", in DUNNING, J.H. (editor) (1971).
PLUMPTRE, A.F.W. (1937) "The Nature of Political and Economic Development 
in the British Dominions", Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science, November 1937.
PORTER, R.C. (1979) "International Trade and Investment Sanctions:
Potential Impact on the South African Economy", Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol.23, No.4, December 1979.
PRAHALAD, C. (1976) "Strategic Choices in Diversified Multinational 
Corporations", Harvard Business Revue, September/October 1976.
PRYOR, M.H. (1965) "Planning in a Worldwide Business", Harvard Business 
Revue, January-February 1965.
- 264 -
PUGH, O.S. (1969) "The Context of Organisation Structures'*, Administra­
tive Science Quarterly, 1969.
REES, M. § DAY, C. (1980) Muldergate, Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1980.
ROBERTSON, D.H. (1969) "The Future of International Trade", in A.E.A. 
Readings in the Theory of International Trade, Blakiston, 1969.
ROBSON, P. 5 LURY, D.A. (1969) The Economics of Africa, Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1969.
ROGERS, B. (1976) White Wealth and Black Poverty: American Investment 
in Southern Africa, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1976.
ROGERS, B. S BOLTON, B. (1981) Sanctions against South Africa:
Exploding the Myths, Manchester Free Press, Manchester.
ROSTOW, W.W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1960.
ROTBERG, R.I. (1980) Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern 
Africa, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980.
SANTAMBANK (1979) Foreign Corporations in South Africa: The Implications 
of the Conduct of South African Business Operations by a Foreign 
Corporation, Santambank, Johannesburg, May 1979.
SCHLEMMER, L. § WEBSTER, E. (editors) (1978) Change, Reform and Economic 
Growth in South Africa, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1978.
SCHMALTZ, J.H. (1980) "Strategic Business Planning", Sloan Management 
Revue, Winter 1980.
SCHRIRE, R. (1982) South Africa: Public Policy Perspectives, Juta,
Cape Town, 1982.
SEERS, D. (1962) "A Model of Comparative Rates of Growth in the World 
Economy", Economic Journal, March 1962.
SEERS, D. (1963) "The Limitations of the Special Case", Bulletin of 
the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics, Vol.25, No.2,
May 1963.
- 265 -
SEERS, D. (1962) "Why Visiting Economists Fail", Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol.LXX, No.4, August 1962.
SEERS, D. (1969) "The Meaning of Development", International Develop­
ment Review, December 1969.
SEERS, D. (1972(1)) in BASTER, N. (editor) (1972).
SEERS, D. (1972) "What Are We Trying to Measure", Journal of Development 
Studies, April 1972.
SEIDMAN, A 5 SEIDMAN, N. (1977) South Africa and U.S. Multinationals,
Dar es Salaam Publishing, Dar es Salaam, 1977.
SELWYN, P. (1975) Industries in the Southern African Periphery, Westview 
Press, Boulder, 1975.
SETAI, B. (1978) "The Role of International Companies in the Economy of 
South Africa", Revue of Black Political Economy, Summer 1978.
SHANK, J.K., BLOCK, E.G.N. § SANDALLS, W.T. (1973) "Balance 'Creativity' 
and 'Practicality' in Formal Planning", Harvard Business Revue, 
January-February 1973.
SODERSTEN, B. (1970) International Economics, Macmillan, London, 1970.
SOUTH AFRICA, Annual Report and Quarterly Bulletin, South African 
Reserve Bank, Pretoria.
SPANDAU, A. (1979) "Sanctions and Disinvestment", in CABE (1979).
STANDARD BANK (1981) A Guide to Business in South Africa: Exchange 
Control, Standard Bank, Johannesburg, September 1981.
JOHANNESBURG STAR (1978) " Inkatha to fight for Unions", Star, July 13 
1978, p.2.
STAVORINUS, J.S. (1798) Reize van Zeeland over de Kaap de Goede Hoope, 
Houkoop, Leyden, 1798.
STEENKAMP, W.F.J. (1972) "Cardinal Aspects of South Africa's Develop­
ment Problem", Paper delivered to the Economic Society of South 
Africa in Bloemfontein on May 25 1972.
- 266 -
STEINER, G.A. G MINER, J.B. (1977) Management Policy and Strategy, 
Macmillan, New York, 1977.
STOBAUGH, R. (1969) "How to Analyse Foreign Investment Climates",
Harvard Business Revue, September/October 1969.
STREETEN, P. (1966) "The Use and Abuse of Models in Development 
Planning", in MARTIN, K. ^ KNAPP, J. (editors) (1966).
STREETEN, P. (1971) "Costs and Benefits of Multinational Enterprise 
in Less Developed Countries", in DUNNING, J.H. (editor) (1971).
STREETEN, P. (1972) The Frontiers of Development Studies, Macmillan, 
London, 1972.
STREETEN, P. (1974) "The Concept of Alternatives", World Development, 
Vol.2, No.2, February 1974.
STROM, G.W. (1978) Development and Dependence in Lesotho, the Enclave
of South Africa, Publications of the Political Science Association 
in Uppsala No.79, Uppsala, 1978.
SUCKLING, J. (1975) "Foreign Investment and Domestic Saving in the
R.S.A. 1957-72", South African Journal of Economics, September 1975
SUCKLING, J., WEISS, R. ^ INNES, D. (1975) The Economic Factor, Foreign 
Investment in South Africa, Africa Publications Trust, Uppsala 
Offset Center, Uppsala, Sweden, 1975.
SUTTON, C.J. (1980) Economics and Corporate Strategy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1980.
SZENTES, T. (1976) The Political Economy of Underdevelopment,
Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1976.
THIRLWALL, A.P. (1970) "The Development Gap", National Westminster 
Bank Review, February 1970.
THIRLWALL, A.P. (1978) Growth and Development, 2nd edition, Macmillan, 
London, 1978.
- 267 -
THOMAS, F.A. (1974) "Corporate Planning in an International Environment", 
Long Range Planning, October 1974.
THOMAS, K.W. (1976) "Conflict and Conflict Management", in DUNNETTE, M.D. 
(editor) (1976).
THOMAS, R.E. (1981) The Government of Business, 2nd edition, Philip 
Allan, Oxford, 1981.
TIME (1978) "Qoboza - a role for the U.S.", Time, April 17 1978.
TRAIN, J. (1978) "South Africa: U.S. don't go home", Forbes, November 27 
1978.
TRUU, M.L. (editor) (1976) Public Policy and the South African Economy, 
Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1976.
TUGENDHAT, C. (1971) The Multinationals, Penguin, 1971.
TUSENIUS, R.R. (1979(1)) "Introduction to the Convention and to the
Background Paper 'Prosperity in Southern Africa' ", First Southern 
Africa Economic Convention, Johannesburg, June 27-28 1979.
TUSENIUS, R.R. (1979) "Prosperity in Southern Africa", First Southern 
Africa Economic Convention, Johannesburg, June 27-28 1979.
UNITED KINGDOM (1979) "Code of Conduct for Companies with Interests in 
South Africa", Department of Trade, Press Notice, February 15 1979.
UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION (1972) "Large Power Transformers from 
France, Italy, Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom", 
Determination of Injury in Investigations Nos. AA1921-86/90 under 
Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended, T.C. Publications 476,
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.
UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION (1973) "Implications of Multinational
Firms for World Trade and Investment and for U.S. Trade and Labor", 
Report to the Committee of Finance of the U.S. Senate and its 
Senate Sub-committee on International Trade, 93rd Congress, 1st 
Session, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.
- 268 -
USHER, D. (1966) "Rich and Poor Countries", Eaton Paper No.9,
Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1966.
VAN DER MER.WE, S. (1976) The Environment of South African Business,
Maskew Miller, Cape Town, 1976.
VAN JAARSVELD, F.A. (1982) Van Van Riebeeck tot P.W. Botha, Perskor,
Johannesburg, 1982.
VAN RENSBURG, W.C.J. "South Africa's Strategic Minerals", South Africa 
Foundation, Briefing Paper No.4
VANCIL, R.F.  ̂ LORANGE, P. (1975) "Strategic Planning in Diversified 
Companies", Harvard Business Revue, January-February 1975.
VANCIL, R.F. (1976) "Strategy Formulation in Complex Organisations",
Sloan Management Revue, Winter 1976.
VERNON, R. (1977) Storm over the Multinationals, Macmillan, London,
(1977).
VERNON, R. § WELLS, L.T. (1976) Manager in the International Economy,
3rd edition, Prentice-Hal1, New Jersey, 1976.
VERRIER, A. (1979) "South Africa: The Investment Outlook", Director, 
December 1979.
VILAKAZI, A. (1979) "Swaziland: From Tradition to Modernity", in 
CARTER, G.M. § O'MEARA, P. (1979).
WALLACE, D. (1976) International Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 
Praeger, New York, 1976.
WASSENAAR, A.D. (1977) Assault on Private Enterprise, Tafelberg, Cape 
Town, 1977.
WEISFELDER, R. (1979) "Lesotho: Changing Patterns of Dependence", in 
CARTER, G.M. ^ O'MEARA, P. (1979).
WIECHERS, M . , SCHLEMMER, L., et al. (1983) Bridge or Barricade? The
Constitution: A First Appraisal, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 1983.
269 -
RECIPROCAL EEEECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE STRATEGY
VOLUME II
Submitted by Nicholas Temple van der Walt 
for the degree of Ph.D. 
of the University of Bath 
1984
Copyright :
Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests 
with its author. This copy of the thesis has been supplied on 
condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise 
that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation 
from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published 
without the prior written consent of the author.
Volume I of this thesis may be made available for consultation 
within the University Library and may be photocopied or lent to 
other libraries for the purposes of consultation.
Volume II of this thesis may not be consulted, photocopied or lent 
to other libraries without the permission of the author for ten 
years from the date of acceptance of the thesis.
N.T. van der Walt
UN*VFP!;ilY or BATH 
U9RAPY
ffZo
CONTENTS - VOLUME II
APPENDIX : TWO CASE STUDIES
Page
1
A.l INTRODUCTION   1
A. 2 THE EFFECTS OF’ COLLUSION ON THE DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE OF THE 3 
FIRM IN SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM PROJECTS
A. The Developmental Implications .. .. .. 9
(i) Development costs .. .. .. .. .. 12
(ii) Technology transfer .. .. .. .. .. 13
(iii) Market effects .. .. .. .. ,, 13
B. The Strategic-Developmental Interaction .. .. 18
A.3 THE DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FIRMS .. 20
A. Introduction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20
B . The Developmental Implications of the Project .. 21
C. The Strategic Approach .. .. .. .. 28
(i) Market structure .. .. .. .. .. 29
(ii) Technology . . .. .. .. .. .. 29
(iii) Political constraints .. .. .. .. 29
D. The Strategic-Developmental Interaction .. .. 34
(i) The economic imperative .. .. .. .. 34
(ii) The political imperative .. .. .. .. 35
(iii) The developmental contribution .. .. .. 35
LIST OF FIGURES
A.l MAP OF TRANSKEI 22
A. 2 THE DEVELOPMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE TSITSA AND MALEPELEPE 23 
SCHEMES FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TRANSKEI
LIST OF TABLES




UTiile the interview based discussion of the preceding chapters pro­
vides an overview for developing an understanding of the strategic 
issues involved in conducting operations in South Africa and thereby 
a basis for assessing how the nature of the environment and the 
strategic approach adopted in response to it determine the develop­
mental role of foreign direct investment, the analysis is limited.
Firstly, it is limited by the fact that it examines only long-term 
foreign direct investment by British manufacturing organisations.
As such it does not consider the shorter term involvement of firms 
in, for example, major infrastructural or construction projects.
Secondly, and following from this, it does not consider the role of 
such service organisations as international banks and consultancy 
firms in the developmental interaction.
Thirdly, it is both of relevance and interest to examine how interna­
tional firms may collude and also how their operations are affected 
by South Africa’s homeland policies.
Finally, the analysis examines overall issues the approach to which 
is determined to a significant degree by the overall strategic 
philosophy of the firm and its management ethos. As such it has not 
been applied to determine how the firm’s response to particular com­
mercial situations may reflect its strategy and determine its role.
For these reasons the researcher has developed two case studies which
- 1 -
briefly examine the short-term involvement of a number of firms of 
European, rather than British, origin in South Africa. The first 
case, citing the International Electrical Agency as an example, 
demonstrates how strategically integrated firms may coordinate their 
strategies to achieve certain desired objectives which may have the 
effect of widening the international development gap. The study 
then examines how firms may respond when such secret agreements fail.
The second case study examines the role of a firm of international 
hydro-electric consultants in the establishment of a consortium of 
Swiss banks and heavy engineering organisations to initiate a major 
infrastructural project in the Transkei and the implications of the 
subsequent failure of the project in terms of its developmental objec­
tives. Specifically, it discusses how international firms may adjust 
their strategic approach to the internal political structure of South 
Africa by examining the Tsitsa Project in the Republic of Transkei 
which is totally dependent on South Africa and not recognised by any 
other country in the world, being regarded as an artificial creation 
of apartheid.
Thus, these two studies supplement the analysis of the preceding 
chapters by presenting a view of certain developmental problems facing 
South Africa and the difficulties facing the investing organisations 
in direct and practical terms, illustrating points of relevance with 
examples. As such the conclusions that may be drawn are clearly 
limited by the nature of the firms discussed. It is beyond the scope 
of this Appendix to determine the extent to which the issues high­
lighted exist and the degree to which they therefore have an effect 
on economic growth and development. The objective of the discussion 
is to merely attempt by means of a brief investigative study to high­
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light in practical terms the problems facing the enterprise operating 
in South Africa as well as the difficulties inherent in host countries 
accepting such involvement as a means of development.
Each case is based on information from a variety of sources including 
private documents, memoranda, inter- and intra-organisational commu­
nications and a limited number of interviews.
A.2 THE EFFECTS OF COLLUSION ON THE DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE OF THE FIRM 
IN SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM PROJECTS
This case extends Doz's approach to the determination of strategy by 
suggesting that it is possible for elements of the organisation's 
strategic approach to be externalised through the coordination of its 
activities with those of its competitors. (Doz, Y.L., 1980.) It is
argued that formal strategic coordination through the extension of 
internal strategies of integration to industry wide relations is of 
significance to the less developed world because of its potential 
impact on economic development.
One example of such externalisation lies in the formation of cartels. 
The ensuing paragraphs therefore examine the effects of two large 
international industrial cartels on South African economic development. 
The members of each cartel are faced by a highly complex technological 
environment with changing market requirements and high levels of
I
investment in capital and manpower with their concommitant political 
implications as regards employment and national prestige. Where the 
nature of the product results in a strategic approach based upon 
integration the pressure of uncertainty and the costs of competition 
may reinforce a desire to limit such costs and risks through agree­
ment. The international heavy electrical industry has, for example,
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reached such an agreement through the International Electrical Agency 
(lEA) based in Lausanne, and this cartel has been extremely effective 
in South Africa as will be demonstrated below.
The importance of the South African market is indicated by the fact 
that the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) alone will spend 
R14,000 m in 1981 monetary terms on new projects and variations of 
old projects over the next decade. The implications of this may be 
seen where one order for six 600 MW turbine generators placed with 
GEC was claimed to secure 8,500 jobs.
However, to compete in such a market requires not only a detailed 
knowledge of that market and its unique characteristics and technical 
requirements, but also a major investment in terms of long-term 
relationships with the purchasers and the need to consistently per­
form to a high level to remain on ESCOM's list of approved tenderers. 
The preparation and submission of tenders for major items of plant 
may be extremely expensive, costing in the case of Matimba, for 
example, in excess of R300,000.
The research and development costs for such contracts may also be 
expensive, not only in terms of the direct costs but also in terms 
of the costs of failure. This is well illustrated by cost of the 
failure of three out of four 500 MW turbine generator sets at Liddel 
in Australia, effectively reducing New South Wales* generating capa­
city by 25%.
Thus, the technical and market environments faced by the industry 
may be seen to encourage collusion.
The lEA is one of the few cartels in operation today which epitomises
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the classic cartel form;
a. it has survived intact since 1930 when it was 
founded, despite suspension during the war, to 
the present in much the same form;
b. it governs trade throughout the world in one 
branch of manufacturing - heavy electrical 
equipment - of great importance to economic 
developments ;
c. it includes virtually all of the industry's 
major competitors. In 1977 it was made up of 
fifty-five members from twelve countries, each 
belonging to one or more of ten product sections.
The lEA also embraces according to its basic 
agreement covering exports each of its members' 
associated companies and licensees insofar as
it can control them. (Table A.l)
The cartel, however, operates in the guise of a trade association with 
its main activities involving statistical and market research. Des­
pite the secretive nature of the lEA its secrecy has been breached 
on various occasions.
Most of what is known about the lEA before the war is contained in a 
Federal Trade Commission report published in 1948. (Federal Trade 
Commission, 1948.) In 1957 a British government report offered 
some further details on its operations while in 1965 Dr. Barbara 
Epstein, an economist working for the consultancy firm of Horace J.
De Podwin Associates, obtained a copy of the basic agreement covering
-  5 -
TABLE A.l MEMBERSHIP IN THE lEA, BY COUNTRY, 1936/38 AND 1977
Company Name lEACode 1936/38 1977
Germany
AEG 1 X X
Siemens 8 X X
J.M. Voith-Heidenheim  ̂ St. Poelten 41 X
J.M. Voith-Heidenheim 41 X
Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg (MAN) 18 X X
Kraftwerk Union 9 X
Transformatoren Union 7 X
Demag 27 X
Gutehoffnungshutte Oberhausen 28 X
Switzerland
Brown Boveri & Co. 3 X X
Maschinenfabrik Oerlikon 15 X (into 3)*
Escher Wyss Engineering 19 X X
Bell Maschinenfabrik 35 X
Ateliers de Secheron 34 X
Sprecher S Schuh 33 X
Ateliers des Chamielle 42 X
United Kingdom
General Electric Co. Ltd. 5 X X
English Electric Co. 4 X (into 5)*
British Thomson-Houston 2 X (into 5)*
Metropolitan-Vickers 7 X (into 5)*
Hackbridge Electric Construction Co. 21 X (into 5)*
Hewittic Electric Co. 24 X (into 5)*
C.A. Parsons Co. 11 X X
Bruce Peebles 5 Co. Ltd. 22 X
Parsons-Peebles 22 X
A. Reyrolle 5 Co. 13 X X
Ferranti 10 X X
Ferguson Parlin 12 X
British Electric Transformer Co. 20 X
Compton Parkinson 29 X
British Electric Engineering 30 X
Johnson S Phillips 49 X
Foster Engineering Co. Ltd. 50 X
Electric Furnace Co. Ltd. 51 X
Boving-Karlstads 40 X X
Walmsleys (Bury) Limited 53 X
Vickers-Armstrong Limited 54 X
Worthington Simpson Limited 55 X
Bryce Limited 56 X
The Mirrlees Watson Co. Ltd. 57 X
Hick, Hargreaves S Co. Ltd. 58 X
Hawker Siddeley 28 X
Bonar Long 89 X
Steatite  ̂ Porcelain Products 33 X
John Brown Engineering 94 X
/continued..
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TABLE A.l (..continued)
Company Name lEACode 1936/38 1977
Sweden
ASEA 14 X X





Société Générale d 'Applications
Electro-Thermique 
Société Générale de Constructions
52 X
Electriques et Mécaniques (Alsthom) 16 X
Alsthom-Savoisienne





Merlin Gerin 26 X
Neyrpic 43 X
SOGET (Société Rateau) 25 X
Italy
AMN Impianti Termici et Nucleari 53 X
ANSALDO Societa Generale Elettromeccanica 47 X
Fiat Termomeccanica e Turbogas 95 X
Riva Calzoni 45 X
Franco Tosi 46 X
Turbotechnica 98 X
GIE 97 X
I taltrafo 88 X
Industrie Elettriche di Legnano 32 X
Magrini Galileo 82 X
Ercole Marelli 67 X
Austria
Elin-Union AG fur Elektrische Industrie 31 X
J.M. Voith (St. Poelten) 49 (see 41)
Netherlands
Smit Transformatoren 83 X
Smit Slikkerveer n.a. X
Norway
National Industri 81 X
Kvaerner Brug 48 X
Finland








Canadian Porcelain 31 X
United States
International General Electric 6 X
Westinghouse Electric International 9 X
Ingersoll Rand Co. 25 X
Ohio Brass Co. 32 X
Country Unknown
Erste Bruner Machinen Fabrika 17 X
Japan
Hitachi Limited A X
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation B X
Toshiba Shibaura Electric Co. Ltd. C X
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. D X
Fuji Electric Co. Ltd. E X
Meidensha Electric Mfg. Company Ltd. F X
* "Into" refers to merger with another member whose code number is
indicated.
Source: Mirow, K.R.  ̂ Maurer, H ., 1982: pp 254-257.
Section H (Transformers) of the TEA, along with details on prices and 
sales in that Section. (Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commis­
sion, 1957; Epstein, B, 1971.) Five years later Kurt Mirow received 
agreements covering the operation of the cartel in Brazil which he 
used to demonstrate how foreign firms had eliminated indigenous 
Brazilian competition. (Mirow, K.R., 1977 and 1979.) In 1977 Dr. 
Richard Newfarmer, a development economist with Notre Dame University, 
obtained copies of the contracts covering nine lEA product sections 
and in 1980 together with Dr. Epstein prepared a report on the cartel 
for the Congressional Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 
(Epstein, B. and Newfarmer, R ., 1980.) In 1979, however, there was
a major leak to Kurt Mirow of various documents. Despite these 
occasional leaks very little has been forthcoming concerning the 
effects of the lEA on South Africa. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
consider the potential developmental implications of such cartels 
in some detai1.
A. The Developmental Implications
In an interview with the South African Sunday Times on the 18th 
October 1981, following allegations of price rigging by foreign firms 
supplying equipment to ESCOM, ESCOM's Chairman denied the possible 
existence of a cartel. However, shortly afterwards he contradicted 
this in a second interview by stating:
"While there are reasons which tend to strengthen 
the belief that such cartels existed or still 
exist this effectiveness as regards ESCOM is 
doubted." (J.H. Smith, Chairman, ESCOM)
IVhen further questioned as to why ESCOM had failed to act against the 
lEA, it was argued that because of its awareness of prices in other 
countries and constant vigilance to obtain the best prices, ESCOM was 
convinced that prices were fair and obtained in a free market. This, 
however, tends to belie the facts:
a. The researcher was informed by senior members of
ESCOM that the existence of the cartel was discussed 
at both Tender Board and Management meetings. In 
addition certain members of ESCOM had, for various 
reasons, been informed directly of the existence of 
the cartel.
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b. The difficulties of making price comparisons under 
normal circumstances are legion. Where these are 
compounded by the existence of possible price 
distortions the accuracy of such comparisons must 
be extremely suspect.
c. Even if ESCOM had wished to there is little action 
it could take against the cartel. Only the Saudi 
Arabian government has to date made any positive 
attempt to overcome the effects of the lEA, when 
bids for transformers, power lines, diesel generating 
sets and switchgear ranged from two to four times the 
independent price estimates. The power of the lEA 
cartel may be further seen by reference to its 
effectiveness in such countries as Brazil. To admit 
to an inability to act would be politically 
embarrassing.
In addition, the evidence and available documentation directly contra­
dicts such a statement. Essentially, members of the cartel have 
concluded agreements aimed at neutralising smaller manufacturers and 
then at artificially raising their profits on export projects by 
between 16 and 62 percent, depending on the target country. The 
cartel further ensures that major contracts are equitably distributed 
among its members.
In terms of various secret agreements it is arranged in advance what 
tender prices are to be, who is to be put in the most favourable 
position to win the contract and how losing members are to be compen­
sated. In communications from the lEA headquarters in Lausanne
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members are referred to by code numbers and letters (Japanese members). 
The Sunday Times showed this in relation to contracts for Mat la power 
station, the Hendrik Verwoerd and Van der Kloof hydro-electric project 
and the Drakensberg Pumped Storage Scheme. (Sunday Times, Op.Cit.)
Despite having to make a series of low price tenders in the mid-1960's 
to overcome competition by non-members, cartel members were able to 
win tenders for transformers in South Africa at prices nearly 20% 
above that they would have made without them.
One cartel report lists eleven South African tenders for transformers 
awarded to cartel members between May 1965 and December 1967. In two 
cases the cartel submitted only one tender raising the prices to 113 
percent and 121 percent of their reference prices. This list indicates 
that when the cartel was functioning it was able to raise its prices 
by as much as 50 percent.
All product sections covered by the lEA have extremely detailed tender­
ing and contract agreements to reduce the risk of contracts being 
awarded to non-designated "winners". Copies of the agreements still 
effective in 1976 are included in the documents obtained by the 
American Congressional Investigators. Terms differ between each 
Agreement but include, for example,
a. the fixing of prices at regular meetings in
so-called "price-handbooks";
b. inflation and escalation clauses which are 
dealt with in terms of fixed multipliers;
c . market share allocations which are fixed in
terms of a predetermined table and which
11
require the Secretary General to ensure that 
tenders are allocated accordingly;
d . terms for delivery, payment and guarantees
which are fixed by standard section agreement 
so that members cannot compete on that level.
Thus, members of Section E, for example, are committed to strict price 
discipline. Tenders are allocated by agreement to ensure each member 
receives a predetermined share. The secretariat then determines who 
is entitled to the next tender and members are obliged to bid at 
higher levels. Firms which do not win the tender are compensated. 
Usually 2 percent of the contract price is placed in a pool for dis­
tribution at the end of each year according to the contract alloca­
tions that preceded it.
While the developmental implications of this cartel are clear it is 
important to examine them before considering the direct effects of a 
similar cartel on a major South African service organisation and the 
nature of the strategic-developmental interaction.
(i) Development costs
Examples of the effects of the lEA cartel on direct contract costs 
are listed in the preceding paragraphs. In major projects where costs 
are raised in a manner determined by industry agreement rather than by 
the market itself, infrastructural development costs are raised signi­
ficantly. While South African expenditure on major projects will, as 
stated, amount to R14,000 m over the next decade, only one third of 
this will be spent on equipment abroad. However, it is necessary to 
recognise that even the domestic element of this will be subject to
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substantial cartel control through the control of members of the 
local industry and agreements covering subsidiaries and licencees.
In other countries the entire industry has been brought under 
foreign control with its consequent implications for price control.
The effects, therefore, on the costs of development are significant 
and serve to indicate the manner in which the development gap between 
North and South is artificially entrenched, particularly when the 
discriminatory pricing practices of the cartel are examined in detail. 
Such an analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this Appendix.
(ii) Technology transfer
The effects on technology transfer are more difficult to assess.
IVhile it may be argued that it is logical for an inverse relationship 
to exist between the degree of collusion and effective research and 
development, it is more difficult to prove in fact. As stated in 
the opening paragraphs of this Appendix, these cases suggest a number 
of areas in which further study would be fruitful. An investigation 
into this aspect could examine equipment failure such as that at 
Liddel and relate this to the available documentation to determine if 
there is a relationship between the operation of agreements covering 
Section B and the supply of new untried equipment to industrialising 
nations. Such a study would to a large extent, therefore, be based 
on the assessment of the extent to which purchasers are faced by 
effective market choice.
(iii) Market effects
ESCOM, following until recently the policy of the State Tender Board, 
when embarking on large projects or purchasing large items of plant
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invited contractors on its approved list of tenderers to submit ten­
ders for particular projects. In recent years several contracts 
have been made the subject of tender by negotiation for reasons of 
poor anticipation of demand and management failures leading to brown- 
and black-outs requiring a rapid expansion in generating capacity.
This is at present the subject of governmental investigations which 
have recommended the suspension of ESCOM's chairman's executive role.
The operation of the cartel, however, removes the essential purchas­
ing decision from the buyer and makes it the subject of inter-company 
negotiation in Lausanne, where organisational factors other than the 
particular interests and requirements of purchasing countries form 
the basis of the final decision. The extent to which these agreements 
may then be monitored is formidable. The researcher was informed that 
a number of the major contractors including certain ones of Japanese 
origin have extremely effective intelligence sources in operation 
within ESCOM, The exclusion of particular firms from tendering has 
been discussed in meetings of the Tender Board as a result of ESCOM 
becoming aware of this.
The result in the case of South Africa, therefore, is to effectively 
remove the purchasing decision from the buyer and place it in the 
hands of a series of firms whose objectives may not may not coincide 
with those of the purchaser, and which base contract allocation deci­
sions on intra-organisational perceptions of the relationship between 
the nature of the market and their own requirements.
While the discussion has suggested a direct relationship between the 
activities of cartels and their particular developmental implications, 
the nature of the developmental interaction is more complex operating
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through the purchasing organisation and affecting its effectiveness.
It is therefore useful to examine the potential organisational effects 
on the purchaser. The ensuing paragraphs discuss the effects of a 
second, though less stable, international industrial cartel on a South 
African state managed industry (SASMI) at present involved in the 
purchase of plant to meet both consumer and industrial demand.
SASMI, following set purchasing procedures based upon technical, finan­
cial and performance criteria but also including, given the political 
antipathy to South Africa abroad, political risk variables, invited 
tenders for six projects. The contract for the first project was, 
however, awarded to a tenderer other than the one appointed by the 
cartel agreement. Information from within SASMI indicated to the 
unsuccessful tenderer (Vendor A) that this contract had been awarded 
elsewhere despite it submitting the offer with the lowest net present 
value - a major decision variable in the adjudication procedure.
During meetings between the Chief Executive of SASMI and the Chairman 
of Vendor A in September 1974 they discussed what occurred. In 
November 1974 an enquiry for Project B was issued and between February 
and March 1975 SASMI's Chief Executive went abroad. During this trip 
he had discussions with the Chairman of Vendor A in the home country 
of the cartel on the award of the second contract for plant and 
equipment (Project B).
Documents which have been made available to the researcher clarify 
how SASMI's purchasing procedures and safeguards were bypassed as a 
result of an agreement whereby in future Vendor A would receive more 
favourable consideration in exchange for certain material benefits
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accruing to the Chief Executive of SASMI. This was achieved by various 
means. For example:
a. By utilising inflation indices within the standard 
escalation rates applied during the adjudication 
that would favour any country where material and 
labour indices lag behind consumer indices;
b. Accepting that export credit guarantees could be 
obtained which would include partial insurance 
for exporters of capital goods against home 
country inflation on fixed-price contracts despite 
this being received during the adjudication process 
and not yet having been approved by the home 
country’s legislature. This was to some extent a 
result of;
c. The leaking of confidential information during 
the adjudication.
IVhile a detailed examination of the organisational elements aspects of 
this are of considerable interest, such a discussion is clearly beyond 
the brief of this dissertation. Nevertheless, its effects on SASMI 
are of importance:
a. Purchasing decisions: The question of the alloca­
tion of contracts by sellers and their monitoring 
through information sources within the firm removes 
the effective purchasing decision from SASMI itself.
This has been discussed in relation to ESCOM and 
will, therefore, not be examined in detail here.
-  16 -
b. Ethics: Where cartels exist in secret and fail,
as in SASMI’s case, to achieve their desired 
objective, it would appear that there is a strong 
temptation to resort to various questionable 
business practices to secure the desired objectives. 
This applies particularly at a time when there exists 
considerable surplus capacity. It is more difficult 
to assess the firm's response to a situation as 
represented by SASMI's Chief Executive who was 
prepared to accept a consideration for his support
of a particular supplier. The consequences of this 
in a country where such practices are considered 
totally unacceptable for a combination of national­
istic and religious reasons are manifold, apart from 
the willingness to subvert this to achieve corporate 
goals.
c. Organisational Morale : As a result of the manipula­
tion of buying procedures within SASMI and the 
unsuccessful challenging of this by members of the 
organisation in various meetings, morale fell within 
the firm and SASMI faced extreme management dissatis­
faction and the departure of certain members of its 
senior management structure.
d. Faulty Equipment: As a result of this intervention
equipment purchased for a subsequent project failed 
in operation. Despite initial fears as regards its 
quality it was nevertheless purchased.
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e. Market l'ai lure: I-ol lowing further intervention in
the purchasing procedures SASMI for the first time 
in its history consistently failed to meet demand 
for its product. The strategic importance of this 
product has led to political intervention through 
the office of the South African Prime Minister as 
a result of the government's concern of the effects 
of this failure on South Africa's future economic 
growth.
B. The Strategic-Developmental Interaction
The nature of the products in the heavy electrical industry with their 
high levels of technology, capital and manpower in addition to their 
role as national industries leads, as Doz points out, to strategic 
integration. (Doz, Y.L., 1980.)
This case extends this by suggesting that through such strategic 
integration it is possible for firms to externalise elements of their 
strategies by means of strategic coordination through, for example, 
cartels. The benefits such firms derive from these agreements depend 
on such factors as their negotiating skills which lead such interac­
tions to further become inputs into the strategic planning process.
While this case refers to formal coordination it has much in common 
with the ensuing study in terms of its developmental implications.
While in the next study firms adopt similar strategic postures because 
of the nature of the particular circumstances in which they are 
operating, both are concerned with specific projects of limited 
time horizons. While in the next study this is limited to one project.
1 '
SASMI and ESCOM's expansion programmes follow a series of discrete 
projects each of a similar time period. In the case, however, of 
contracts subject to agreement uncertainty as to competition is 
reduced substantially.
The major determinant of the nature of the developmental contribu­
tion would therefore appear to be the period of involvement. While 
the discussion of the preceding chapters would indicate that the con­
tribution to development of direct investment in, for example, manu­
facturing such as that undertaken by the Chloride Group results in 
an inherent politicisation process, these cases would suggest that 
where firms are involved for shorter periods of time with activities 
directed from home country or head office they are able to avoid 
this. However, it is important to emphasise the nature of the 
product at this stage. The General Electric Company, for example, 
with its wide product range follows a strategy of integration as 
regards its Turbine Division while in relation to its consumer 
products it follows a strategy more in line with that of any manu­
facturing industry.
Therefore, on the basis of the analysis of the preceding case, it is 
possible to argue that the developmental contribution lies in the 
contribution to economic growth alone as an element of development 
as defined in this dissertation. The extent to which firms contri­
bute to such growth cannot as argued be assessed in any comprehensive 
analytical framework but only as argued in relation to the relevance 
of neo-classical models on the basis of the merits of each case 
taken on its own. This would suggest that in the situations taken 
above the developmental contribution was limited. Nevertheless, each
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case would require further study and by their very nature serve only 
to indicate the nature of the strategic-developmental interaction in 
direct terms on the basis of independent research,
A.3 THE DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FIRMS
A. Introduction
The relation between the strategy adopted by one firm and the impli­
cations of this on such dependent developmental variables as, for 
example, technology transfer, the flow of funds or the reduction of 
dependency may be relatively straightforward. Such analysis, however, 
becomes more complex when the relationship between strategy and role 
of a number of firms each mutually interdependent for the successful 
conclusions of a commercial undertaking or project is considered.
The case under consideration examines the relationship between the 
strategies and roles of a firm of international hydrological consul­
tants based in South Africa and a consortium of Swiss banks and heavy 
engineering firms. It argues that the strategies of those involved 
did not lead to the ultimate failure of the project in terms of its 
developmental objectives. Rather, it is suggested, the inherent 
organisational ethos leading to the adoption of the particular strategy 
and the role so determined led to the rejection of a major developmen­
tal opportunity by the government concerned.
Essentially the case has four objectives;
a. to consider how service as opposed to the
manufacturing industries examined in preceding 
chapters, may adapt their strategies to particular
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situations from which they wish to extract a 
commercial advantage;
b. to demonstrate the complexity of a major 
developmental project with significant politi­
cal as well as technical implications;
c. to examine how firms may coordinate their 
differing strategies to achieve what they 
perceive to be a mutually beneficial goal.
d. to suggest how firms may respond to a single 
project covering a limited period of time 
rather than, as in previous chapters, a 
continued commitment to an investment project.
To achieve this the discussion takes place under three headings, each 
in turn considering the strategic element, the developmental element 
and the role of the participants in the development of the state as 
a result of the interaction of the two.
B. The Developmental Implications of the Project
On the 26th October 1976 the Transkei attained independence from the 
Republic of South Africa with decision-making centralised in Umtata 
in a parliament under the premiership of Chief Kaiser Matanzima and 
comprising both traditional cheifs and representatives elected by 
universal suffrage.
The Republic of Transkei is nevertheless, in terms of Strom's criteria, 
totally economically and politically dependent on South Africa. In 
addition, it is not formally recognised by any other country as it is
-  21 -
-  22 -
h-
to ■H 0 O
0 0 c 0
o 0 3 0 c 0 X
4-> E 0 c 0
u 5h •H X E 0 •H
O Cl 03 0 E r-H
CL 0 CL > to ■H
CÛ 0 (3 to 3 3
■p T3 O ( 0 O 0 ■rH
ÛÛ 0 O > to 0 3
2 Cl c c to 0
DC O •H 0 0 0 •H oS Cl
CM c u C 0 0
L0 o 0 c 0 X
to o3 CL E 03 o3 to 0P 0 Cl X 0 E 13 o 0 c OJ
•rH ■0 0 to to 03 O O c ■H 0 3
DC +-> •M 0 0 33 c *r4 0 C3 •H O
O c •H Cl c > o 0 c OS 3 0 •H
0 c 03 3 0 C E 0 03 o •H •H 0
E D 0 o E C 0 C 0 0 C t 0 3
in X +-> 3 3 X 0 u C o 0 3
LU o Cl C o3 03 0 3 0 c 0 to 0 0 • rH 3 3
Z o 3 3 Cl C 1 on 0 0 3 3 0 0 to X 0
UJ CL CL 0 03 DC • fH c •H on o 0 1 r—1 0E CL 0 (3 CL c 0 * H 0 3 CL 3 0 CL 3
G 0 O 0 O 0 o 0 •H O 0 3 CL ■H
CO 0 3 o 0 c Cl c O 0 3
0 3 0 3 0 3 C 0 03 t 0 3 03 0 3 o to Cl to to 0 3
LU 0 0 (3 O 0 0 T3 3 3 0 C • rL CL CL 0
CL to to 03 •H (3 0 Cl 03 Cl 3 Cl 0 o I— H Cl to
LU Cl oS 03 0 03 > 0 Cl o 0 0 03 Cl Cl 03 0 0 a
—1 0  0 0 0 t—1 C o 0 3 CL 0 on 0 0 CL 130 0
LU Cl 3 03 OÛ Cl o3 O CL 3 03 •H on X 0 03 •H 3
CL O  0 0 0 3 J 3 ■H CL 0 > o 0 0 Cl 3 u on Cl 0 0 0
LU CL C c 33 0 0 E Cl 03 •H Cl Cl 0 a Cl 03 3 3 to 3-J (3 w CO DC Cl C3 LU Cl ID z 0 Cl U 0
< o3 o on 3 Cl










o  - oO  -M 
0) Lh
cLw O
o  oIc ̂O  r-H
• H  CD 












3 N • H
03 E 0










> 3 3 O
3 • H C L
H 3 0 X
U 0 3 0
0 0
"O) O 0 03






o  c  cu tu 
X  a ,
CD 0  
T 3
î-̂3 X  O W) J3
03 0









0 3  C  0 O 
0  -H C -M 
0to 3 
to 0 3  0 0 -J DC
- 23 -
regarded internationally as being a creation of South Africa's 
Bantustan policy; when raising capital abroad it is dependent on 
South African Reserve Bank guarantees, and it remains part of the 
Rand monetary area. Thus, the Transkei is in the anomolous situa­
tion of being politically independent with full political self- 
determination and expression but only as regards South Africa on 
which it is totally dependent.
Following the granting of independence the South African government 
undertook to assist the Transkei in its development and accordingly 
the Department of Water Affairs was directed to carry out a hydrolo­
gical study of the rivers in the Transkei with a view to establishing 
the degree to which its hydro-electric potential could be exploited. 
Various work studies had been undertaken in previous years. These 
may be divided into two groups:
a. those dealing with the export of excess electricity 
from the Transkei to South Africa;
b. those dealing with the supply of local demand in the 
Transkei.
The Department of Water Affairs duly appointed Henry Olivier and 
Associates, a firm of international hydrological consultants, to 
carry out the study on their behalf. On completion of this study it 
was recommended that a project at the Tsitsa Falls and Malepelepe 
which would result in the export of electricity to South Africa be 
undertaken. However, the results of this study were not published 
and the Secretary of Water Affairs and Dr. H. Olivier then met in 
Switzerland to assist in the establishment of a consortium of suppliers 
to undertake the project despite this not lying within the terms of
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their brief. This consortium then arranged finance with a group of
Swiss banks including Credit Suisse and the Union Bank of Switzerland.
The objectives of the Tsitsa and Malepelepe Schemes were set out by 
the members of the consortium in a meeting with the Director of Works 
of the Transkei in November 1978. These were stated to be as follows;
"The objective is clear, and is to exploit the hydro­
electric potential of the Umzimvubu and adjacent
rivers in four phases over a period of time and sell
the electricity to the Republic of South Africa at a 
tariff that will encourage them to buy it and at the 
same time give a substantial income to the Transkei."
It was emphasised that:
"The alternative is to leave matters as they are in 
which case the Transkei will not earn an income 
from a renewable energy source, not take an important 
step towards industrialisation, risk crop failure 
during possible droughts and lose other material 
advantages."
The developmental implications, however, go beyond the relatively 
straightforward objectives listed during this meeting. Significantly, 
they include both an economic and political element. See Figure A.2. 
These may be listed under five headings:
a. Employment:
Such a project would increase the limited employment 
opportunities within the Transkei with its concommit- 
ant implications for the squatter problem at Nyanga
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thereby reducing the pressure on tlie government 
following the deportation of squatters from South 
Africa,
b. Manpower Development:
The project would also serve to raise level of 
skills and technical training of the workforce 
employed on each site.
c . Energy Independence:
The Transkei would no longer be totally dependent 
on the South African ESCOM for its electricity 
supply.
d. Prestige/Confidence:
By demonstrating that it could undertake such a 
project the Transkei would increase internal con­
fidence in its economic standing and force those 
of its detractors who felt that as a state it was 
not economically viable to at least reconsider 
their position.
e. International Economic Involvement:
Such a project would serve to indicate to other 
firms and suppliers that opportunities existed in 
the Transkei and serve to attract greater interna­
tional involvement in the economy. This would 
perhaps also secure certain political benefits.
These reasons explain the involvement of Prime Minister Matanzima 
in the scheme from its inception in January 1975. At this point the
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scheme was totally dependent on the willingness of ESCOM to purchase 
2.3% of its requirements from the Transkei on the terms offered. 
Initially, therefore, ESCOM was approached with a view to convincing 
its chairman of the viability of the project. However, a number of 
factors mitigated against this despite ESCOM being specifically 
charged under Section 4(1)(h) of the Electricity Act, 1958 with "the 
investigation of new or additional facilities for the supply of elec­
tricity within any area and the coordination of existing undertakings 
so as to stimulate the provision, wherever required, of a cheap and 
abundant supply of electricity". ESCOM's objections reflected on the 
feasibility of the project as proposed by Henry Olivier and Associates 
and the Consortium.
a. ESCOM rejected the project as uneconomic because 
of the rate of return required by the Transkei.
ESCOM felt that it could provide the equivalent 
supply from other alternatives as cheaply, if not 
more cheaply, as the Transkei given that under its 
constitution as a public utility it merely had to 
cover costs and not aim to achieve a specific rate 
of return.
b. Based on its experience of the Drakensberg Pumped 
Storage Scheme, where adverse geological conditions 
raised the development costs significantly, ESCOM 
felt that the consortium had seriously underestimated 
the costs and took issue with both the estimates of 
capital costs and the projected tariffs based 
partly on these.
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c. ESCOM has its own operating procedures which would 
have entailed the Transkei adopting similar pro­
cedures thereby losing independence of operation.
d. Within ESCOM itself the Design and Construction 
Department wished to give precedence to other 
schemes, the ideas for which had been developed 
internally such as, for example, that at Cape 
Hangklip.
Despite these objections which, as will be demonstrated, could have 
been overcome by the establishment of more realistic cost and tariff 
projections and by persuading the South African government that such 
a project was in its political interests in terms of Prime Minister 
Botha’s concept of a "constellation of States" and demonstrating the 
viability of its homeland policy, Henry Olivier and Associates decided 
to continue pressing for the scheme as set out in their unpublished 
recommendations.
C. The Strategic Approach
The ensuing paragraphs examine the strategic responses of the main 
participants in the project to the political and economic imperatives 
engendered by the proposals. It is suggested that the participants 
made a series of limited adjustments in response to specific develop­
ments such as, for example, the scepticism by ESCOM without attempting 
to integrate these adjustments into a consistent cohesive strategy.
The strategic approach adopted with its lack of a stable pro-active 
stance may be described as one of administrative coordination. While 
this section concentrates on the roles and strategies of the individ­
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ual participants it is useful to consider the basic determinants of 
the strategy adopted:
(i) Market structure
The world market for power generating equipment and associated civil 
works is, as was demonstrated in the preceding case study, highly 
competitive with many firms retaining high levels of surplus capacity 
In addition, the number of such projects that may be undertaken by 
the Transkei is limited by its size as well as its financial and 
economic resources and the willingness of South Africa to purchase 
any surplus electricity generated. Thus, to retain control of such a 
project through advising both the purchasers and the contracting con­
sortium could lead to significant benefits to the consultants in
terms of continuity of work in a depressed market and fees.
(ii) Technology
The technology for such a project is well know internationally. Many 
developing nations such as the Transkei, however, are totally depen­
dent on consultants or external advice for detailed economic assess­
ments, hydrological and geological surveys, project management and 
the training of technicians in appropriate operating and maintenance 
procedures. The Transkei was totally dependent on the advice of 
Henry Olivier and Associates who could not only meet these technical 
requirements but facilitate operations through their detailed know­
ledge of local conditions.
(iii) Political constraints
Political constraints on the freedom of operation of the consortium 
arose in two ways. Firstly, the Swiss government, while accepting
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the participation of Swiss firms in the project, would not accept 
financial guarantees from a state it did not recognise and required 
these to be obtained from the South African government. Secondly, 
the Swiss government insisted on secrecy "for political reasons".
Despite their unwillingness, the South Africans nevertheless agreed 
to provide the requisite guarantees subject to certain conditions. 
These included an assessment of the project and its alternatives by 
the Department of Water Affairs and ESCOM. This implied that not 
only did the Transkeian government have to accept the proposals, 
which it did, but experts in South Africa had to be convinced. The 
then Secretary for Water Affairs, Dr. Kriel, who had helped establish 
the consortium, was clearly in favour although ESCOM had already 
indicated informally that it was not because of the objections out­
lined above.
Having listed the significant strategic determinants it is possible 
to examine the roles and strategies of those involved.
It may be argued that the first of these. Dr. J. Kriel, failed in his 
duties in not publishing the report and exceeded his brief in going 
to Switzerland to assist in the establishment of a consortium of 
suppliers to undertake the project. He had been directed to advise 
the Transkei government on the hydro-electric potential of its rivers 
and not to initiate any project or without tender establish who 
should undertake the scheme.
It is, however, the role of Henry Olivier and Associates and Dr. 
Olivier which is of greater interest. As suggested, the strategy 
adopted by this firm was one of administrative coordination. This
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survey was seen to provide a unique opportunity to propose a major 
project and put it into effect by acting as its promoter and as 
intermediary between the governments concerned and the consortium.
Thus, a consortium consisting of Escher Wyss, Brown Boveri, Credit 
Suisse and the Union Bank of Switzerland were brought together to 
provide the necessary finance and implement the project. Henry 
Olivier and Associates' objective then became the implementation of 
the project.
The first significant obstacle to this was, as indicated, political, 
when the Swiss government required financial guarantees from South 
Africa. Henry Olivier and Associates found themselves in the position 
of having to cooperate with South Africa more closely and convince 
ESCOM at two levels - as potential purchaser and as assessor.
Their response to ESCOM's objections to the project was to call for 
independent verification of the initial cost estimates. These were 
verified as falling within an acceptable margin of error by Energy 
Consulting Services. This firm had, however, been directed towards 
Brown Boveri and Escher Wyss by Dr. Olivier and these companies had 
in effect simply confirmed their original estimates.
The researcher could not find any other evidence to suggest that 
Henry Olivier and Associates had attempted to answer any of ESCOM's 
other objections. However, the evidence would seem to indicate that 
they were relying on the nature of the political relations between 
the two countries to result in the South African government directing 
ESCOM to purchase surplus power from the Transkei.
It is also possible that a disagreement between ESCOM and the Secretary
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of Water Affairs could liavc been used to advantage prior to Dr.
Kriel’s retirement.
The strategy adopted as regards the political imperative indicates 
various adjustments to a series of unplanned changes in the environ­
ment .
The second obstacle was commercial and ethical in nature and resulted 
from the role conflict that Henry Olivier and Associates found itself 
in. The firm were in effect advising the adoption of the Tsitsa 
Scheme as consultants to the Department of Water Affairs while at the 
same time acting as project promoters for their own benefit.
This conflict emerged clearly in the formal report on the project 
when in his summing-up Dr. Olivier did not comment on an offer by a 
French consortium led by Spie Batiquoles: Dr. Olivier argued that
the report had been "received too late in the day to be considered" 
and also as South Africans they "had to be careful not to be seen to 
be meddling in the Transkei's affairs".
The French consortium managed to obtain the required information to 
submit an offer which appeared to be clearly more attractive than 
that of the Swiss. To ensure that this offer was not overlooked the 
French consortium sent copies of it under covering letters to the 
Transkeian and South African governments. As a result of sustained 
pressure an additional report was submitted on the French offer.
By this time, however. Dr. Olivier had ensured the success of the 
Swiss offer by taking the unusual step in terms of South African and 
Transkeian state contracts of arranging for the offer to be by nego­
tiation rather than tender as is the norm in other than exceptional 
ci rcumstances.
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These responses reflect Dr. Olivier's desire for short-term strategic 
flexibility in developing his response to changes in the nature of 
the political and competitive parameters reflected in changing 
emphases on the political and economic imperatives. This will be 
further commented on below. However, it is necessary to finally con­
sider the actions of the members of the consortium.
The Union Bank of Switzerland, perhaps recognising that a smaller 
scheme might be more appropriate, offered finance for two smaller 
schemes on the Mbashe River which were being investigated by the Swiss 
firm of Motor Columbus. It thereby placed itself in a position to 
exploit either scheme despite the fact that together with Credit Suisse 
it was placing pressure on the government of the Transkei to issue a 
statement of intent by December 1978 by threatening to withdraw their 
offer of finance if such a statement was not forthcoming.
At the same time Credit Suisse, through their representative in South 
Africa, Dr. P.G. Eggstein, were attempting to have Electrowatt Indus­
tries appointed as consulting engineers for the scheme before the end 
of 1978. This would have implied:
a. acceptance of the project;
b. loss of control of the project by the Transkei to 
Swiss consultants chosen by a Swiss banking consor­
tium to administer the activities of Swiss contract­
ors all directed by Henry Olivier and Associates.
At the time of writing the project had not yet been implemented and 
the Transkei, finding itself in an impossibly convoluted situation 
not knowing how to proceed, appointed a firm of South African consulting 
engineers - Watermeyer, Legge, Picshold and Uhlman - to advise them.
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L) ■ The Strategic-Developmental Interaction
This case demonstrates clearly the difficulty of applying the tradi­
tional forms of neo-classical analysis to assess the developmental 
contribution of such firms operating within these unusual economic 
and political parameters. The role played must, as argued in Chapter 
Four, be analysed within the unique constraints of the situation 
itself. To this end it is useful to consider the strategic-developmental 




(i) The Economic Imperative
Each participant, although not formally coordinating their strategic 
approach to the proposed project, attempted to retain maximum strategic 
flexibility within the parameters of the control economic objectives - 
the implementation of the project within the desired time constraints.
It is, however, in the determination of the most advantageous time 
horizon for the project that significant differences in approach 
occur. While the members of the consortium wished for a statement of 
intent by December 1978, Henry Olivier and Associates wished to extend 
this for reasons listed in the preceding paragraphs. Given the market 
structure and technical requirements of the project, control of the 
project had to be secured. Their position as consultants enabled 
them to act not only as "independent advisors" to the governments 
concerned but also as promoters of their own interests. This facili­
tated the arrangement of an offer by negotiation and the pressing
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for the Tsitsa and Malepclcpc Scheme.
It may, therefore, be argued that the strategic approach adopted was 
determined firstly by the inherent ethos of the firm and the ethical 
parameters within which it was prepared to operate in order to achieve 
its objective, given the nature of the economic imperative once the 
project had been perceived to be a single opportunity given the limi­
tations on the size and resources of the Transkei.
(ii) The Political Imperative
The unique nature of the political relationship existing between the 
Transkei and South Africa determined the nature of the response to 
the political imperative. The structuring of relations between the 
two governments and the interaction between them and Henry Olivier 
and Associates required an ability to react and adapt rapidly, parti­
cularly as the roles of each had not been determined prior to the 
Swiss rejection of Transkeian financial guarantees immediately 
following independence. Nevertheless, it was the political situation 
that created the opportunity. Thus, while the major emphasis of the 
strategic approach adopted focused on the economic imperative the 
firms were forced to retain an ability to respond to significant 
changes in the political and economic parameters within which strategy 
was determined.
(iii) The Developmental Contribution
The lack of consideration of the developmental objectives of the 
project other than in meetings with representatives of the Transkei 
government reflects the importance of the distinction between the 
Involvement of manufacturing organisations such as, for example,
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those interviewed in Chapter Six and international service organisa­
tions such as Henry Olivier and Associates.
The first aspect of this to be considered is the time factor. In 
many countries the level of economic development in conjunction with 
the nature of the project may be seen by consultants to imply that 
they may be involved for a short time only in the development of the 
country. Consequently, they may lack the social, economic and devel­
opmental commitment of manufacturing organisations with a longer 
time horizon for its involvement. The relationship with the host 
country therefore becomes exploitative, reflecting the desire to 
obtain the maximum benefit over the life of the particular project 
withdrawing upon its conclusion. To this extent the pursuit of the 
economic imperative determines the nature of the business practices 
adopted and the developmental contribution.
It should not, therefore, be assumed that benefits automatically flow 
from the involvement of the firm. IVhile developmental benefits 
including those of a socio-political nature may flow, as argued in 
preceding chapters, from the long-term foreign direct investment 
commitment of a firm to the host country, the benefits from such 
short-term commitments, only arise to the extent to which they con­
tribute to economic growth alone through the project itself.
Thus, in the case of the Tsitsa and Malepelepe Scheme few developmen­
tal benefits could be expected to flow from the firms themselves. 
Rather, the developmental contribution was determined by the extent 
to which the government of the Transkei could determine what it 
required from the project and direct those involved to that goal. 
However, it was frustrated by political factors as well as a lack of
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technical and management expertise in addition to its inherent depen 
dence on South Africa. Botswana and Lesotho are at present involved 
in two projects which include participation by many of the firms dis 
cussed in this study. Events to date suggest a number of parallels.
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